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FOREWORD

CSCAP has continued consolidating its organisational arrangements and pursuing substantive issues in regional security. We now hope that a solution has been found to the China-Taiwan membership question, with Taiwanese participants having observer status in their personal capacities only, but participating fully in the Working Groups. China's membership is crucial to all of CSCAP's work, and to its relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While supporting an active second track, including CSCAP's role, the ARF has accepted that all ARF members should participate in ARF second track activities. The CSCAP Working Group on the North Pacific is also greatly handicapped by China's absence.

Vietnam and Mongolia would seem likely prospective members of CSCAP in the near future, and affiliate status was given to the UN Regional Centre (Kathmandu), and observer status to the East Asia Pacific Division of the UN (New York).

Meanwhile all CSCAP Working Groups have met, several more than once. The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia, has made good progress, the papers discussed at the first meeting to be available in published form shortly. In April, its second meeting will discuss regional naval cooperation, marine science and the environment, shipping and seaborne trade, and marine resource and boundary disputes. Australia has also been active in the other Working Groups. The Group on CSBMs presented its first report to the ARF HOMs in May 1995 before the last ARF meeting. The Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security completed a report which will also go to the HOMs and the papers from its first (Wellington) meeting will be published shortly. The Steering Committee will decide whether the Group should develop some issues further or be discontinued. The Working Group on Security Cooperation in the North Pacific has also met, with the papers to be published.

The two year term of Amos Jordan of the US as CSCAP Co-Chair is about to end. Under arrangements determined at the December CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting he will be replaced by a non-ASEAN member at the June Steering Committee Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, while an ASEAN member will replace Jusuf Wanandi after a further year.

At the two meetings of AUS-CSCAP since the last newsletter, and particularly at the more recent meeting in February, there has been recognition of the need for added work on environmental issues, especially in relation to the work of the Group on Maritime Cooperation. International crime in the region was seen as a possible subject for the Group on the Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security.

The AUS-CSCAP programme is at last sound financially. For this we are grateful to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and to three generous corporate sponsors. This is particularly important since Australia will host the December 1996 Steering Committee meeting here in Canberra.

Professor Stuart Harris, Co-Chair AUS-CSCAP

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THE SECOND MEETING OF THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)

The second meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held on 1 August 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, immediately prior to the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and commencing with an informal dinner on 31 July. The meeting was a success, marked by a greater commitment by participants to the ARF and confidence in its viability and value. It also saw a consolidation of ARF processes as reflected in the ARF Chairman's Statement issued on 1 August.

Discussion of regional security issues, while non-confrontational, was more detailed and frank than at the first ARF with no issues ruled out for discussion. It represented an intensification and deepening of the exchanges on such issues, compared with the first ARF. Australia had consistently argued that while it was too early in the development of the ARF for it to be able to play a role in resolving South China Sea issues, this was an issue which the ARF should not shy away from discussing in light of events this year. We were therefore pleased with the exchanges on that issue because it showed that the ARF was capable of discussing even sensitive issues in a meaningful but appropriately non-confrontational and constructive way.

Australia was also keen to see discussion of the nuclear testing issue. We were heartened by the number of regional countries which shared our concerns over continued Chinese testing and the announced resumption of French testing and by the depth of opposition to such testing, the only discordant note coming from the European Union (EU) - the Presidency of which attends the ARF meetings - which took the unusual step of circulating a written disclaimer to the relevant paragraphs of the Chairman's Statement.

Australia was pleased to see at this second meeting of the ARF agreement on some modest defence-related cooperative measures such as annual submission to the ARF of short defence policy papers and endorsement or exchanges between ARF members of their security perceptions. Australia, along with Japan, had submitted to the ARF processes this year an example of such a defence statement in an effort to encourage greater transparency.

Another welcome outcome was agreement to move forward with a substantial official-level work programme. An Intersessional Support Group (ISG) was established, co-chaired by Indonesia and Japan, to study confidence building measures (CBMs) over two meetings before the next ARF meeting in July 1996. The first meeting of this ISG will be in Tokyo in mid January 1996. Intersessional Support Meetings (ISMs) to study peacekeeping and search and rescue were also endorsed. The US will co-chair with Singapore the ISM on regional cooperation in search and rescue meeting in Honolulu in March 1996, and Canada will co-chair with Malaysia the ISM on peacekeeping scheduled for Kuala Lumpur in April 1996. The full and equal participation by non-ASEAN members is ensured by these chairing arrangements, whereby each intersessional meeting is co-chaired by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN country.

