FOREWORD

At the 13^th Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur, Professor Desmond Ball took over from Professor Han Sun-joo from South Korea as Co-Chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee for two years from June 2000. In that role, Professor Ball has already been active in a number of directions. In particular, a review has been initiated into the practice and effectiveness of the CSCAP working group processes with a view to considering how these will meet future needs and circumstances. He has also been active in ensuring an effective follow up to the important initiative taken by the Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (the then Chair of the ARF) looking for ways in which closer links could be established between CSCAP and the ARF.

At the Kuala Lumpur meeting, three new members were admitted and welcomed to CSCAP. Cambodia and Papua New Guinea were made new members. India, which had previously been an Associate Member but whose participation had been limited, was made a full member with an augmented committee and new leadership. It is perhaps also worth noting that the investment in the CSCAP involvement of North Korea in its activities, notably in the North Pacific Working Group, has presumably been a part, however small, of the process through which North Korea has become a member of the ARF.

In addition to adding a number of new members to the AUS-CSCAP Committee at its August meeting there have also been some administrative changes. John McFarlane has taken over as AUS-CSCAP Executive Director from Euan Graham who has returned to his postgraduate studies. We thank Euan for his valuable contribution to our efforts and wish him every success.

While there are many controversial aspects of national missile defence (NMD) or theatre missile defence (TMD) I shall limit my comments to two issues that have changed the direction of the domestic debate quite recently.

Questions concerning how missile defence will affect the Australia-US alliance have become central to some of the arguments against it. In its narrower context it has been suggested that the joint facilities would be directly involved with consequences in terms of our broader relations with the region and notably with China. I am not an expert but my understanding is that in the operation of any such system, the joint facilities would not have a key role since they do not provide the real time response that would be needed. While I want to emphasise the missile defence issue as an example of how we should improve our management of the alliance relationship, that narrower aspect of the relationship does not seem a concern to me.

The second, more fundamental change is the emphasis being put on the argument that NMD or TMD are defensive systems. One of the few history lessons I remember is that the Roman legions were able to dominate in battle because they had shields that knitted together to protect them as a group from attacks of their opponents. Paul Nitze had obviously learned the same lesson because he was able to stimulate a major increase in the Reagan years’ US defence expenditure on the grounds that the USSR was building up its civil defences. He saw that as a threatening act in the same way as many countries see NMD in particular as threatening. So even if there is a genuine belief that these systems are for defence they inevitably have the potential to facilitate offensive actions. This may be less so for TMD but that depends. Provided it is limited, a TMD system, unlike the NMD system, would not breach the ABM treaty. In my view, Australia gains greatly from the regional stability provided by the ABM treaty and we should be telling the US we want it maintained with, at the most, only marginally negotiated changes.

We don’t know what proponents of missile defence in the US really want or why. The argument that it is against rogue states (states of concern) such as Iraq and North Korea, always dubious, has been weakened somewhat by developments on the Korean peninsula. Others have worried about a possible accidental missile firing from Russia or longer term, a threatening re-assertive Russia. Just as McNamara said in the 1960s that the Sentinel, the ABM system of the day, was against China when he meant the USSR, today most believe that a defensive capability against China’s small ICBM force is the real target. Certainly, Presidential candidate Bush has spoken of a wide system rather than the limited one unwillingly accepted by the Clinton Administration.

My concern is with the reaction of the region. There are already missile defence systems at the theatre level so they are not new and, depending on their nature, TMD may not itself give undue concern to China or others. Sha Zukang, China’s arms control chief, has indicated that China could live with a TMD limited to Japan. China’s major concern is that TMD could be extended to Taiwan. This would not only reduce the credibility of China’s missile deterrence in the event of a declaration of independence but could give greater confidence to Taiwan to go down that track. Is China taking counter measures in anticipation of missile defence? It does not seem that there has been any acceleration of China’s missile build-up overall, but US arguments to ignore any response on the grounds that China would have increased its missile capacity anyway implicitly denies the idea of a security dilemma although history tells us it happens a lot. While there has been an increased concentration of missiles across the Taiwan Strait, the pace of missile modernisation seems to have remained pretty steady, and much of it of a new-for-old character. There is some suggestion that it is doing some work on decoys, and decoys and other such counters are likely to be sold to others who the US would regard as states of concern. NMD would increase US-China tension, and reduce China’s cooperation where needed, as in proliferation and on the Korean peninsula. Although to the US hard-liners (many of whom voted against CTBT), unease in China over NMD would be a plus, China is not the only arms race concern. While Congress has been pressing for supply of TMD to Taiwan, any transfer of missile defence to Taiwan likely needs considerable US involvement and thereby would be seen as restoring US-Taiwan military links. That is a serious risk that need not be taken.

Limited TMD is defensible for US bases in Japan but Japan is likely to be very cautious about a larger part in a more extensive high-level ship-based TMD. Always unwilling to be drawn into other peoples’ conflicts, to get into one against China over Taiwan would have massive and long-term implications. A colleague and I have argued that it would be better to put any ship-based TMD on US ships in Japan rather than on Japanese ships. If China does build up its missile capabilities, however, Japan could well respond in the same way, and others, including India and then Pakistan would do the same.

This leads to my broader point about alliance management. We have said little to the US about their missile defence proposals except to say at AUSMIN that ‘we understand’ why they are doing it. In this we are paralleled by Japan but other US allies have been vocal in their opposition. We seem to fear that to differ from US official statements will cause offence. This underrates the intelligence of our US allies. But we should not wait until they have made a decision because by then not only is a contrary view not much use but it would irritate. We should be more willing to say where our interests differ but to do so well before a decision is made.

The seventh meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in Bangkok on 27 July 2000. The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, chaired the meeting. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer led Australia’s delegation, which included Dr Ashton Calvert, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Dr Richard Brabin-Smith, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence. The meeting, which again comprised the traditional informal dinner followed by a full day of plenary discussions, clearly demonstrated that regional countries are becoming more comfortable with exchanging views on a widening range of security issues.

The highlight of the meeting was the presence for the first time of a DPRK delegation, led by Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun. DPRK participation served to complete the circle in terms of embracing the ARF’s geographic footprint and mandate. Korean Peninsula issues remained an important topic for discussion among Forum members. The ROK reported on the recent North-South Korean summit, saying it hoped that the admission of the DPRK to the ARF would facilitate the dismantling of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula.

