AUSTRALIA AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
AUS-CSCAP NEWSLETTER NO 8                                                                   APRIL 1999

At the 10th Steering Committee meeting in Manila, December 1998 it was decided that the Europeans be accepted as the newest member of CSCAP. AUS-CSCAP would like to welcome the European Union as a full member and look forward to their valuable contributions to CSCAP issues.

A CSCAP web site has been established. The responsibility for setting up and maintaining it coming to the Australian Committee. The site will link a home page to the various International Committees and Working Groups, and also to other related sites. It is in its preview stage at present and will be fully operational by the second half of the year. The address will appear in the next edition of the newsletter.

The 12th edition of the Regional Security Calendar is available from the CSCAP office, or visit it on the World Wide Web at: http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/SDSC/APSecurityTop.html. Contributions are welcome at any time as the calendar is constantly being updated.

Lesley McCulloch
Executive Officer, AUS-CSCAP
 

A sudden transition to democracy would almost certainly create more problems than it solves. The East Timorese simply do not have the skills or resources to take control of their own affairs in such a short time period without putting at risk the very independence and freedom they have fought so long to achieve. In theory, Indonesia could wash its hands of East Timor entirely as many in the Jakarta elite are now arguing. But a policy of studied indifference or benign neglect is hardly a promising formula for a constructive relationship with a new East Timorese state. The reality is that Indonesia cannot quarantine itself from events in East Timor. Continuing political instability among the East Timorese would inevitably spread into adjacent Indonesian West Timor and probably beyond. The two most likely sources of instability are divisions within the indigenous East Timorese population, and between the East Timorese and the Javanese and Buginese migrant communities that have established themselves in the province over the past two decades.

It is often erroneously assumed that the majority of East Timorese are in favour of independence. But there is ample evidence to suggest that a great many East Timorese are yet to be convinced that independence is their best alternative. A small, but committed minority of ‘integrationists’ are vehemently opposed to severing ties with Indonesia. Unless these diametrically opposed views can be reconciled then further bloodshed and even civil war cannot be ruled out. Tensions between the Christian majority East Timorese and Muslim Javanese and Buginese transmigrants have already resulted in several outbreaks of violence and killings in recent years. If anti-Muslim pogroms were to occur in the lead up to independence, or after East Timor assumed statehood, public opinion in Indonesia would almost certainly force Jakarta to respond vigorously.

A chronically weak state on its doorstep could provide precisely the kind of opportunities for external power influence and intervention that Jakarta has long feared and which largely precipitated its decision to invade East Timor in 1975. There is also the risk that East Timor, like many of the micro island states of the Pacific and the Caribbean, could become a haven for criminal elements trafficking in drugs, illegal migrants and a conduit for money laundering activities. For all these reasons and more, Indonesia must now begin to craft the elements of a new long term policy of engagement with East Timor that protects its vital national interests but allows an independent East Timor sufficient geo-political space to pursue its own affairs free of coercion or undue outside influence.

First, Jakarta must allow the East Timorese to decide their own future. To simply declare that East Timor is no longer part of Indonesia by a vote in the Indonesian parliament, denies a future East Timorese administration the political legitimacy which only an act of free choice can provide. Second, if East Timor chooses independence Indonesia should support a transition period of no less than three years and preferably five. This is the minimum period that a new government in Dili would need to establish itself and to begin what will be a long and difficult process of reconciling the nascent country’s divergent political, ethnic and religious interests. Third, Indonesia needs to take concrete steps to ameliorate the distrust and hostility that have built up over 25 years of Indonesian occupation of the province. Indonesia has a unique understanding of East Timor and is well placed to contribute to its future economic and political growth. A bilateral framework agreement addressing areas for future cooperation would be seen as a positive gesture by East Timor and a tangible sign that Indonesia is prepared to consider a mutually beneficial partnership for the 21^st century. Fourth, Indonesia could reassert its regional leadership by encouraging other Southeast Asian states to invest in East Timor and by sponsoring an independent East Timor’s membership in the region’s key economic, political and security forums.

East Timor’s transition to independence also poses a major challenge for Australia’s defence and foreign policy. Prime Minister, John Howard, has made it abundantly clear that Australia shares many of Indonesia’s anxieties about the future direction of an independent East Timor. However, it is important not to exaggerate East Timor’s capacity to destabilise Australia’s immediate strategic neighbourhood. No rational East Timorese government is likely to deliberately antagonise its two giant neighbours and forfeit the goodwill and aid which are critical to its long term survival and prosperity. So suggestions that East Timor will choose to pursue a radical strategic course and become some kind of latter day Asian Cuba should be discounted. The greatest risk to Australia is that rather than being a political circuit breaker, independence for East Timor will actually complicate bilateral relations with Indonesia and pose a new set of political, economic and security problems. On the other hand, a prosperous and friendly East Timor which enjoys good relations with Indonesia is very much in Australia’s national interests. It is to this end that Australia’s defence and foreign and trade policies should now be directed.

An integrated, ‘whole of government’ strategy for East Timor would incorporate three key elements. Should the East Timorese opt for independence over autonomy, Australia must ensure that relations between Jakarta and Dili do not go into terminal decline. That would be the worst possible outcome for all concerned. Australia must also be prepared to help shoulder the economic burden of reconstructing the East Timorese economy. The cost may be considerable in the first few years of independence but Australia will eventually reap a more than matching political and commercial dividend. Finally, isolating or ignoring an independent East Timor

would be a recipe for future regional instability. Australia should use its good offices to ensure that the international community shares in the task of building a vibrant democracy and a viable economy in East Timor.

Alan Dupont
Fellow
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
ANU
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The meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) for the intersessional year 1998-1999 were held in Honolulu from 4-6 November 1998 and in Bangkok from 3-5 March 1999. Both meetings were co-chaired by Saroj Chavanaviraj, Permanent Secretary of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ralph ("Skip") Boyce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. The Australian Delegation to the Honolulu Meeting was led by Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and included officials from the Department of Defence. Bruce Miller, Director, Asia Pacific Security Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, led the Australian Delegation to the Bangkok Meeting.

Honolulu

The Honolulu meeting was the first gathering of the ARF ISG on CBMs since the full impact of the economic crisis had been felt in the region. It was therefore notable and pleasing that there were no signs that the strains imposed by the crisis were significantly affecting the commitment of regional countries to the ARF process. All but one ARF member provided delegations and most delegations contained both Foreign Affairs and Defence officials. Moreover, Mongolia participated in the ISG for the first time, its delegation - which included a uniformed military officer - being informed, active and constructive throughout the meeting.

As has become customary, the meeting included a half-day "Defence transparency" component, the inspection by delegations of two Aegis Class guided missile cruisers, the USS Chosin and the USS Lake Erie, and an address by Admiral Prueher, the then Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Command.

The atmosphere of the Honolulu meeting was positive and the momentum generated in Brunei and Sydney in the intersessional year 1998-1999 was maintained.