There was also agreement to a second track meeting on basic principles to govern relations in the Asia Pacific region. But most encouraging in the consideration of the future work programme was the degree to which ARF Ministers were agreed on the need for the ARF to show progress and to produce, from this process, some concrete results.

In the Chairman's Statement, Ministers endorsed an evolutionary approach for the ARF taking place in three broad stages, namely the promotion of confidence building measures, development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and elaboration of approaches to conflicts. Within this evolutionary framework, there was recognition of the linkage between confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy and that there would be an overlap in discussions on the implementation of these two stages. Australia sees it as important not to lose sight of preventive diplomacy as a valuable issue for official-level discussion. The development of habits, practices and mechanisms to avoid and prevent disputes is achieved most easily and effectively at times of relative peace - rather than leaving it to the eleventh hour to develop the appropriate mechanisms.

A matter which will require consideration over the next few years is that of membership of the ARF. There is an impressive list of countries which have expressed interest in joining the ARF including countries such as India, the UK and France, the last two wishing to be members in their own right and not just through the EU representation. There is a general feeling, however, that given the infancy of the ARF, it should consolidate with its present membership before considering expansion. Ministers therefore agreed at the second ARF to defer consideration of further applications for participation after the admission of Cambodia, pending the completion of a study of membership criteria. Indonesia, as the incoming ARF Chair has responsibility for commencing this study.

The Second ARF Meeting saw a consolidation of the ARF with deeper discussion of regional issues, and the establishment of a first track work programme. A road map for the future development of the ARF has been laid down and this augurs well for the future of the ARF as the Asia Pacific's primary inclusive regional security body.

Rosemary Greaves, Director, Regional Security Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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THE INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES SECURITY CONFERENCE

Asia Pacific security cooperation is a not a new concept at least at the non-government level. In the post-Vietnam period especially, a considerable number of conferences on a range of topics has effectively built strong networks of academics and practitioners throughout the region. Many took their impetus from Cold War concerns but, in the post-Cold War period, have expanded to include colleagues from the former communist bloc countries.

Organisation
The international conference on the security of sea lanes of communication (SLOC) was effectively launched in 1982 following a number of informal meetings between Dr Han Li Wu from Taiwan, Hon Min Kwan Shik of South Korea and Hon Shin Kanemaru of Japan. These three had held ministerial office in their respective countries and they added a number of senior American former officials who had been closely associated with their countries. These included General Richard Stilwell, formerly UN commander in Korea, and Ambassadors Alex Johnson and Len Unger who had served for many years in East Asia.

The central concern of these mainly retired but very influential individuals was what was perceived as a serious security threat posed to the merchant shipping which not only serviced the rapid economic growth of the region but also permitted the reinforcement of Western forces in Northeast Asia. The rapid development of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and especially its air arm based around the long-range supersonic Tu-26 Backfire bomber was seen to be the principal security threat, perhaps eclipsing that of nuclear war.

The first conference was held in San Francisco in 1982 and included representatives from the four countries. Key participants were a group of retired Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force officers based in the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS). The conference confirmed not only the perception of threat but began the process of quantifying the degree of dependence of the North-East Asian economies upon the free movement of merchant shipping.

That first conference also noted the extent of the sea lanes involved and the fact that they passed through South-East Asian waters where they were vulnerable to interdiction from the new Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. As a result, participants from the ASEAN nations and Australia were invited to the second conference scheduled for October 1983 in Tokyo. Commodore Alan Robertson RAN (Rtd) and I took an active part in this conference while the Australian Defence AttachŽ in Tokyo attended as an observer.

Subsequent conferences have been held in Singapore (1985), Taipei (1986), Seoul (1987), Melbourne (1988), Washington (1990), Bali (1992) and Kuala Lumpur (1994). The next is scheduled for Taipei in January 1996. The conference programme is managed by a small and informal steering committee which delegates the conduct of each conference to a host institution. Until 1994, I was the Australian representative on the committee but handed over this responsibility to Commodore Sam Bateman AM RAN (Rtd) in 1994 when he joined the Centre for Maritime Policy at the University of Wollongong.

Because of their reluctance to become involved in the East-West confrontation, there was an initial reluctance among the ASEAN nations to become involved in the SLOC conference. The Singapore conference was notable for some vigorous exchanges between some senior US participants on the one hand and representatives from ASEAN institutes on the other. This changed from 1988 onwards with an increasingly important and productive contribution from Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA).