An exchange of views on missile defence took up a significant part of the agenda, both at the pre-ARF dinner discussion of globalisation and during the discussions on regional security.

The discussion on Indonesia was constructive. The Chairman’s Statement issued at the close of the meeting underlined all Forum members’ support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia.

For the first time in the Forum’s history the Chairman’s statement also contained references to recent developments in the South Pacific, in view of their implications for overall security within the ARF geographic footprint.

China, Vietnam and the Philippines provided an account of progress in the negotiation of the code of conduct in the South China Sea.

Australia advised the Forum of progress in its human rights dialogue with Burma, and encouraged ASEAN countries to foster change there. Action to combat drug trafficking provided a practical focus to discussion on Burma, with a number of countries speaking on the transnational impact of drugs.

Illegal drug trafficking also had a high profile in the discussion of transnational security issues, with the Chair proposing a regional conference on drugs. It was also emphasised that the ARF needed to find ways to complement existing regional processes dealing with transnational issues rather than duplicate them. Australia proposed that the ARF draft a declaration regulating the use of small arms in the region, and noted that the whole region was the victim of people smuggling, the response to which needed to be cooperatively based. The meeting agreed that an ARF Expert Group on Transnational Crime would be convened in conjunction with the first meeting of the Inter-sessional Group on CBMs to explore further the ARF’s role and contribution in addressing transnational crime.

The Chair reported on efforts that had been made in the previous year to explore the overlap between Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy, and to strengthen the four proposals already agreed upon. These included an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, an ARF register of experts and eminent persons, an annual security outlook and preparation of voluntary background briefings on regional security issues. On the enhanced role of the ARF Chair, Australia proposed that the ARF consider adapting a mechanism similar to the ASEAN troika concept, drawing on both ASEAN and non-ASEAN members.

The report of the Co-Chairs, Japan and Singapore, on the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was tabled and endorsed, with Ministers noting the successful implementation of track one and two activities during the current inter-sessional year. The list of new CBMs for implementation in the short and medium term was endorsed, with agreement also that the Republic of Korea and Malaysia would be the Co-Chairs for the 2000-01 inter-sessional year.

The Australian delegation welcomed the frankness of the discussion of regional security issues in Bangkok, including the willingness of members to share views on internal matters with wider security implications. Also welcome was progress in some practical measures to develop an enhanced role for the ARF Chair as the Forum moves toward the second stage of its evolution—preventive diplomacy. In sum, Bangkok was an important milestone in the continued development of the ARF as a focus for regional security exchanges and cooperation.

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The year 2000 has witnessed an unprecedented campaign of diplomatic activism on the part of North Korea. The high point was undoubtedly the visit of President Kim Dae-jung to Pyongyang on 12 June. The momentum was maintained by reciprocal visits by divided family members in August, followed by direct talks between Defence Ministers.

The context for this activism has been the ‘sunshine policy’ of the Kim Dae-jung administration. As expounded in the ‘Berlin declaration’ of March 2000, this entailed the resolute pursuit by Seoul of dialogue and the facilitation of family reunion while providing assistance and funds for reconstruction, all provided that Pyongyang not threaten South Korea through direct military pressure. In the event Kim’s determination brought him the reward of the Nobel Peace Prize, though substantive confidence building measures in the military field await a future bi-lateral agenda.

This activism extended beyond the Korean peninsula. North Korea joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, conducting direct negotiations with the US and Japan on the sidelines. In October, following the visit to Washington by Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright travelled to Pyongyang for talks with Chairman Kim Jong-il, and Washington-Pyongyang negotiations regarding North Korea’s missile program then convened in Kuala Lumpur. There was some speculation regarding a possible visit to North Korea by President Bill Clinton. Meanwhile the major Western European states, including Britain and Germany, joined the queue of North Korea’s diplomatic partners.

The early decision by Australia to resume diplomatic relations with North Korea, announced on 5 May, therefore contributed to the broad move by many countries to engage what has been the world’s most isolated regime. In November, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announced his intention to visit Pyongyang in order to convey directly Australia’s concerns over the need for a more constructive approach on the Korean peninsula. Australian policy makers hope that these initiatives will help to convince Pyongyang of the urgent need for internal reform as well as for transparency in its nuclear and missile programs. While North Korea may take some notice of advice from Canberra on these matters, and will surely welcome the additional food and other aid that might be forthcoming, Pyongyang’s recent efforts to open a dialogue with Australia also address a specific historical legacy.

The visit of a party of Canberra-based senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to Pyongyang on 22-26 February 2000 placed the prospect of improved ties between Australia and North Korea on the agenda. Relations between the two were "interrupted" after the abrupt and still unexplained withdrawal of Pyongyang's embassy in Canberra in 1975, after a short stay of 11 months.

The outcome of the February visit was positive. Bilateral, regional and global issues were discussed, including the question of the transparency of North Korea's nuclear program and its efforts to develop long-range missiles. The Australian position was expressed that North Korea’s serious problems with food supply would only be addressed with extensive reconstruction of agriculture and industry.

In recent years Australia has had intermittent official contacts with North Korea as a result of persistent efforts made by foreign policy officials in Pyongyang. On the North Korean side the greatest concern was attracting new Australian trade and investment. The Australian interlocutors used these occasions to remind North Korea of its responsibilities to mitigate tensions on the peninsula and to respond to concerns regarding weapons proliferation. The February talks in Pyongyang may also have been prompted by developments elsewhere in the region. Australia's role in assembling the INTERFET force in East Timor was surely noticed in North Korea, where the possibility of international intervention remains a concern. The invitation was timed to coincide with a campaign to diversify North Korea's foreign contacts.

Australia's interest in North Korea stems from several sources. Concern with weapons proliferation and North Korea's reluctance to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty led Australia to support the Korea Peninsula Development Organisation (KEDO). KEDO, formed after an agreement between Washington and Pyongyang in October 1994 under which North Korea is freezing its nuclear weapons program, is constructing nuclear power plants in the country, at an estimated cost to the international consortium concerned of US$4.5billion. So far Australia has contributed A$14.8million to KEDO. Australia's close relationship with South Korea has been an important factor in support for a policy that reduces the likelihood of conflict between the two Korean states. The famine in North Korea that has resulted in the loss of as many as one million lives has also prompted Australia to offer humanitarian assistance. In May 1999 Australia donated A$10 million in famine relief, and on 16 February 2000 a further A$6million was pledged mostly to the World Food Program to assist with agricultural rehabilitation.