Discussion of the economic crisis dominated the exchange of views on regional developments. A number of delegations, including Australia, touched upon the security implications of the crisis. Other delegations focused on its social impact. There was a brief exchange of views on the South China Sea. Developments on the Korean Peninsula, including the 31 August missile test by North Korea, were also discussed at some length. Discussion under the disarmament agenda was dominated by the issue of South Asian nuclear testing. Other disarmament issues discussed included the progress on a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.

During the exchange of views on defence policies, Australia reported on the outcomes of the Seminar on the Production of Defence Policy Documents held in Canberra in September 1998 and recommended that a further seminar would be a worthwhile exercise in approximately two years. A number of countries, including Australia, offered presentations on their defence policies. Other countries notified the meetings of forthcoming updates to their defence policy documents or production of new White Papers. Some discussion was also given to defence conversion, the meeting welcoming defence conversion as a useful step towards the promotion of disarmament.

Progress was made on the CBMs agenda of the ARF with a number of recommendations to be forwarded to the ARF Ministers in July. Australia tabled a detailed proposal for an ARF Defence Language Schools Seminar in October 1999. Among a number of possible CBMs, Australia suggested that ARF incorporate cooperation in the area of the law of armed conflict (or law of war) into its CBMs agenda in the medium term.

Following the discussions on maritime issues at the Sydney meeting of the ISG in March 1998, a meeting of maritime experts was held concurrently with the first day of the ISG and dealt with issues of maritime safety, law and order at sea and marine environmental protection. There was general agreement that the ARF could play a role in keeping its members informed of maritime developments and in providing high-level support for and impetus to existing instruments and cooperative activities on maritime issues.

Discussion of preventive diplomacy measures was left for the Bangkok meeting.

Bangkok

Following on from Honolulu, participation at the Bangkok meeting was good, demonstrating a continuing commitment from regional countries to the ARF. There were a number of useful outcomes from the meeting which will provide both substance for the ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 1999 and further momentum for the ARF agenda, particularly in the field of preventive diplomacy. The meeting also included a visit to the Sattahip Naval Base and an inspection of Thailand's aircraft carrier HMTS Chakrinaruebet.

A number of preventive diplomacy proposals, which have gathered support over the past two years, were discussed. The concept of a "Good Offices" role for the ARF Chair was again canvassed and it was agreed that procedures for the operation of such a role be developed in the next intersessional period, together with a set of principles for preventive diplomacy. The CSCAP meeting on preventive diplomacy held immediately before the ISG was successful in developing a set of draft principles.

This is a useful and helpful document which will no doubt form the basis of the ARF's work in this area in the next year.

In two potentially useful institutional advances for the ARF, the meeting agreed to recommend to the ARF Ministers that the role of the ARF Chair be expanded to include liaison with other regional forums, such as the OAS and OSCE, and, on an informal basis, with the second track (there was no agreement on a proposal for a formal link between the ARF and second track bodies such as CSCAP). There was also a large measure of agreement that the coordinating role of the ARF Chair should be expanded to allow for the convening of special ARF sessions or the issuing of statements (after due consultations) on particular issues. This proposal will be considered in more detail next year. Other preventive diplomacy measures at the meeting were an "in principle" agreement to develop a register of experts or eminent persons for preventive diplomacy, an agreement to encourage the practice of ARF countries briefing each other on issues of security concern, either on a bilateral basis or through the ARF, and wide support for the concept of a regular publication of an annual security outlook, either in the first track or the second track.

Australia's proposal for a defence officials' workshop on the law of armed conflict - first suggested in Honolulu - was among a number of new proposals added to the ISG's list of possible future CBM activities. Australia has offered to host this workshop in Australia in December 1999.

A number of recommendations from the meeting of maritime specialists held in conjunction with the Honolulu meetings were accepted by the meeting. A proposal to establish a maritime information and data centre was marked for further consideration. There was agreement that ARF maritime specialists should meet on a regular basis. CSCAP's maritime cooperation guidelines were also commended.

The issue of the South China Sea dominated discussion during the exchange of views on regional security perceptions. Other regional security issues discussed were the Korean peninsula, the South Asia nuclear tests and the current state of India-Pakistan relations. The South Asia nuclear tests again featured prominently during discussion on disarmament issues. TMD and small arms were also discussed.

Conclusion

Given that both the Honolulu and Bangkok meetings took place in a context of economic downturn and a number of difficult regional security issues, these two meetings were successful and positive in promoting and progressing the role of the ARF, CBMs and preventive diplomacy among ARF members and within the region as a whole. Japan and Singapore will co-chair the ISG on CBMs in the intersessional year 1999-2000.

Paul Wilson
Asia Pacific Security Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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The differing reactions to North Korea’s missile launch in August 1998 and to its intransigence over suspected nuclear sites has revealed a worrying lack of coordination among the United States and Northeast Asian players. Regional players are increasingly concerned about US-North Korean relations and remain more skeptical than the US about North Korea’s ultimate intentions. They also have differing short term priorities. South Korea’s priority lies in the maintenance of peace and stability to enable the recovery of its economy, Japan is focused on the North’s missile program and what that now implies for its own security, while the US is increasingly viewing North Korea as a global nuclear issue. Meanwhile, Chinese officials openly question the legitimacy of the US demands for inspections of nuclear sites in the absence of hard evidence of their existence, and along with Russia, have voiced strong concerns over US moves to develop a Theatre Missile Defense system, perhaps in conjunction with Japan and Taiwan.

The events over the past year or so have seen US tolerance for a ‘deterrence and engagement’ approach waiver. The US Congress has increasingly come to question the effectiveness and direction of US policy centered on the 1994 Agreed Framework. Reflecting this, Congress has tied future US funding commitments to assurances that must be provided by the Administration by May, that the suspect nuclear sites are benign. Four years of dealing with North Korea has also seen a hardening of perceptions within the Clinton administration toward the North. Meanwhile, there have been calls from former Republican administration officials that the US at some stage may need to ‘go it alone’ on the Peninsula without a multilateral consensus.

Despite the North’s schizophrenic foreign policy actions, current tensions largely reflect the North’s frustration with the failure of the US to live up to its side of the 1994 Agreed Framework, namely the lifting of the economic embargo, and with delays in funding for the implementation of the Agreed Framework. At the time of its signing, the US saw the Agreed Framework, not only as a means of tension reduction, but also as a means of ‘buying time’ for the North’s collapse. Yet with the demise of the regime unlikely in the near future, this premise no longer makes sense. Instead, dealing with the reality of the North as it exists and waiting for North Korea to change gradually could now be the only way to advance. The appointment of former US defence secretary William Perry to conduct a review of US policy and objectives toward North Korea (to be completed by the end of March), reflects the view that the current policy has failed and that a new approach is required in dealing with North Korea.

North-South relations

This hardening of the US position has occurred just as South Korea under President Kim Dae-jung has shown strategic vision and a determined willingness to promote inter-Korean reconciliation under the so-called ‘sunshine policy’. The 1997/98 financial crisis has also broadened support among the South Korean populace for a policy of peaceful coexistence, although Koreans were already growing wary of the economic cost of unification even prior to the crisis.