Programmes
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet threat, the conference lost its earlier focus on the measurement of that single problem and the measures necessary to counter it. In recent years, there have been attempts to define a range of maritime problems which might demand a cooperative response. These include environmental issues, law of the sea, sub-national threats such as piracy, and resource management issues. Since the Melbourne conference in 1988, official participation has grown so that the conference is now an important meeting ground between officials and non-official contributors.

As might be expected from such a diverse group, there have been a number of disputes. Perhaps the most persistent is the issue of whether SLOCs should properly be called sea lanes or sea lines! The Australians generally attempted to insist that the real focus should be upon the ships that use these lanes/lines but success has yet to be demonstrated.

Various groups have tended to specialise on the issues covered by the conference and their specialisations have been reflected in the conference programmes. The retired admirals of the JCSS did much to define the problem by quantifying the numbers of merchant ships and tonnages involved. The Koreans, especially through Professor Park Chun Ho, have concentrated on law of the sea issues while the Americans have concentrated on the new technologies available that can enhance cooperation.

The Australian contributions have tended to emphasise the organisational structures needed to make cooperation effective. With all due respect to our overseas colleagues, I believe that the Australian and Japanese contributions have also tended to be oriented more to practical and operational issues, often to the manifest discomfort of some of those colleagues especially at the official level. Of course, this is an important function of a second-track body.

Generally speaking, the conference proceedings have been published by the host institution although the Taiwanese SLOC Study Group accepted this task for the San Francisco and Singapore conferences. The Melbourne conference proceedings were not published. Instead, my colleague, Dr Malcolm Kennedy and I accepted a request by the steering committee to produce a collection of the most significant papers with additional text by ourselves. This appeared in 1990 as Safely by Sea, a hardcover book published by the University Press of America. It was not a best seller and, with its Cold War focus, now reads more like a museum product.

Some of the original participants have passed on to a world where SLOC security is of no moment while others through age and ill-health have retired from the fray. At the same time, a new collection of institutes and individuals have taken up the cause. Notable has been the formation of bodies such as the Australian Centre for Maritime Policy and the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs reflecting a growing recognition of the importance of the sea and sea transport to the Asia Pacific region. Whether or not the conference continues in its traditional form or is subsumed into the CSCAP Maritime Working Group remains to be seen. If nothing else, however, the SLOC conference over more than a decade has helped to put maritime issues on the regional security agenda and may in fact have generated some of the spark for the formation of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

Michael O'Connor

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FIRST MEETING OF CSCAP WORKING GROUP ON MARITIME COOPERATION

The first meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Cooperation was held in Kuala Lumpur on 2-3 June 1995. A report on the meeting was included in CSCAP Newsletter No. 3 and rather than going over the details of that report again, this article covers some additional impressions and insights from the meeting.

The objective of the meeting was to move beyond the rhetoric of maritime cooperation, and identify some practical measures and areas of cooperation to help reduce the risks of maritime tension and promote a stable regional maritime regime. The focus of the meeting was the entire Asia Pacific region and it was considered important not to become too preoccupied with the South China Sea and its problems. These are being comprehensively addressed in other forums.

Papers during the meeting provided a comprehensive review of the main maritime security concerns in the region. A comprehensive approach to security was explicit in the meeting programme which included sessions on shipping, marine science, and the marine environment.

Inevitably there was some discussion of the South China Sea as the major maritime 'hot spot' in the region. With shifts apparent in China's policy towards a harder line on sovereignty, it was of concern that the pressure could be on ASEAN to develop a coordinated position, including a possible preparedness to hold the line militarily with consequent risks of the situation deteriorating into military conflict.

While the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) was much discussed as a common concern of most Asia Pacific nations, the meeting agreed that care was necessary with perceptions of threats to shipping. There was a risk that some cooperation and dialogue on SLOC protection could be destabilising if certain countries were excluded from the process. The meeting also noted the difficulties associated with the complex interdependencies in the shipping business, particularly with regard to the ownership of cargoes and ships.

The desirability was discussed of a more imaginative and innovative approach to regional naval cooperation than is the case at present. Conventional wisdom suggested that the region was not yet ready for a Standing Naval Force but on the other hand, the symbolism of such an arrangement could be important, despite the obvious problems of the lack of systems inter-operability and common doctrine. Avoidance of incidents at sea (INCSEA) agreements were another area where a new regional approach was possible, which did not necessarily use existing agreements as a model. For example, an agreement could be tabled not to undertake particular activities at sea (for example, not to interfere with another navy's operations or to conduct surveillance operations of other forces) as an alternative to the current agreements with Russia, which are effectively about how to avoid incidents when actually undertaking particular activities.