These efforts to improve relations should be seen also in the wider strategic context. After consultation with Japan and South Korea, the United States released the "Perry Report" in September 1999 which outlined a step-by-step strategy of improving relations between the two countries. If North Korea would cease missile exports and allow greater transparency in its weapons programs, the US would ease economic sanctions and ultimately implement full diplomatic contacts. As an initial step, a number of obstacles to US trade with and investment in North Korea were removed.

In Australian policy making circles, the view emerged that the time had passed when quarantine was an effective instrument in dealing with this suspicious and embattled regime. Keeping North Korea isolated has done little to improve its behaviour. It also threatens the programs of internationally funded reconstruction that the agricultural sector now desperately needs.

Throughout the sporadic contacts of the last few years, while trade, aid and investment have been perennial matters on the agenda, North Korea has consistently sought to resume full diplomatic relations. Australian spokesmen have been clear that this development is not predicated on any specific ‘performance’ on the part of North Korea, including their adherence to the proposed ‘Perry package.’ However, the agreement of the two Korean states to convene a meeting of their respective leaders gave impetus to a policy shift that was already under consideration.

The question remains of what return North Korea might gain from full relations, given that this goal has been so doggedly pursued. Currently Australia-South Korea relations are close (as was apparent during Kim Dae-jung's official visit in September 1999 and was reflected in South Korea’s prompt participation in INTERFET) and the two countries are important trading partners. Pyongyang may consider that a small triumph at this point may amount to an assertion of its separate identity. But there is also a significant historical legacy at stake. Australia is one of the sixteen countries to contribute forces to the UN command during the Korean War, and as such is one of the signatories of the July 1953 Declaration that committed those countries to action again if hostilities recurred. While this commitment is largely forgotten in Australia, its symbolism is still a matter of some importance for Pyongyang. North Korea has never accepted its responsibility for the war, and may view bilateral relations as an indicator that this commitment is at an end. From this perspective, it is no accident North Korea regarded the opening of relations in 2000 with Italy (a country that contributed non-combatants to the UN command during the conflict) as a major breakthrough. In addition, contacts were pursued with the Philippines and Canada, two further members of the sixteen, both of which have now recognised the DPRK.

For the past decade or more the South Pacific region has experienced a considerable degree of political and economic turbulence. Competition for power and access to the resources of the state have been intense; economic management and performance have been highly variable; challenges to governments – both constitutional and extra-constitutional – have been frequent; ethnic conflicts have seriously damaged the polities and economies of at least two Pacific Island countries; and, in many, the legitimacy of government and governing institutions is in question.

The picture is not completely uniform. Some Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are relatively stable; economic and policy reforms are taking good shape in a number; and, almost universally, civil society is expanding its voice for greater participation and better governance.

But issues of political instability and internal security are likely to predominate for a considerable time. Transnational crime is also beginning to impact on the security equation.

Conflict of various kinds is serial across the South Pacific region. The so-called "arc of crisis" to Australia’s north has its eastern extension into the Pacific. A broad sweep of the region from the Indonesian Province of West Papua (the second largest ethnic Melanesian entity) through Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands to Fiji in the central South Pacific, reveals at the very least -

• struggles for political autonomy (Papua, Bougainville);
• serious inter-tribal fighting over control of resources (PNG’s Southern Highlands);
• violent ethnic conflict over resources and identity (Solomon Islands);
• ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict over power and control (Fiji);

some of which have the potential to spill across borders thereby creating international dimensions to internal conflicts.

To this stage the South Pacific’s "regional security architecture" has been rudimentary. Various mechanisms exist for regional security cooperation including -

• Regional Agencies – e.g Forum Secretariat’s Regional Security Committee, South Pacific (SP) Chiefs of Police Conference, Pacific Island Law Officers Meeting, Oceania Customs Organisation, the Forum Fisheries Agency and its various arrangements for vessel licensing and surveillance;

• Regional Treaties and Agreements – e.g. the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (1985), the Honiara Declaration (1992) on law enforcement cooperation, the Aitutaki Declaration (1997) on consultations for security issues; and

• Bilateral arrangements including Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) and New Zealand’s Mutual Assistance Program.

But these mechanisms are uncoordinated and not geared to handling internal crises.

Regional dialogue and consultation on security issues (including economic and environmental) has lacked coherence, context and clout. More often than not the agenda has been driven by Australian and New Zealand interests. A "security and defence constituency" has not been developed in the South Pacific. Perhaps the largest impediment to a more comprehensive dialogue, however, has been the Pacific Island Forum’s informal "rule" or convention not to infringe each others’ sovereignty by discussing sensitive matters internal to each state.

That obstacle would appear to have been overcome (in theory at least) by recent developments at the SP regional level. A Forum Secretariat initiative saw the production of a report on "Enhancing Pacific Security" (June 2000); the inaugural meeting in August this year of the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers (FFAMM) in Samoa adopted a set of principles of democratic conduct and a commitment to consult in the event of a crisis (such as a coup) affecting the region’s security; and the Forum Meeting in Kiribati in October which adopted the Biketawa Declaration. which sets out a more activist approach to security issues.

The Biketawa Declaration mirrors the Commonwealth’s Harare Declaration by allowing for the exclusion from the SP "family" of a member which moves against democratic principles. Sanctions may also be considered. The Declaration provides for possible assistance to a member in dealing with internal conflict and post-conflict rehabilitation and it contemplates measures such as preventive diplomacy, mediation and sanctions. This signals a qualitatively and quantitatively different approach to regional security action in the South Pacific.

For the approach adopted in Kiribati to be effective, however, there is a clear need to construct a regional dialogue on security issues and to build knowledge and confidence in those policy and security communities on the management of regional crises. A form of "second-track" diplomacy is required to help develop an informed security constituency in the South Pacific with input into the policy process on issues of sovereignty and security and on conflict management and resolution. That form or "track" need not necessarily be as comprehensive as CSCAP. Regular defence, strategic and security conferencing involving politicians, officials, activists, scholars and commentators from within the Forum region as well as selected participation from the wider Asia Pacific would provide an appropriate start.