The ‘sunshine policy’ of separating politics from business, implies a recognition of the North Korean regime, a resignation that a near term collapse of the regime is unlikely and undesirable, and therefore a willingness to postpone unification. Kim Dae-jung has called on the US and regional players to offer the North a comprehensive package deal—encompassing economic assistance, the lifting of economic sanctions, and the first steps toward diplomatic recognition by the US—in exchange for access to suspected sites and adherence to the Agreed Framework.

US/China relations

While both China and US share the common view that Pyongyang and Seoul drive the process of resolving the Korean divide, at the same time they also accord the Korean Peninsula different strategic weights. Both have quite different outcomes in mind when they speak of a soft landing. US support for North Korean reform and integration into the international community is not aimed at making the regime more prosperous, it is to support a stable Korean unification process on terms acceptable to South Korea.

China, on the other hand, does not want to see North Korea collapse, nor does it necessarily want to see Pyongyang undergo a full-scale conversion to capitalism, and it may not want the peninsula reunified under Seoul’s leadership. However, Chinese officials will privately admit to being as baffled as others by North Korea’s reluctance to openly embrace reform given that reform would seem critical to the regimes prospects for survival. Although China continues to be the North’s main lifeline in the provision of grain and oil, this generosity is unlikely to be limitless with China’s own internal economic challenges hindering its commitment in the long run.

Whilst often cited both as being a key element in the US-China ‘constructive strategic partnership’, the North Korean aspect of the relationship is likely to be tested over the coming months and come under greater scrutiny from the US Congress. Internal developments in North Korea

Although there is a consensus amongst analysts that Kim Jong-il remains fully in charge, there is less of a consensus amongst analysts as to the current role of the military in North Korean society. Some see North Korea as moving in a more conservative direction, as evidenced by the various incidents during 1998, the reported purging of progressive officials, and the launching of the missile during on-going negotiations with the US. At the same time, inter-Korean economic relations have expanded, North Korea is more open to foreigners that at any other time in its history, and North Korean economic officials are working with several institutions in the training of economic personnel.

The most significant development since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 has been the defacto devolution of economic authority from the central government to local authorities in dealing with the food crisis, and the transformation by default of North Korea’s economic structure from central planning regulating supply and demand to one in which market mechanism plays an albeit limited role in the provision of necessities. Pyongyang itself is seeking changes in its economic policies. The new constitution adopted in September last year included for the first time articles on cost, prices, profits, the laying a legal basis to build more economic zones, and moves toward rights of ownership. Pyongyang is not as impervious to Chinese-style reform as its rhetoric indicates. Chinese-style agricultural experiments are taking place in rural cooperatives. While not called reforms, they have regime endorsement and mirror the rreforms undertaken by China just prior to the adoption of more meaningful reforms in 1979.

While the lifting of economic sanctions by the US alone would not solve North Korea’s economic woes, a comprehensive package would help reinforce the reformist elements in Pyongyang, especially now that the North is keen to embrace investment from the South. North Korea views the lifting of sanctions as an important gauge of US commitment to the Agreed Framework and to US intentions toward it. It would also provide an effective empirical test of Pyongyang’s intentions.

Clearly there is a moral hazard problem here—the perception that the international community is rewarding an uncooperative and odious regime. But a certain amount of propping up of North Korea will be required in order to achieve long term objectives. This could take years and quick results should not be expected. In this regard, the mainland China-Taiwan model of increased economic contact provides a more practical model than the German reunification model.

Other measures are also required to make evolution a more concrete policy. This could include such moves as military to military contact between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the US. At present the North Korean military remains the most insulated and inward-looking segment of North Korean society. Such an approach could aid in the seeking to contain adventurous behaviour by the North, cultivate interaction and build trust. It is also important to continue to engage North Korea through more people to people exchanges and confidence building measures, including through such second track forums as CSCAP and PAFTAD.

The worst case scenario

In the event of a pre-emptive strike by the North, it is clear that the Peninsula would be unified under the South’s terms. However, most North Korean watchers view a continuation of the gradual irreversible economic decline, accompanied by rising elite division and public unrest as a more plausible ‘worst case’ scenario. Given North Korea’s heavily armed forces, the real risk of warlordism is certainly higher than it was 2 years ago, and a situation of chaos, a la Somalia, is not totally outside the realm of possibility. This is particularly pertinent in North Korea where the food security system is segmented and fragile.

Although status quo remains everyone's preferred option, there is the need for greater contingency planning and synchronisation of tactics and strategies in the event of a real crisis than currently exists. This scenario has received little practical discussion either amongst the key players, or within governments who share an interest in regional stability such as Australia. Some of the issues that would likely arise include:

• The role of the UN command in the event of civil war/anarchy—which states would be drawn in and how would they be drawn in? Would it involve unilateral movement by South Korean forces, combined South Korea-US forces, or neutral UN forces encompassing middle powers such as Australia?
• What would be the Chinese response to refugees or troops on its borders? The ability for the UN to play a significant role may be questionable, given that China, through the Security Council, would likely oppose a new mandate for the UN to engage in peace keeping efforts. Could key actors sustain a political consensus in the face of collapse? The imperative for an agreement of sorts to keep US and Chinese forces out of North Korea in the case of internal conflict may be crucial to ensuring that miscalculation and a widening of conflict did not ensue
• The capacity of the South to meet the financial burden accompanying collapse? In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis it would be difficult to envisage mobilisation of funds from current regional and international financial institutions in the event of short or medium term collapse to support restructuring/rehabilitation of the economy.

Heather Smith
Director, Korea Economy Program
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management
ANU
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The main objective of the Association is to promote regional economic cooperation and human resource development. Each member state has so-called "tri-partite" representation at IOR-ARC meetings with delegations comprising bureaucrats, business people and academics: an interesting first/second track mixture! In Australia the formula has been to include representatives of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), the state government and the Indian Ocean Centre which, under the terms of the IOR-ARC charter was nominated as Australia’s "national focal point" to coordinate issues relating to regional cooperation.

Australia’s interest in the Indian Ocean region developed very slowly after Federation in 1901. It was not until the 1980s that the region began to become an area for some limited foreign policy and defence debate inaugurated by Bill Hayden when Foreign Minister. The reasons for this are self-evident. For the first half of the twentieth century the Indian Ocean was a "British lake" and as such the western coast of Australia with its small population and insignificant economy fell under the mantle of British protection. The Commonwealth government maintained a skeleton defence presence at Fremantle with Singapore viewed as the lynch pin of western defence.

By the second half of the century however, the British were gone and the region had become a cockpit for Super Power rivalry. In addition, the rapid growth of the economy of the state of Western Australia and the presence of Western Australians in powerful political positions at the federal level in defence and trade under Labor governments, gave greater voice to what had once been considered parochial concerns by Canberra. Western Australian mineral and gas exports combined with the Indian Ocean focus of Ministers such as Beazley and McMullan to provide a powerful voice for a national interest in the Indian Ocean in Canberra.

The issue of the defence of the western seaboard became a national issue with the declaration of a two oceans naval policy, and the state government of Western Australia began to promote the state as Australia’s gateway to the Indian Ocean rather than as the backdoor to the Pacific. But although there was an increasing interest in Australia with respect to the Indian Ocean it was largely reactive and posited on defence concerns and the global concerns of the Cold War debate. The interest as such was not based on any recognition of commonalities binding us to our Indian Ocean neighbours.