It became apparent during the meeting that marine environmental security, particularly the prevention of marine pollution, is perhaps a relatively bigger issue in the context of maritime security than environmental security is generally in the context of regional security. The consensus at the meeting was that the Working Group should pursue this issue regardless of whether it was being covered by the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive Security. The concern of some members of the Maritime Working Group that environmental issues appeared not to have been picked up yet by the Comprehensive Security Group highlighted the importance of coordination between the various CSCAP Working Groups.

Law of the sea issues, particularly excessive claims and navigational and resource regimes, were a fundamental aspect of many of topics discussed by the Working Group. Due to the enclosed or semi-enclosed nature of the seas in East Asia, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime is leading to problems with resource management and environmental responsibilities. Northeast Asian countries, South Korea in particular, have not ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) apparently because of these problems. Resource management regimes were identified as a particularly important area for further consideration by the Working Group.

The seas in the Asia Pacific region are relatively complex with high levels of resource exploitation and maritime activity. These factors underpin the importance of cooperative marine scientific research, marine information exchange and the establishment of data bases. Rather than talking about 'strategic' marine information systems, which could send the wrong message to some countries, it was decided more appropriate to simply talk about 'marine information' systems.

Education and training for marine affairs emerged during the meeting as another area for worthwhile cooperation, particularly at the integrated policy level, rather than in specific technical or vocational fields. Some proposals in this regard will be developed for the next meeting of the Working Group which is scheduled to take place in Kuala Lumpur in April-May 1996.

Overall the meeting confirmed the potential value of a wide range of maritime issues as providing the basis for possible regional CBMs. The next meeting will endeavour to concentrate on specific proposals, including in the fields of naval cooperation, resource management regimes, marine information data exchange, and education and training. Law of the sea issues will not be studied specifically as this could duplicate work in other fora.

Sam Bateman
Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong

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THE NORTHERN TERRITORY'S ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

Introduction
The Northern Territory's engagement with its near neighbours in South East Asia is characterised by its comprehensive nature and an unparalleled level of commitment. In addition to trade links and expanding transport capabilities, unique levels of social, political and business interaction are enjoyed by the Northern Territory. Of course it should not be surprising that the closest part of Australia to Asia has developed links with the North. After all, a traveller heading south from Darwin faces several thousand kilometres of sparsely populated and largely undeveloped country before reaching the business centres of the nation. By contrast only three hundred kilometres north of the Northern Territory lies Asia and its enormous markets.

The Territory's relationship with South East Asia has been a conscious focus of the administration since self government was granted in 1978. While the growing participation in the region has been led by government it has not been confined to the public sector. Territory businesses, educators and the community generally recognise the importance of South East Asia and routinely look North to foster relationships.

Background
Darwin is about one hour's flying time from Indonesia. Its climate is typical of that experienced throughout South East Asia. The Territory's history has a dominant Asian influence. In 1895 Chinese made up 70% of the Northern Territory's non Aboriginal population. Consequently today's Darwin has a culture that is much enriched by a strong Asian influence. In Darwin 63 different ethnic groupings co-exist, making it a truly multi-cultural city. The Tiwi Islands (Bathurst and Melville) to the north of Darwin exhibit strong cultural links with the Macassan traders who ventured there over many hundreds of years.

Social Engagement
In addition to the many day to day contacts, Territorians interact with their Northern neighbours through major organised events such as the Arafura Games. The games seek to include participants from all nations around South East Asia. In 1995 the games attracted over 4,000 participants from 26 countries including Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, China, PNG, Fiji and Western Samoa.

The annual yacht race from Darwin to Ambon in Indonesia attracted 430 participants in 80 boats in 1995.

It is common for Territorians to acquire Indonesian language skills. There are more students studying Indonesian in the Northern Territory than the rest of Australia combined. In many schools it is compulsory. The national curriculum for the teaching of Indonesian was written in the Northern Territory.

Territorians regularly take the opportunity to sample some of the exciting and inexpensive holiday destinations in Asia. Coming in the opposite direction are numerous holiday makers, family and business people. For the second consecutive year, Darwin Airport was the fastest growing in Australia. It experienced 20% growth in the international segment and a 19.9% increase in domestic passenger boardings. Darwin Airport has 19 inbound and 18 outward bound international flights each week.