The Seminar on "Indonesia’s Future Challenges and Implications for the Region", co–organised by CSCAPs Indonesia and Japan, was held at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Jakarta, 7–9 March 2000. Roughly 200 participants took part, including 64 CSCAP representatives. The Seminar was opened by Mr Jusuf Wanandi and the Keynote address given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Alwi Shihab. His predecessor, Mr Ali Alatas, was present during the seminar and a frequent contributor from the floor. Dr Harold Crouch and Professor Ross Garnaut of the Australian National University were among the speakers. Also attending from AUS-CSCAP in a reporting capacity were AUS-CSCAP Executive Director John McFarlane and Euan Graham.

The seminar comprised four sessions:

1. Opportunities and risks in Indonesia’s democratisation process;
2. The decentralisation process in Indonesia: future relations between the centre and the provinces;
3. The future of the Indonesian Armed Forces;
4. The regional impact and the role of the region in Indonesia’s transformation:

In the keynote speech, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Dr Alwi Shihab, highlighted two watershed events in the crisis which brought about Indonesia’s democratic transition:

• The June 1999 Elections, as the first democratic elections held in Indonesia since 1955
• The October presidential election.

He identified five challenges facing the nation:

1. The magnitude and complexity of Indonesia’s economic problems
2. Creation of political institutions to meet popular demands
3. Promoting good governance and ridding the country of ‘corruption, cronyism and nepotism’
4. Building social order
5. Protecting the integrity of the State

Turning to the region, Dr Alwi stressed ASEAN would remain the linchpin of Indonesia’s diplomacy, and identified ASEAN’s economic initiatives as crucial to Indonesia’s reconstruction.

Mr Roth’s presentation was followed by Dr Mochtar Pabotingi, Professor Carolina Hernandez (CSCAP Co-Chair) and Ambassador Kim Kyung-won (CSCAP Korea). Dr Mochtar focussed on a legacy of abuse of the nation during the New Order, leaving Indonesia under Gus Dur with a massive task of reconstruction. Professor Hernandez and Ambassador Kim offered comparative experiences of democratic transitions in the Philippines and Korea.

The Minister for Regional Autonomy was not present to deliver the lead address and the second session lost some momentum as a result. The main point stressed was the importance of decentralisation to the democratisation process. Meaningful autonomy would have to be devolved to the regions to avoid local people feeling that their destiny is determined by Jakarta. Dr Hadi Soesastro discussed the fiscal viability of decentralisation. He said its aims should include increasing the revenue-generating and institutional capacity of the regions.

Dr Rizal Sukma’s presentation on Aceh highlighted the difficulty of negotiating autonomy in a historical context of political repression, and the importance of preserving a collective ethnic identity. This resulted in some lively exchanges between the panel and the floor.

The Minister of Defence’s address was delivered by a proxy. The three most important challenges identified in the Minister’s speech were to (1) revive the economy, (2) maintain national unity and (3) empower the Indonesian people through sustainable democracy. Among the efforts required to meet these challenge were increasing the size of the middle class, building a more critical attitude to the mass media, repositioning the defence and security apparatus to gain the respect of society, and strengthening cultural resilience.

The other speakers in the session were Ambassador Hasnan Habib, Dr. Harold Crouch, and MGEN. Agus Widjojo. Ambassador Hasnan Habib gave an engaging presentation highlighting milestones in the on-going reform process, including:

• ending the practice of assigning active military. personnel to non-military positions;
• retiring the Staff for Political Affairs at the Kodam (Region), Korem (Resort) and Kodim (District) command levels;
• severing TNI-Golkar ties;
• separating the police from ABRI, with ABRI reverting to its previous name: TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia);
• first appointment of a civilian Minister of Defence in 50 years.

Ambassador Habib acknowledged that the TNI leadership was aware of a "credibility gap" over military reform, but their awareness of Indonesia’s unpredictable social situation meant any approach to reform would be cautious.

Dr Crouch spoke on the challenges before the TNI, including how to dismantle the territorial structure of the armed forces. Difficulties identified included the problems of scale—since this requires restructuring 2/3^rds of the army’s troops; the belief of many officers that the police lack the capacity to take over the army’s territorial law and order functions; and the opportunities for material advancement which come with territorial appointments. Dr Crouch also ruled out the possibility of a military coup, above all because of the anticipated reaction on the streets.

MGEN. Agus Widjojo added the TNI’s perspective, claiming that the new paradigm introduced by the Armed Forces demonstrated awareness of the need for change, although its implementation was not as smooth as it might be. Describing reform as a two-way process, MGEN. Widjojo stated that civilian politicians had to establish their competence to deal with the military.

The ASEAN Secretary-General, Rodolfo Severino, emphasised the importance of Indonesia to ASEAN, stressing that ASEAN’s creation was made possible only by Indonesia’s internal transformation between 1965–1967.

The second part of Session Four was led by Professor Han Sung-joo of CSCAP Korea, who framed the importance of Indonesia’s recovery in a regional and global context. In terms of Indonesia’s impact on regional security, Professor Han singled out the safety of sea lanes and the potential for a power-vacuum leading to power rivalry in the region.

The European CSCAP representative noted that the distinguishing and positive feature of the transition from Suharto was that all this happened within Indonesia, was implemented by Indonesians, of their own will and was not forced on them from outside.

Prof.essor Ross Garnaut was the last speaker. In his presentation he placed Indonesia’s political changes in the context of wider power shifts, with the rise of China and India. Addressing relations between Australia and Indonesia he suggested it is important for Australia to ‘close the loop’ with Indonesia and elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia.

Referring collectively to the TNI, political parties, civil society, the press and Gus Dur as Indonesia’s ‘nodes of power’, Mr Wanandi sounded an optimistic note in his closing remarks, stating that these remained intact to provide an anchor for the nation.

1. Specialists in strategic studies from the Centre for Political and Regional Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPW–LIPI) and the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC), Australian Defence Force Academy, met in Jakarta between 7–9 June 2000 to discuss a ‘second track’ framework and agenda for advancing bilateral security cooperation.
2. The meeting, which was held in a positive and constructive atmosphere, agreed to establish the Indonesia–Australia Strategic Forum (IASFOR). The Forum’s primary purpose is to enhance dialogue between Indonesia and Australia on security issues of mutual concern by:

1. Increasing public awareness and understanding of each country’s security interests and perceptions;
2. Acting as an incubator of ideas for progressing the bilateral relationship in the security domain;
3. Identifying and formulating practical initiatives for future security cooperation;
4. Providing strategic policy options for the Indonesian and Australian Governments to consider.