By the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the demise of apartheid in South Africa and a fundamental shift in Indian economic policy had established the preconditions for previously disparate states around the Indian Ocean to explore the possibility of a regional dialogue. Ideological differences were subsumed by the demands for global economic cooperation, and a push from Western Australia to encourage Canberra to take proactive interest in the region which matched the ambitions of the Foreign Minister of the time, Gareth Evans.

Early in 1995, the state and Federal government issued mutually supportive announcements setting Australia on a "Look West" policy and securing for Western Australia the title of "Australia’s gateway to the Indian Ocean". A month later, in March 1995, Australia joined several other Indian Ocean states for preliminary talks that led to the establishment of IOR-ARC in 1997. Initially Australia was interested in promoting comprehensive security as an issue for cooperative action but it soon became clear that anything tagged to "security" was too sensitive to be discussed in such a forum at this stage. The focus remained squarely on economic cooperation with a vague nod in the direction of other more contentious issues. Obviously the priority was to build habits of dialogue rather than risking early and fatal dissension.

At the second-track level, however, such sensitivities were not so rampant. Amongst researchers as opposed to bureaucrats there was a more sophisticated understanding of the concept of "comprehensive security" and in Australia, India and South Africa there has been growing pressure to establish a regional comprehensive security dialogue.

In Australia the Indian Ocean Centre at Curtin University - established as a joint initiative of the state and federal governments in 1995 – has a role to play in keeping the issue alive. Whilst the main focus of the Centre’s activities has been on economic issues it has been able to establish research links relating to transnational crime, maritime security issues and projects relating to environmental security. In the process it has become obvious that all the building blocks are there for a comprehensive security dialogue located in the second track process which operates in support of the IOR-ARC process.

Partners in this process could be, in Australia, the Maritime Studies Centre at the University of Wollongong and a number of researchers in Canberra and Perth currently working on relevant issues. Regionally there are centres in South Africa (eg. The South African Institute of International Affairs), India (The Centre for Policy Research and IDSA in New Delhi), and in Singapore (The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) where existing links could be reworked to structure a fruitful comprehensive security dialogue.

Whist such a dialogue is theoretically possible, obviously a major precondition is either the neutrality or the support of IOR-ARC member states towards such a project. The signs are still not clear on this matter although the positive hostility of 1995 towards the idea has certainly abated. The second Ministerial Meeting of the IOR-ARC is to be held in Mozambique late in March and should provide a venue in which second tack participants can test the water to see if our time has come!

Kenneth McPherson
Indian Ocean Centre
Curtin University, Perth
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The origin of the Pacific Patrol Boat (PPB) project lies in a visit by a group of Australian and New Zealand defence experts to the South Pacific region in 1979 at the request of the Pacific island countries to examine their surveillance needs. This was in the context of the expansion of the ocean space of the island countries with the declaration of 200 mile fishing or exclusive economic zones. The project was formally announced by the Prime Minister, R.J. Hawke, to the South Pacific Forum meeting held in Canberra 29–30 August 1983.

The PPB project is the largest and most complex defence cooperation project ever funded by Australia. Twenty-two boats have now been donated by Australia to twelve recipient countries (see Table 1). The project is the centre-piece of Australian defence cooperation in the South Pacific.

The project involves not just the boats, but training for the crews, naval advisers posted to each recipient country, and through-life logistic and technical support through the Follow-On Support Agency.

The operating authority for each of the PPBs is shown in Table 1. In three of the recipient countries, the vessels are operated by the naval arm or maritime element of the national defence force (Fiji, PNG, and Tonga), in one country by an independent organisation similar to a coast guard (Marshall Islands), and in all other countries, the PPBs are operated as part of the national police force.

The cost of the project to Australia to date has been A$249m. This includes operating subsidies given to some of the participating countries. In addition, each of the countries has spent varying amounts on operating costs and the US has also contributed to the operating costs of some nations through a Compact of Free Association. In terms of direct budgetary and in-kind support the commitment of island countries to the PPB project is high. All recipient governments have provided continued funding for operations, maintenance and manpower for the vessels, although the contributions have waxed and waned over time.

The island countries strongly support the project. The PPBs are now very well accepted by island elites, police and military around the region. The fact that the project has grown so quickly, from the initial planned ten vessels to five countries in 1985 to twenty-two in twelve countries and that no country has to date indicated that it wishes to hand its boat(s) back, underlines the degree of regional acceptance that the project has achieved.

Australia’s strategic presence and interest in the region is more widely recognised since the introduction of the PPBs. Partly this is due to the role of the Australian naval advisers, partly because the boats enjoy a visible presence in many island harbours and partly because Prime Ministers, government officials, senior police and other VIPs use the boats for special occasions and for VIP transport.

The most valuable part of the project, as far as Australia is concerned, are the people that go with the PPBs, and the personal networks created. The naval advisers give Australia a presence right through the region. They are valued by the island maritime agencies for their help in-country, providing a facilitating role in identifying training and developing a more mature maritime enforcement arm.
 
 

The PPB project has resulted in a number of benefits at the regional level.

The PPBs are the only fisheries enforcement surface assets that the island nations operate. Aerial surveillance is limited, and relies on Australian, New Zealand and some French assistance. No fisheries department in the region operates their own separate enforcement surface assets.

Without the PPBs, there would be virtually no offshore fishery policing in the region. The region would have had to rely on diplomatic, legal and administrative strategies entirely for fisheries compliance. The PPBs have put in place a system of regional maritime resource surveillance where none existed before.

The PPBs have had a significant deterrent role as well as generating revenue through fines. The fact that a surveillance capability existed played an important role in bringing some Asian fleets to the negotiating table. In terms of fines, the PPBs have been involved in fifteen direct successful fisheries prosecutions in FSM, Kiribati, Vanuatu and the Marshalls, producing well over $2 million for island states in revenue. Also critical has been the role of the PPBs in license inspection and compliance, but mainly in the fish rich areas, with Kiribati undertaking 14 boardings just in 1997, the Marshalls around eight boardings per year and Vanuatu about 10–15 boardings per year. FSM has undertaken on average around 25 boardings a year over the last eight years.

The boats have been used for customs work, (eg inspecting yachts) and prevented smuggling and some drug running. The PPBs have been also used for quarantine inspections on boats. Some states have used the vessels for charter work such as salvage. The PPBs have resulted in an expansion of recipient countries maritime infrastructure, including buildings, wharves and often areas that can be expanded into slipways or marinas.

The project involves steady logistics support in terms of victualling, building accommodation, providing transport etc. The boats have been used for hydrographic work thus contributing to tourism through better chart coverage and in drawing up baseline points for maritime boundaries. Precise boundaries are also important for successful fisheries prosecutions.

The PPBs have been involved in many tasks that have a strong humanitarian, civil defence type focus. Search and rescue and towing disabled vessels are particularly important tasks in the region. In a number of states the PPBs are being used for safety checks on local craft. The vessels have been used to transfer people and material to outer islands, particularly in situations of disaster relief.