1. The Forum identified the following subjects for analysis and cooperation:

(a) Shared security interests and problems;

(b) Civil–military relations;

(c) Regional oceans management;

(d) Transnational threats, including illicit drug trafficking, people smuggling, illegal fishing and piracy.

2. The Forum agreed that cooperation in each of these areas would best be undertaken through the following processes:

1. Networking.

1. PPW–LIPI and ADSC agreed to report the outcome of their deliberations to their respective governments and to meet again in Australia before the end of 2000.
2. It was also agreed that IASFOR will encourage broad-based participation in the Forum's activities under the auspices of PPW–LIPI and the ADSC.

9 June 2000

Head Director

Centre for Regional and Australian Defence
International Studies Studies Centre

PPW–LIPI ADFA

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The CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group will hold two meetings during the year. The 8^th Meeting of the Working Group took place in Manila 25–26 July and the 9^th will be held in Beijing 20–21 November.

The Philippine Center for Marine Affairs and CSCAP Philippines hosted the meeting in Manila. These organisations did a fine job in arranging the meeting for which the Working Group was most appreciative. Both Co-Chairs of the Working Group were present at the meeting along with twenty-one other participants from thirteen member CSCAPs (Australia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, US and Vietnam) with one participant from Taiwan and eleven observers.

The objectives of the Manila meeting were to:

• review regional maritime security, including current initiatives for regional cooperation;
• discuss the draft CSCAP Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea.;
• consider the scope of a prospective CSCAP Memo on Law of the Sea; and
• discuss the program for the 9^th Working Group meeting.

Three papers on regional maritime security were presented to the meeting each covering a particular part of the region (i.e. Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific). The first of these papers was from CSCAP China. It noted that, despite positive developments with maritime security and confidence-building in Northeast Asia, destabilising factors still existed, particularly the lack of mutual trust between regional countries. Northeast Asia was a maritime region with overlapping claims to jurisdiction, relatively few agreed maritime boundaries and a potential for tensions to increase, particularly over resource disputes. But maritime cooperation was on the agenda of Northeast Asian countries with several fisheries agreements either already agreed or under discussion (i.e. between China and Japan and between China and South Korea). China was also pursuing a range of other maritime cooperative activities with neighbouring countries, including marine safety, language training and marine scientific research.

The overview of maritime security in Southeast Asia was provided by CSCAP-Vietnam. This paper reviewed recent developments in the region, including progress with the proposed Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The negotiating future for the Code was optimistic although a major problem still existed with resolving differences between China and ASEAN countries with regard to the geographical area of application for the Code, specifically that China wanted the Paracel Islands excluded from the area. The paper also discussed the various ongoing bilateral talks that Vietnam was involved with, including a joint experts group on maritime issues with China.

CSCAP-New Zealand presented the South Pacific review. This paper focussed on general security in the South Pacific rather than more narrowly on maritime issues. It provoked discussion of the extent to which the South Pacific was "a strategic backwater", as suggested in the paper. However, a consensus emerged that, at least as far as oceans issues were concerned, this was not the case. Important factors were the extent of the Pacific Ocean, the value of its resources and the common interest of regional countries in the sustainable development of those resources. Despite the ‘bad image’ created by incidents such as had occurred in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, there were also many good developments, particularly cooperative activities in the maritime domain and the prospective development of a regional oceans policy.

The meeting was briefed on several current initiatives for regional maritime cooperation, including the program for Partnerships in Environmental Management of the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, naval cooperation in Northeast Asia (particularly between the US, Japan and South Korea), fisheries management cooperation in Asia Pacific, and Japan’s recent initiatives to combat piracy in Southeast Asia. The latter included a meeting of regional coastguards. This suggested the potential for coastguard cooperation as a maritime confidence building measure, complementing naval cooperation, particularly as more countries were now establishing coastguard forces responsible for maritime enforcement and safety.

The representative of CSCAP-Thailand briefed the meeting on recent activities dealing with maritime cooperation conducted under the umbrella of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This led to some discussion of the relationship between the ARF and CSCAP, and specifically how best the Working Group could serve the interests of the ARF. Participants saw this not as a matter of expecting tasking from the ARF but more of the Working Group using the expertise it had available to lead with identifying problem areas and canvassing solutions that might ease tensions and reduce the risk of conflict.

Extensive discussion took place of the draft CSCAP Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea most of which focussed on the recommendations in the draft. Comments on the draft were generally supportive and constructive. Several Working Group members accepted responsibility for re-drafting the annexes to the draft memo and parts of the recommendations. The objective will be to circulate another draft of the memo as soon as possible with a view to being able to table an agreed outcome at the CSCAP Steering Committee meeting to be held in Manila December 2000.

For some time now, the Working Group has had the study of "grey areas" in the Law of the Sea on its agenda in so far as they are apparent in the Asia Pacific region. The origin of this work dates back to an ARF Inter-sessional meeting in Singapore in 1997 that referred a paper on Navigational Rights and Freedoms to CSCAP. One of the authors of that paper, the representative of CSCAP Europe, was present at the Manila meeting and led off discussion with a short talk on his work on a possible declaration on navigational rights in the Asia-Pacific region.

The meeting considered how the Working Group could structure its contribution to resolving regional "grey areas" in the law of the sea and which of these were real problems. Participants acknowledged that these extended to more than navigational regimes and included such issues as coastal State powers in the various maritime zones and the regime of islands. The uncertainties emerged largely from discrepancies between current state practice and conventional regimes. A consensus emerged that useful work for the Working Group lay in examining state practice in the region and the extent to which it accords with the relevant conventions. Representatives of CSCAPs Canada, Philippines, New Zealand and India agreed to present papers at the next Working Group meeting canvassing interpretation issues with the law of the sea from their separate perspectives.

CSCAP-China will host the 9^th Meeting of the Working Group. The theme of the meeting will be Maritime Cooperation in Northeast Asia and a special effort will be made to ensure that there is participation from CSCAP-DPRK and CSCAP-Mongolia. In expressing his appreciation on behalf of CSCAP China for the opportunity to host the 9^th meeting, Ambassador Xu Guangjian acknowledged the serious security problems in Northeast Asia but referred also to the common interests of Northeast Asian countries, particularly in the maritime domain. There was scope to exploit common maritime goals and interests and thereby assist in making the region stable and more prosperous.

Regional maritime cooperation continues to be an exciting and potentially rewarding area of work. On the one hand there are some pessimistic developments with countries hardening their sovereignty claims at sea and seeking to exert national maritime jurisdiction more strongly. But on the other hand, some optimistic trends are evident with an increasing incidence of maritime cooperation and dialogue in the region. This could lead to cooperative management arrangements in disputed areas that reduce the risks of conflict. There is growing acceptance of the principle that resolution of sovereignty claims is not a prerequisite of cooperation.

The first meeting of the Working Group on Transnational Crime for 2000 took place in Manila on 31 May–1 June. The two themes of that meeting were identity fraud, especially in relation to international travel documents, and law enforcement cooperation in the region.

The theme of identity fraud provided a lively basis for discussion amongst the group. A range of papers established that the problem is pervasive throughout the region and that it is especially prevalent in relation to travel documentation. In that form, it is a major facilitator of a number of crimes, including illegal movement of people, trafficking in women and children, terrorism, fraud (especially credit card fraud, which is rising rapidly) and illicit drugs trafficking.

Two sub-themes emerged from these discussions, and the Working Group subsequently decided to explore these further by establishing two Sub-Groups.

The first of these is attempting to develop best practice guidelines for the issuance of identity documents, especially relating to travel, throughout the region. It will be progressed under the chairmanship of the author.

After a slow start due to other commitments on the part of the Chair, the Sub-Group recently provided a set of draft best practice guidelines. It would be fair to say, however, that a viable network capable of ‘sense checking’ these guidelines has not yet been developed throughout the region. So the guidelines have no status other than some ideas from Australia at this stage. Meanwhile, at the Eighth Meeting of the Working Group in Bangkok (17–18 October) the meeting undertook to assist the Chair of the Sub-Group to extend the network into the countries represented by attendees.

Once a network has been developed, it will be necessary to establish a ‘virtual dialogue’ to further develop the draft best practice guidelines. No doubt the final version will be substantially different from the present, given the range of levels of technological capacity and political systems to be found throughout the region.

The second Sub-Group to develop from the work at Manila is working on ‘Cyber-Crime’. This Sub-Group came into existence because of the perception that there is a close connection between document and identity fraud on the one hand and new computational technologies such as scanning on the other. Notwithstanding its roots in these concerns, the Sub-Group is dealing with the issue of Cyber-Crime more generally, with a special focus on lack of a coherent framework of legislation throughout the Region.

The Cyber-Crime Sub-Group has been formed under the Chairmanship of Hamish McCardle of the New Zealand Police Service. It has made considerable progress forming a research network and identifying the extent of the problem in the Region. Mr McCardle presented the work of the Sub-Group at the recent Bangkok meeting, which endorsed a program of further action by the Group. Like the Document Fraud Group, the Cyber-Crime Group has a practical bias to its work, in that it will continue to build a professional network and focus on regulatory and legislative issues. The Bangkok meeting also benefited from a comprehensive account of Cyber Crime in Singapore by a member of the Singapore Police, Mr Wilfred Nathan.

A third area of work covered at the Manila meeting was law enforcement cooperation. Considerable discussion took place on this issue, but the Working Group had some difficulty in finding a satisfactory approach to the problem. One reason for this difficulty may have been the perception that it was hard for the membership of the group, being a mixture of officials and non-officials from a large range of professional backgrounds, to bridge the gap between the second track and first tracks. However, it was generally agreed that the level of cooperation throughout the region was far from adequate, given the number of mechanisms already available, such as INTERPOL and ASEANAPOL.

This difficulty in reconciling the work of the second and first track was subsequently brought to the surface at the CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting at Kuala Lumpur, where one regional country expressed the view that issues covered at the Transnational Crime Working Group meeting in Manila were now being covered at the official level elsewhere. Presumably, one of the initiatives that the delegate who expressed this view had in mind was the decision to form an ARF Experts’ Group Meeting on Transnational Crime. This group will initially cover the issues of piracy, people smuggling and trafficking and firearms trafficking.

Despite these difficulties encountered by the Working Group at Manila, it was decided that an assessment of the state of play with mutual assistance and extradition in the region was needed. Special Agent Myron Fuller of the FBI Honolulu office was commissioned to undertake this work. Mr Fuller’s report to the Bangkok meeting confirmed the poor level of cooperation, as evidenced by the low number of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) in place in the region. Mr Fuller’s work also identified that MLATs are the most effective means of progressing law enforcement cooperation. He will continue to explore the causes of this lack of effective cooperation in further work.

The Bangkok meeting adopted the view that there is still considerable work to do in all three areas covered by the sub-groups. The Transnational Crime Working Group is confident that this work will effectively augment the work of the first track by providing detailed research on issues of a practical nature, such as developing best practice guidelines and reviewing regional legislation. Moreover, the areas being addressed are not currently being covered by the Experts’ Group Meeting.

The Bangkok meeting also requested further attention to the role of the military and security apparatus in law enforcement, the problem of terrorism (but strictly from a criminal perspective) and the role of police in peace keeping and peace making. These issues will be addressed at the next meeting, to take place in Australia, along with the three issues covered by the sub-groups.

Finally, it was noted that Australia now has an academic institute to deal specifically with transnational crime. This is Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, located at the Law Faculty of the University of Wollongong in New South Wales. The Institute will take on graduate diploma and masters students at the beginning of the 2001 academic year. The Working Group on Transnational Crime has been working closely with this institute, along with similar institutes throughout the region, and will continue to do so.

While recent international developments in electronic communications and information technology, transport and trade offer countries many economic and social benefits, they also pose new and complex crime prevention and investigation problems for governments, law enforcement agencies, banking and financial institutions. The freer movement of people, money, goods, services and ideas creates institutional vulnerability and opportunities upon which organised criminal activity thrives. In 1997, the Study Group on Transnational Crime of the Asia Pacific Council for Security Co-operation identified 19 crime types impacting on regional security. Examples are narcotics production and trafficking, firearms and people trafficking, smuggling, fraud, corruption, money laundering, internet crime, paedophile activity, natural resources poaching and illegal shipment of hazardous waste.