In many cases, the PPBs have proved to be the only asset available to undertake disaster relief tasks after cyclones. In a number of countries too the boats have undertaken environmental monitoring in coastal areas. In times of drought the vessels have been used to carry water. The PPBs have been widely used in medivacs. The PPBs give the island countries a sense of reassurance concerning their ocean and broader political interests. The PPBs provide a uniformed para-military or military presence which is able to travel to all individual islands whenever required. The boats have been used by PNG and the Solomons for border operations around the island of Bougainville, an area of strategic significance to both countries. The vessels are used in PNG, Fiji and Tonga to support land operations and exercises.

The grey colour of the PPBs gives the impression that they are mini-warships. They are in effect a badge of sovereignty for the country. The PPBs bestow a sense of national pride and prestige.

The training component of the PPB project is regarded as one of the great benefits of the program by island states. Most of the training is provided by the Australian Maritime College (AMC) in Tasmania. The AMC training provides a pool of skilled seamen to the recipient country.

The PPBs have assisted in regional monitoring, control and surveillance through the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), not least through the role the Australian naval advisers play in sending and sharing surveillance data with FFA. The PPB project has resulted in a boost in the FFA’s reputation in the whole area of maritime surveillance, and fisheries compliance. The PPBs have worked with US Coast Guard vessels at various times.

Despite the fact that the potential is there with twenty-two boats in twelve nations, the hope that the introduction and spread of the PPBs, as a region-wide capability, would see the development of joint patrols has not really occurred. In part this is because of resource constraints. The distances involved in the South Pacific make it expensive for boats to travel to other island states for patrol purposes on a regular basis and countries have been reluctant to charter or pay other states for patrols. There is also a natural tendency for states to focus on their own zone. Most countries really have insufficient boats to participate in regional activities, while at the same time meeting their own EEZ patrol requirements. There are also sovereignty concerns in organising joint or cooperative patrols in neighbouring zones.

From the perspective of the island countries there are no real cost-effective alternatives to the PPBs, for maritime surveillance and enforcement. Some island countries want greater aerial surveillance, but recognise that not only would this be very expensive but that a surface platform would still be required.

There is little likelihood of island government’s committing to large one-off payments to purchase a similar vessel. Apart from PNG and Fiji, if a vessel was to be acquired in the future it may have to be smaller than the PPB, due to resource constraints. But a smaller boat would have considerable drawbacks in terms of endurance, sea-keeping capability and a small personnel carrying (and in some cases cargo) capacity.

The best option is for the PPBs to be given a life-of-type-extension (LOTE), which would extend the life of the vessels for another eight years beyond their present design life of 15 years. This would allow the island countries the maximum degree of flexibility to consider their future maritime surveillance and enforcement requirements. It is understood that Australia is currently deciding whether to fund a LOTE for the PPBs, with a final decision to be made in 1999.
 
 

Associate Professor Anthony Bergin
Director, Australian Defence Studies Centre
University College
Australian Defence Force Academy

Sam Bateman
Executive Director, Centre for Maritime Policy
University of Wollongong
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The Fifth Meeting of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group was held at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) in Kuala Lumpur on 17 and 18 November 1998. There were seventeen participants from eleven member CSCAPs with approximately twelve observers from overseas missions in Kuala Lumpur and Malaysian government departments and agencies. The Chairman of the Association of Maritime Education and Training Institutes in Asia-Pacific (AMETIAP), Mr Das Sharma from Singapore, also joined the meeting.

Stan Weeks from CSCAP US provided the Working Group with a useful overview of maritime cooperative activities that are currently occurring in the region, including with maritime safety, search and rescue, law and order at sea and marine environmental protection. There is a lot going on in different forums and worthwhile linkages to be established. In this session also, Mr Das Sharma provided a briefing on the work of the AMETIAP to facilitate discussion in the Working Group of prospective collaboration with AMETIAP, including possible joint delivery of the annual workshops on maritime issues previously considered and endorsed by CSCAP.

The main keynote paper on "Prospects for Multilateral Maritime Regime Building in Asia" was presented by Mark Valencia from the East-West Center in Honolulu. This paper was designed to set out the conceptual basis and framework for the initiation and development of regimes that would assist in stabilising the maritime environment of East Asia and help reduce the risks of conflict at sea. Jim Boutilier on behalf of Ian Townsend–Gault (CSCAP Canada), delivered a second paper on "Regimes for Managing Regional Seas and Oceans – the Use and Abuse of International Law". These were both stimulating papers that led to much discussion. The Group accepted that there was a need to concentrate on principles and objectives of cooperation rather than initiating work directly on regime building. Cooperation can exist without regimes but a web of cooperative arrangements can ultimately lead to the establishment of regimes.

This discussion of maritime regimes drew attention once again to the difficulties that can arise in the maritime environment with drawing a distinction between more traditional military security issues and matters of comprehensive security. This distinction can be very blurred and traditional security concerns were often too sensitive for multilateral forums. This meant that even military forums, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, spent a lot of time on issues such as marine safety, search and rescue, marine environmental protection and disaster relief because they are seen as less sensitive. However, these activities were also the responsibility of civil agencies in most regional countries and were usually dealt with in other forums.

Ideas about the future work and the contribution of the Working Group that emerged from this discussion of regime building were: (1) the importance of sharing information, education and training, and promotion of public awareness of maritime issues; (2) the need to support existing regimes to overcome concerns evident over the level of ratification and compliance with various international maritime instruments; (3) understanding the security significance of the range of bilateral activities, such as joint development zones and training programs; and (4) the importance of laying the groundwork for cooperation through informal means (including workshops, conferences and publications, such as those that resulted from Working Group meetings).

The main paper in the session on "Navigational Rights and Freedoms" was delivered by Erik-Jaap Molenaar representing European CSCAP. Its topic was "Navigational Rights and Freedoms: Grey Areas and Scope for Regional Agreement". A useful general discussion followed of possible areas of uncertainty and disagreement. These included: (1) the interpretation of some of the phrases in the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, particularly those related to the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage, such as "routes of similar convenience" and "the duplication of routes … shall not be necessary"; (2) the status of fishing vessels exercising rights of navigation in international straits and archipelagic sealanes; (3) "normal mode" considerations for different types of vessel; and (4) possible gaps in the Convention, particularly ones related to marine environmental concerns and navigational rights (including the rights of vessels carrying ultra-hazardous cargoes). The Working Group considered that there would be value in it continuing its study of these issues.

The papers in the session on "Law and Order at Sea" were presented by Linda Paul (CSCAP US) and Dick Sherwood (CSCAP Australia). These papers stimulated considerable discussion that was mainly related to the importance of good "oceans governance" and a stable maritime regime that involved law and order at sea. In this regard, this session related strongly to the discussion of maritime regimes earlier in the meeting. Networking and information-sharing were identified as key issues in maintaining law and order at sea. This was essentially a multinational problem and it was difficult for countries, particularly those adjoining enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, to deal with problems on a national basis. Then at the national level, many different agencies are involved necessitating good domestic coordinating arrangements but making bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime law and order issues more difficult. It was agreed that it would be useful for the Working Group to develop a list identifying the agencies in the member countries of CSCAP with responsibilities in the area of law and order at sea. A questionnaire was then distributed to participants to solicit this information.

The working group considered the proposal in a paper delivered by Grant Hewison (CSCAP New Zealand) for a study of international and regional maritime instruments to determine levels of ratification and compliance. This would involve developing a list of relevant treaties and then distributing a survey form for completion by member CSCAPs to ascertain the position of their country with regard to these treaties. Some participants thought that this was a useful proposal but on further discussion, it was apparent that there was not a consensus for the provision of views from individual countries. Sensitivities were involved and governments may be reluctant to declare their position on particular treaties. Also, several participants referred to work being conducted by other forums. It was agreed that initially the work should be limited to compiling a list of relevant treaties with details of ratification and signature by regional countries.

Another paper by Grant Hewison addressed the issue of shipments of nuclear materials, including the particular problems of notification of shipments to coastal States along the route of the planned shipment and liability in the event of an accident. A number of participants had reservations about the role for the Working Group in this issue but it was agreed that the issue should be retained on the agenda in the context of it being another "grey area" in the regional implementation of navigational regimes.

The topic of "Monitoring Operational Pollution from Ships" was briefly discussed. While cooperation on oil spill response arrangements is being introduced, particularly within ASEAN, there were still issues related to the monitoring and detection of oil pollution and the possible study of cooperative activities in this regard should be retained on the agenda of the Working Group.

Further work agreed at the meeting included a study of "The Objectives and Principles of Good Oceans Management". This work should be a priority for the Working Group, including identification of the security implications. The emphasis should be on cooperation rather than the development of regimes. It should be directed towards the building of law and order at sea, and should include coastal zone issues in so far as they impacted on the broader maritime environment. Specific work to be undertaken by the Group under the umbrella of this topic included the surveys of maritime instruments and responsibilities of national agencies. A joint meeting should also be conducted with the CSCAP Transnational Crime Working Group. With the Law of the Sea and navigational regimes, the Group identified the following three issues for further study: (1) "Grey Areas" in the navigational regimes; (2) The navigational rights and freedoms of fishing vessels in the various maritime zones; and (3) "Gaps" in UNCLOS such as environmental concerns with hazardous cargoes and sub-standard ships.

The Fifth Meeting of the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group stimulated useful discussion on a range of issues. The maritime area continues to be a key area for regional security cooperation and there is considerable scope for the Working Group to contribute usefully to the role of CSCAP as the principal "second track" forum in Asia Pacific concerned with security issues. This contribution will be by way of activities that support the objectives of the CSCAP Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation and through the development of further CSCAP Memoranda on maritime security cooperation, addressing issues such as law and order at sea and the survey of maritime agreements.

Sam Bateman
Working Group Co-Chair
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The 4^th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime was held in Sydney between 11 – 13 October 1998. A total of thirty three delegates and speakers attended from twelve countries. The Opening Address was given by Mr Michael Palmer, AO, APM, Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), who noted the potential value of the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime as a means of explaining the nature and importance of transnational crime as a factor affecting the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Deputy Commissioner of the AFP, Mr Adrien Whiddett, APM, spoke at the final dinner on "Law Enforcement and Good Governance".

The Illicit Trafficking In Firearms

Dr Christopher Smith of EU-CSCAP and Dr Margaret Beare of CSCAP-Canada led these discussions. One of the difficulties that arose during this session related to the wide range of weapons that were discussed and the diverse definitions that were assigned to each of the weapon categories. For the purposes of the Working Group it was agreed that -

• Weapons of Choice for Transnational Criminal Activity. It was agreed that illicit traffic in firearms that are commonly used in criminal and terrorist activities in the various regions were appropriate for our Working Group’s mandate;
• Supply versus Demand. Presentations debated where the enforcement/regulatory emphasis should be placed – on the supply (original producers of the weapons as well as the suppliers along the various ‘routes’) or on the demand (criminals using the weapons). The tendency was to focus on the criminal users, although a number of jurisdictions emphasised the need to recognise the role of some states in facilitating the proliferation of these weapons. The point was made that a glut of weapons is often left in regions following wars and, often, peace support operations fail to undertake comprehensive disarmament (e.g. Cambodia);
• Links to Organised/Transnational Crime. The relationship between the trafficking in firearms and transnational crime is not necessarily a direct link. Weapons – particularly illegal weapons, or weapons obtained illegally – are a lucrative commodity and therefore one of many commodities trafficked by organised criminal operations.
• Cultures of Violence and Gun Cultures. The presentations revealed that different jurisdictions had very different attitudes towards and experience of the


use of weapons – legal or illegal;

• Weak States and Loose Weapons. Several presentations highlighted the role of weak states in facilitating the proliferation of weapons of all types. At the same time, other presenters emphasised the complicity of strong states in supplying weapons in expedient situations;

Various speakers addressed the need for recognition of the root causes of the trafficking in small arms and for a ‘human security’ approach to this issue in addition to a more direct law enforcement approach.

• Corruption. The smuggling of weapons of whatever sort often involves the corruption of officials at borders (where there are borders)

Production and Trafficking in Synthetic Drugs in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Working Group considered the production and trafficking in synthetic drugs in the region, under coordination by Dr James Tolliver of US-CSCAP and Attorney Reynaldo J.D. Cuaderno of CSCAP-Philippines.

For the purposes of this Working Group, the following definition of synthetic drugs was adopted:

Conclusions

• Scope of the Problem. Many illicit synthetic drugs can be produced at low cost and provide large profits upon distribution. There are numerous scientific and medical databases that can provide information on the pharmacology of these drugs and on the chemical procedures for their manufacture;
• Usage. The meeting agreed that the abuse and trafficking of methamphetamine and MDMA (known as "ecstasy") is clearly on the rise in most, if not all, countries of the Asia-Pacific region;
• Effects. Many of the illicit synthetic drugs can be expected to produce harm to the abuser, the surrounding community and to the country or state;
• Legal Controls. A number of countries have had considerable experience in both the surveillance and development of regulatory regimes to restrict the trafficking of illegal synthetic drugs.

The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Transnational Criminal Activity

A short workshop on the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the development of transnational crime within the region was included in the Working Group meeting. This workshop focussed on a paper presented by Dr Sandy Gordon of the AFP with informal contributions from the other delegates present.