As traditional national borders become less of a barrier to criminals, everyday policing is being internationalised. However, the resulting cooperative enforcement practices and extensions of municipal law lead to a multiplicity of jurisdictional problems. Moreover, the increasing sophistication of multi-jurisdictional crime requires at least as sophisticated a response employing new knowledge, skills, technology, mandates and lines of communication. In particular, the multi-disciplinary skills required in transnational crime prevention and investigation, additional to those necessary for traditional policing work, include specialised legal, commercial, information technology and political skills.

The University of Wollongong and the University of Wollongong Foundation have established an interdisciplinary Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP), located within the University's

Faculty of Law. The Centre has a unique opportunity to work at the cutting edge of regional research on policing and crime prevention and investigation and to forge strong international and domestic links. The Centre will develop as a focal point for exchange of information and research on these matters among Asian and Pacific countries.

CTCP activities and postgraduate programs were discussed internationally at the recent seventh and eighth meetings of the CSCAP Transnational Crime Working Group in Manila and Bangkok, respectively. To ensure that CTCP has the necessary external advice on all aspects of its activities and remains relevant to stakeholders, a National Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr Duncan Chappell, and an International Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr Sandy Gordon are being established.

From February 2001, CTCP will offer a specialised postgraduate program, including an inter-disciplinary masters degree and graduate certificate by coursework, for law enforcement and other professionals from Australia, the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The unique coursework program will require students to undertake a range of subjects that will provide the knowledge and skills to be effective in a complex, multi-jurisdictional environment, requiring co-operation between both governmental and private organisations. The skills addressed include both financial and auditing, and computer and IT skills required in tracking fraudulent and other criminal activity.

Completion of a postgraduate program should enhance students' career opportunities, including in risk management and corporate crime prevention. Within Australia, researchers and coursework program participants are expected to come from Police Services, Customs, Immigration, Tax, and Specialist Law Enforcement Agencies, Stock Exchanges, Banks, Insurance Companies and Private Security Organisations. International participants are expected to come from like agencies in other countries as well as from international agencies.

The multi-disciplinary character of the Centre is reflected in the broad range of expertise linked with the program both from within, and outside, the University of Wollongong. CTCP’s on campus stakeholders include the School of Information Technology and Computer Science, the Department of Accounting and Finance and the History and Politics Program. The Centre also seeks to forge partnerships with institutions with common interests. Domestically, CTCP already has a strong relationship with the Australian Defence Studies Centre and consults widely with government and corporate entities about its activities. Internationally, CTCP has established a range of strategic relationships with governmental and academic institutions.

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The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Seminar on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) was held at the Royal Australian Air Force Base Williamtown, near Newcastle, from 13–16 December 1999. The seminar was one of the new confidence building measures proposed for implementation during the 1999–00 inter-sessional year.

Each ARF member nation was invited to send a delegation of two officials. 55 delegates, both military and civilian, Defence, Foreign Affairs and ICRC attended. 20 ARF countries were represented. Participants were generally mid to senior level officers who are actively involved in the consideration of legal issues in the defence strategic planning process, or from training or operational areas.

Australia hosted and chaired the seminar, with the Department of Defence having prime carriage. The seminar was held with the cooperation and financial participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This was the first time that an NGO had been involved in an ARF activity, and the expertise that the ICRC was able to contribute to the development of the program was invaluable. A number of ICRC experts attended the seminar, and were able to speak on various LOAC topics from the NGO perspective.

The LOAC is a body of rules which attempts to limit the effects of armed conflict. It aims at protecting persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in combat and restricts the methods and means of warfare. However, with the proliferation of intra-state conflicts, non-combatants are becoming much harder to distinguish from combatants. This is complicated by the large number of peacekeeping operations being deployed worldwide to address these conflicts. Defence force personnel need to have a sound understanding of the law of armed conflict and its application.

The ADF has developed an LOAC training program, and a number of other ARF countries have undertaken bilateral cooperative activities in the area of LOAC training. There has also been some regional cooperation to date, including through the ICRC. Australia saw value in further contributing to a shared, regional understanding of LOAC.

The objectives of the seminar were to:

• Provide those participants who might be less familiar with the issues with an overview of the LOAC framework;
• Provide a forum within which participants could discuss specific issues relating to the application of the law of armed conflict, including:

• How LOAC principles can be applied to the planning process;
• How to apply LOAC principles to the conduct of operations; and
• How to apply LOAC principles to post-conflict action and administration.

• Engage participants on issues relating to training concepts and delivery platforms for LOAC; and
• Explore possibilities for greater regional cooperation in dialogue and training on LOAC.

The seminar had a suitable balance of theory, guest presentations by senior defence officials, ICRC representatives and academics, syndicate exercises and presentations, regional nation presentations, and open discussion periods. However, the focus of the seminar was on practical implementation and training. Topics addressed included:

• Command responsibility;
• The conduct of operations;
• Air and Naval operations;
• Internal conflict and human rights; and
• An interactive case study.

Training methodologies were shared, including a film from the Philippines, ICRC techniques and a newly developed interactive CD-ROM on military operations and the law applicable in Australia. Each ARF country was given a copy of this CD-ROM.

All of those countries who attended gave very informative presentations on their national approaches to, and implementation, of LOAC. These presentations contribute greatly to regional transparency and information exchange, and they provide the basis for future discussion on regional cooperation.

The inclusion of the ICRC in the seminar was extremely valuable. It gave participants the opportunity to be exposed to the ICRC focus on the humanitarian aspects of LOAC, which was very useful and complementary to the military’s traditional experience. One of the presentations focused on the CROCODILE 99 exercise. The ICRC was included in this command post exercise to enhance the realism of the exercise, and simulate the interactions that would take place in reality.

The ICRC had already worked with many ARF members on LOAC and other related areas, so was not an unknown quantity. From this experience, we have recommended that the inclusion of such NGOs warrants consideration for future activities.

The atmospherics of the seminar were very friendly and relaxed, with all delegates actively involved in discussions, syndicate work and presentations. The mix of presentations and syndicate work proved successful. We were able to engage participants intensively on the issues underpinning LOAC and gave them much to think about.