Conclusions

• The Asian economic crisis was in part a result of accumulated and undocumented non-performing or poorly performing loans, on a massive scale. Key countries in precipitating the early stages of the crisis were Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. As has become evident only over the last few weeks, the situation in Japan was far more serious than most people had imagined;
• While it would be incorrect to argue that these poorly performing loans were principally the result of criminality rather than simply poor management, it is

• Although the dividing line between influence peddling, corruption and criminality is blurred, the effects are the same - lack of transparency and, ultimately, a price to pay in terms both of the loss of confidence of lenders in the systems to which they have made loans and the capacity of loan-based projects to service those loans.
• There will probably be a major increase in unemployment in the region, possibly leading people to resort to illegal means to survive;
• There may well be an increase in public disorder, robberies and assaults as a result of the political aspirations and/or poverty of the population;
• There may be a threat to the legitimacy of governments as a result of the potential collapse of the financial and social sectors, leading to public disorder and illegal immigration;
• Individual countries may internalise their problems to the detriment of cooperation in overcoming regional security and stability problems;
• There is likely to be an increase in illicit capital flight and money laundering through and from the region;
• There is the possibility of the establishment of fraudulent business enterprises exploiting the situation;
• There is the likelihood of increased corruption, as a consequence of the economic crisis;
• There are possible opportunities offered by the Y2K problem on increased white collar crime and fraud; and
• There may be an increase in illegal immigration and people smuggling, currency counterfeiting and credit card fraud in the region.

• Fiscal stringency in some countries is likely to lead to a diminished capacity on the part of their law enforcement agencies to interdict the flow of drugs and generally perform law enforcement duties;
• Political and social unrest in some countries could also divert the efforts of national police from interdiction of crime to a role in supporting the civil authority;
• Official corruption, which facilitates the illicit drug trade and other illicit activities, will be harder to deal with in circumstances of economic hardship, especially on the part of poorly paid, low-level, officials.

Next Meeting

The Working Group will meet next between 23 – 25 May 1999 in Bangkok

John McFarlane
Working Group Co-Chair
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The meeting of the Working Group (WG) on CSBMs discussed two items: the WG's activities on multilateral nuclear cooperation on nuclear energy related issues and those on preventive diplomacy.

Under the first item, it reviewed the WG's PACATOM project identifying, defining and promoting regional CSBMs associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Working Group's Report on PACATOM: Building Transparency and Enhancing Nuclear Transparency (Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, October 1998), was distributed at the meeting. The Special Report outlines the activities of the Working Group to date and describes some of the future efforts to be undertaken.

Working Group members also received a report on the Nuclear Energy Expert's Group Workshop held at the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico in October 1998. This Workshop was a pilot program in conjunction with CMC specialists, to develop a generic nuclear energy monitoring scheme using currently available technologies for consideration by nuclear energy producers in the region on a voluntary basis, as a trans-national confidence building measure.

Participants included nuclear power industry experts and security specialists from China, Japan, Canada, the United States, and Taiwan - all current producers of nuclear energy. (CSCAP-ROK and CSCAP-Russia were invited but were unable to participate). In addition, nuclear specialists from Singapore and New Zealand added a broad regional perspective.

Workshop members identified questions of concern regarding nuclear energy production and then reviewed available technologies that might assist in addressing these concerns. The parameters of a generic monitoring system were outlined. CMC engineers have agreed to make a draft design for a generic nuclear energy monitoring system for review at the next Experts' Group meeting.

The spring 1999 meeting of the WG will focus on developing a comprehensive inventory of current organizations, programs, and initiatives that already address nuclear-energy related challenges and concerns, in order to understand what institutions and processes - whether multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral - are tackling what parts of the problem. A review of various ASIATOM, PACATOM, and other multilateral nuclear energy-related cooperation proposals will also be included in this Asia Pacific Nuclear Energy Cooperation Handbook, in order to evaluate their feasibility and to see what aspects of these initiatives can realistically be incorporated into CSCAP's future efforts. The aim is to create a comprehensive roadmap of what's already being done or proposed to better educate the policy-making community and to better determine what still needs to be done. Once completed, this Handbook will be posted on the World Wide Web and continually updated. CMC has indicated that it will consider requests by CSCAP energy

specialists for a research grant focussed on this project and will make their web site available to post and update the Handbook.

The WG is to develop a generic Nuclear Energy White Paper (similar to the earlier Defense White Paper effort) to promote greater transparency among nuclear energy producers. The first rough draft of such a paper has already been prepared and distributed to members. The feasibility of establishing a 'Statement of Principles Relating to Nuclear Energy Research and Production in the Asia Pacific is also being studied.

Under the preventive diplomacy item, the WG reviewed past and potential future CSCAP efforts to support ARF deliberations on preventive diplomacy, including a possible Preventive Diplomacy Workshop to better define the process.

Participants highlighted the need for greater regional understanding of preventive diplomacy given the existing wide range of definitions and interpretations of the concept. It was noted that case studies examining previous examples of preventive diplomacy in action would help to clarify or operationalize the definition. So too would practical exercises that walked participants through the preventive diplomacy process.

There was general agreement that the WG could contribute positively to the regional debate on preventive diplomacy by conducting a Preventive Diplomacy Workshop aimed at reviewing past CSBM Working Group and other recommendations relating to the ARF's eventual transition from confidence building to preventive diplomacy. The Workshop would include discussions on creating a Statement of principles of Preventive Diplomacy to better define the parameters and limits of the process in the Asia Pacific context. Particular care will be given to choose neutral case studies that respected the non-interference principle to ensure focus is on a particular issue, and to emphasise the process of preventive diplomacy itself - how and why it did or did not work. The US Institute of Peace, which has developed considerable expertise in examining case studies and conducting practical exercises, has offered to assist in this effort.

It was noted that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) would be conducting an Intersessional Support Group (ISG) meeting on confidence building measures in Bangkok in early March that would examine the overlap between confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. It was proposed that the CSBM's Preventive Diplomacy Workshop be held immediately prior to this meeting, on March 1-2 1999, in Bangkok with attendance of ISG participants invited. This would maximize the Working Group's efforts to be relevant to the ARF process and is consistent with the ARF's stated position that preventive diplomacy discussions be handles primarily in the track two arena. The Thai Foreign Ministry and US State Department will co-host the ISG and fully endorse the companion CSCAP CSBM's Workshop efforts.

Other projects.

Participants also discussed other projects that the WGmight focus on in the future, to include its involvement in the production of a Security Outlook document if the CSCAP Steering Committee decided to become more directly involved in this effort. The topic of environmental security was also identified as one for possible future study, although it was noted that other working groups were already discussing various aspects of this problem.

Stuart Harris
Co-Chair
AUS-CSCAP
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The fourth meeting of the North Pacific Working Group was held in Beijing, November 8-10 1998. This was the first time that the NPWG has met outside the home countries of the co-chairs.

The NPWG continues to be a "full house" dialogue engaging all parties in the North Pacific. The meeting was attended by representatives from the following CSCAP Member Committees: Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Europe, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, United States, and Vietnam. Also participating were two "other participants" and one expert invited by the co-chairs. The Member Committees of Russia and the Philippines sent observers to the meeting. Officials from various local embassies and institutions in Beijing attended sessions as well. In all, approximately forty individuals were present during the Working Group sessions.

Advance consultation with Member Committees by the Co-Chairs resulted in agreement to focus four topics at the Beijing meeting:

Security Implications of the Asian Economic Crisis

This was the first opportunity for the WG systematically to consider the economic crisis and its potential impact upon security matters. The papers presented and subsequent discussions were far-ranging, considering the impact of the crisis on domestic conditions, (including civil-military relations and military acquisitions), on the systemic security environment, and on regional economic/security cooperation activities in Northeast Asia and in the Asia Pacific region.

There was unanimous agreement that the crisis had brought great economic turbulence to the region and had reversed the results of decades of economic growth and prosperity for vast numbers of people. There was little debate about the causes of the crisis, which were seen to be a combination of internal factors (lack of regulation and transparency, irregular business practises etc.) and external forces (global capital markets, initially misguided responses from IFIs etc.). There was, however, less consensus among participants concerning the security implications of the crisis. In part this depended upon whether one took a short vs. long term perspective or focused upon Northeast Asia as opposed to Southeast Asia.

Several participants suggested that the graver security implications of the crisis were exaggerated. While domestic instability was a serious concern in Southeast Asia, it was not in Northeast Asia. Because the overall economic and security fundamentals were sound, in several years the region would be on the rebound. The most optimistic suggested that the "economic crisis has promoted subregional cooperation....among the regional economies in Northeast Asia" "Asia may turn a misfortune into a blessing". Others noted the dampening of arms acquisitions and defence budgets in Southeast Asia (but not in Northeast Asia, except for South Korea). There was some discussion about the observation that countries that had recently undergone political reform, i.e., South Korea and Thailand appeared to be better equipped to weather the crisis.

Others cautioned that the WG was paying "not enough attention to what might happen", as the crisis was not over yet and would not be for several years at best. Furthermore, the crisis needed to be appreciated, not simply as a series of economic downturns, but as phenomenon that undermined the psychological, social, political, and security fundamentals of the post-Cold War Asia Pacific community.

Korean Peninsula

The unfolding situation on the Korean Peninsula remains at the core of the Northeast Asian security complex and thus is a central focus of each NPWG meeting. A series of recent, important political and economic developments in both the North and the South were noted by participants in this fourth meeting. These included the consolidation of Kim Jong Il's leadership in the DPRK and the election of Kim Dae Jung in South Korea. The economic difficulties being experienced in both countries were reviewed. Progress (or the lack thereof) on Four-Party Talks and on KEDO's operations were discussed. In general terms, while most agreed that there have been certain positive movements, an overall, "apparent intractability" prevails regarding the Peninsula. This continues both because of the impasse between North and South and, in the words of one participant, because the "major powers thus far have failed...to build a habit of formal sub-regional security cooperation or to implement

other practical cooperative measures that might more strongly facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation efforts".

It was agreed that progress towards settlement on the Korean Peninsula must necessarily involve resolution of bilateral issues between North and South and at the same time establishment of an international regime, or regimes, that satisfies the interests of the major powers and engages their commitment over the long term. Thus, inter-Korean and international issues are inextricably intertwined, but how to manage and effectively implement a workable "division of labour" ( a term that some objected to) among interested parties remains an illusive goal. There was agreement, however, that there are notable contradictions and discontinuities in current policies that could and should be resolved. (Indeed, participants suggested that this would be a useful avenue for further work by the NPWG).

Proliferation

Northeast Asia remains among the most militarised regions of the world. Defence budgets are not declining appreciably. Acquisition of high tech, conventional weaponry proceeds apace, (unlike in Southeast Asia where the economic crisis has stalled such purchases). Developments over the past year to do with proliferation of weapons and Northeast Asia have not only heightened concerns about regional stability, but also raised major questions regarding the efficacy of the traditional strategies associated with nonproliferation regimes. In what was the first session that the NPWG has devoted to proliferation matters, attention was focused on the consequences of three sets of events: the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, the satellite launch/missile test by the DPRK, and the sale of missile and missile technology by regional states into other regions.

NPWG participants wrestled with how best to come to terms with weapons proliferation issues. The consensus view was that the most effective strategy is to promote the acceptance of global nonproliferation regimes that are universal and non-discriminatory. It was admitted, however, that current regimes such as the NPT do not meet such criteria in the view of certain states. Furthermore, the strategies of denial and sanctions mandated by these regimes and by individual states in their efforts to enforce the regimes were seen to have been ineffective. Addressing the root causes of proliferation, namely the structural forces of supply-push and demand-pull - the latter arising from continued perceptions of threats to national security - remains the most difficult challenge.

Bilateralism, Multilateralism in Northeast Asia

The status of relations among the major powers of Northeast Asia is a determining factor of regional stability and thus the subject of continued attention at NPWG meetings. This was particularly true of the meetings in Beijing.

The consensus of participants was that recent steps taken by the major powers have created a network of bilateral relationships with significant, largely positive, results both for the states concerned and for regional security as a whole. In addition to the US-PRC, (which participants viewed as the determining dyadic relationship of the Asia Pacific region), US-Russia, US-Japan, China-Japan, and Japan-Russia bilateral ties were reviewed. The net effect, in the words of one participant, has been to create a "regime of summits". In the terminology of another, a process of "concerted bilateralism" has been established, effectively replicating certain aspects of a concert of powers.

WG participants pursued these matters at some length, focusing particular attention on the following issues:

• The character of bilateral relationships,
• "Strategic triangles",
• Multilateral initiatives in Northeast Asia,
• Northeast Asia and Asia Pacific security regionalism.

There was a consensus that this Fourth Working Group meeting had been successful. There has been a notable trend towards fuller and franker discussion of issues at WG meetings. Certainly all involved appreciate the importance of sustaining the NPWG's confidence-building role as the only "full house" security dialogue for the subregion.
 
 

Brian Job
Co-Chair
NPWG
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As a respected diplomatic actor and 'middle power' in the region, Australia may be well positioned to facilitate economic recovery and strategic stability in North-east Asia.

There are several premises underlying this observation:

Associate Professor Bill Tow
Australian Representative at NPWG Meeting
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20-22 May 1999 ARF Senior Officials Meeting Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore Contact: FAX: 65 330 5830

23-25 May 1999 CSCAP Working Group Meeting on Transnational Crime, BangkokContact: John McFarlane FAX: 61 2 6268 8440

25-26 May 1999 CSCAP Working Group Meeting on Comprehensive & Cooperative Security,Beijing
Contact: CSCAP China FAX: 86 10 65598133

25-27 May 1999 CSCAP Working Group Meeting on CSBMs, Seoul
Contact: Ralph Cossa FAX: 1 808 599 8690

28-29 May 1999 11th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, Kuala Lumpur
Contact: CSCAP Secretariat FAX: 60 3 293 9340

30 May-June 2 13th ASEAN ISIS Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur
Contact: Secretariat FAX: 60 3 293 9340/291 3210

July 1999 6th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Singapore
Contact: Email: mfa@mfa.gov.sg

18-19 August 1999 AUS-CSCAP Committee Meeting, Canberra
Contact: Lesley McCulloch FAX: 61 2 6257 8526

August 1999 CSCAP Working Group Meeting on Maritime Cooperation
Contact: Sam Bateman FAX: 61 2 4226 8866

October 1999 CSCAP North Pacific Working Group Meeting
Contact: Brian Job FAX: 1 604 822 5540

December 1999 12th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting
Contact: CSCAP Secretariat FAX: 60 3 293 9340

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