Overall, the seminar was judged to have been most successful. The objectives were met in a useful and productive atmosphere, and the seminar was seen to meet a real need within the region and to be timely and appropriate. Both Thailand and Cambodia intend to hold follow up seminars on this subject.

One of the many CBMs in the ASEAN Regional Forum panoply of measures mentioned in the last Bangkok Ministerial Meeting communiqué was the annual meeting of Defence Colleges. The 4^th ARF Meeting of Heads of Defence Colleges and Institutions was held in Beijing, 6 - 8 September 2000. 21 of the 23 ARF member nations were represented on this occasion, usually by the heads of colleges or senior delegates from training institutions. Australia was represented by the Principal (Brendan O’Loghlin) and Director of Studies (Paul Varsanyi). The meeting coincided with the visit by the Australian Defence College to China during its annual Overseas Study Tour. This confluence was on one hand fortunate in ‘killing two birds with one stone’ (I am careful to quote General Xing Shizhong since the application of such terminology to these august events by a visitor could cause serious international repercussions … or at least surreptitious smirks), and on the other hand difficult, in forcing some time-sharing between events (I missed the trip to the Great Wall this time!)

The Minister for Defence, General Chi Haotian, officially opened the meeting. The PLA NDU under the leadership of General Xing Shizhong hosted the

conference, all proceedings being conducted in Beijing at a large hotel. The host nation made every effort to ensure that the event was well conducted and impressive in every detail. A briefing and tour of the NDU provided delegates with an excellent overview of a large and expanding campus which has already produced ten thousand graduates for the PLA, many now in positions of authority.

Following introductory statements by each college, the agenda covered presentations and debate on regional security, education in the information age, war-gaming and simulation, and cooperation between colleges. The long attendance list naturally curtailed the number and extent of speeches and interventions, but papers presented were well prepared and presented. Subsequent discussion was generally time-limited and consequently could not reach searching and candid levels.

Many of the papers were limited to brief and factual statements regarding delegates’ college or official policy. A few papers in each of the six sessions were able to go beyond this level and provide substantive contribution to debate on the main topics. Some countries were represented nominally or not at all, and others made very little contribution in plenary. However, such benchmarks do not capture the value of interaction outside the formal meetings.

The debate on the security outlook for the region was marked by familiar references to negative and positive aspects, with some concern being expressed about the questions of trends in non-military violence, individual security, economic development and stability as strong precursors to other elements of security. Border disputes, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan are always worth discussing; these and many other issues offer opportunity for different countries to state ‘party line’ or opinion, although deeper debate on drivers and solutions, as already noted, was constrained.

The primary purpose of the conference, to foster linkages between the counterpart colleges, universities and institutes, was achieved well. Senior staff had opportunity to interact and exchange views at various levels. Suggestions for ways to formalise or improve the content of collaboration were tabled, although implementation will inevitably be measured in accordance with ARF principles and practice. National colleges, universities and institutes display much commonality in purpose and much divergence in scale and charter. All recognise the importance of developing leaders in security communities with a deep understanding of regional and national issues. The role of the armed forces in security is also a constant but its prominence within the complex contours of national security studies varies markedly according to the nature of the institute and host nation.

Most colleges conduct educational courses at the operational or command and staff college as well as strategic studies level. The process of exchanging information about curricula and method is important—the initial multilateral forum, albeit superficial in content, nevertheless provided impetus to bilateral exchanges at a deeper level. So there is an interest in further sharing of information, papers and ideas especially by those more connected and globally oriented through such channels as the Internet.

Incidentally, the ADC study tour, which is intended to allow participants to interact personally with government, academic, industry or policy areas in relevant countries, was most successful. The itinerary also included the Philippines and Malaysia, providing opportunities for round table seminars with counterparts. Besides the PLA NDU meetings, we therefore had very useful sessions with the National Defence College of the Philippines under Dr Clarita Carlos and ISIS Malaysia with Dato’ Jahwar Hassan. Papers presented and subsequent discussion on regional issues was particularly interesting and rewarding.

Future topics will probably include accreditation or credentials of courses. Australia’s nationally structured educational system and many course opportunities, which are solidly used and appreciated by sectors of regional countries both within and beyond the armed forces, are clearly of some interest and highly valued. The ADC, with a growing level of experience in tapping external academic sources for its educational content, intends to contribute on this topic next year.

The 5^th Meeting in 2001 will be held in Japan and hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo. By then, structural developments will have changed the ADC significantly. The redevelopment of the campus brings the newly combined Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) to Weston Creek on the site of the old JSSC as part of the ADC. If we attend again next year as hoped, the small Australian delegation (usually two plus the defence attaché) could therefore be drawn from a new leadership team comprising Rear Admiral Raydon Gates RAN as Commander ADC, Paul Varsanyi in the retitled role of Principal of the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Air Commodore Peter McDermott as Commandant of the ACSC (all of these at Weston Creek) and Brigadier Gordon Jones at ADFA.

A Confucian analect inscribed over a portal at the PLA NDU reminds us that it is very good to receive guests from afar. China certainly fulfilled its own great sage’s advice perfectly well. For the delegates’ part, three days coming from afar is a substantial investment but as a CBM the activity continues to serve the ARF Phase I purposes. It may also support less directly other phases as they evolve. While goal-oriented delegates chafe for focus, progress and structure, others savour the insights gained and the loose network of contacts as a sufficient product.

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Editors: Shahram Akbarzadeh, School of Sociology, Politics and Anthropology, La Trobe University, Michael O'Keefe, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The University of Melbourne

Volume 13, 2001, 3 issues per year
ISSN 1323–9104

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The last several years have seen dramatic changes, not least the end of the Cold War, the break-up and decline of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the widespread phenomenon of internal conflict, the expanding role of the United Nations, new forms of global economic and financial integration, and the remarkable economic fluctuations of the Asia-Pacific region. Equally striking is the emergence of a 'macropolitical agenda' in which human rights, the global environment, population movements and transnational crime are moving closer to the centre stage of international affairs.

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10 December 2000: 7^th Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, Makati Shangri-la Hotel, Manila.

11-12 December 2000: 14^th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, Makati Shangri-la Hotel, Manila.

May 2001: 9th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime, Sydney. [Details to be advised].

May/ June 2001: 15^th Asia-Pacific Round Table, Kulala Lumpur. [Details to be advised]

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