Business
Business interaction between the people of the Northern Territory and South East Asia is growing exponentially and assuming increasing national importance. In 1990/91 the Territory exported goods to the value of $22.3 million to ASEAN countries. This figure grew to $125.3 million in 1994/95. Among the examples of business activities in South East Asia and the region are:

• live cattle export of 223,000 head (out of Australia's total export of 396,000 head)
  
  
• the supply of power generation systems to relatively remote areas of Asia
  
  
• sales of solar power and hot water systems to Eastern Indonesia and PNG
  
  
• administration of AusAid education and training projects in Western Samoa and Eastern Indonesia worth over $50m.
  
  
• joint venture proposals for water supply and desalination projects for 135 communities in Eastern Indonesia
  
  
• the provision of planning advice and expertise on the use of alternative energy
  
  
• numerous health care projects in Eastern Indonesia
  
  
• the export of expertise in mining engineering
  
  
• sales of $20 million of innovative side-tipping trailers for mining operations in Indonesia and China.

In return South East Asian organisations invest heavily in the Territory in areas such as hotels, pastoral properties, manufacturing and construction. Brunei, for example, owns four cattle properties in the Territory, each of them larger than Brunei itself. Indonesian interests own eight properties and Sabah and Sarawak each own five properties.

While previously much of the Territory business focus has been on Indonesia and Malaysia, the growing opportunities arising out of the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are attracting increased attention.

The Northern Territory Department of Asian Relations, Trade and Industry has a functional group devoted to the development of business and relations with China and each of the ASEAN countries. The department employs people with the language skills required to do proper business with neighbouring countries.

Government
The Northern Territory Government recognises that its growth and that of the nation as a whole largely depends on developing relationships and links with Asia. Understandably, in recognition of the importance of the region to the Territory, it has a senior ministerial portfolio of Asian Relations.

In addition to forging ties at the ministerial and departmental level there are Territory agents and officers permanently residing in Asia. A public service exchange programme also exists with the Malaysia State of Sabah. Student and teacher exchanges have occurred between Indonesian and Territory schools since 1973.

Formalisation of the Territory's relationship with Indonesia came in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in January 1992 by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, and Chief Minister of the Northern Territory Marshal Perron, on behalf of the two Governments. The MOU represents the only such commitment Indonesia has entered into with an Australian State or Territory.

The MOU calls for involvement between both regions to develop manufacturing and processing industries, trade and infrastructure, transport, professional services, technology transfer, energy, tourism and primary industries. A Joint Policy Committee, with representatives from both countries, was established under the MOU to monitor progress and facilitate business ventures. Working parties were created in all ten Eastern Indonesian provinces and the NT.

Soon after the MOU, a Trade Zone Partnership agreement was signed between the Makassar Industrial Estate in South Sulawesi and Darwin's Trade Development Zone.

The Northern Territory was invited to participate in the first East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA - Indonesia, East Malaysia, Brunei and Southern Philippines) business conference at Mindanao in November 1994. This resulted in bilateral agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) being signed with the Philippines (August 1995) and Brunei (30 October 1995).

Within the EAGA region there is potential for economic growth and development. The priority areas designated for cooperative development are: air linkages, shipping, fisheries and tourism. Other activities being considered include environmental protection and management; energy; construction and materials; telecommunications; human resources development; agriculture; financial services and forestry.

In promoting regional international trade, the Northern Territory also hosts an annual Expo which has grown to be one of the largest business and trade conventions linking Australia and South East Asia. The 1994 Expo attracted over 800 international participants and some 30,000 people visited the exhibition.

Another area of engagement in South East Asia is the Northern Territory University's various cooperative agreements with universities in Ambon, Lombok, West Timor and Irian Jaya in Indonesia. Further arrangements have been made with universities in the Philippines. The NT University plans to expand its links with the East Asia region through agreements and collaborative projects.

Ian Watts, Assistant Secretary, Defence and Space Industries

Department of Asian Relations, Trade and Industry, Darwin

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CSCAP WORKING GROUP ON COMPREHENSIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY

The second meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from 27-28 August, 1995. The aim of this session was to develop some of the conceptual themes discussed at the first Working Group Meeting in order to formulate some broad security principles which could serve as an overarching organising concept for managing security in the Asia Pacific region. The papers which were presented by participants explored a number of related themes, ranging from proposals for a new security framework to the impact of small 's' security issues on developing states.

At the end of the session, it was agreed that the term 'comprehensive security' should be adopted to describe the security concept most acceptable to Working Group members, and that the concept should be clearly elucidated and articulated in a memorandum to be put to the Steering Committee at its Fourth Meeting in mid December, 1995, for its consideration. This memorandum also set out some of the key elements which were taken into account by the Working Group in formulating the concept of comprehensive security, as follows:

1. The on-going efforts to develop region-wide collaborative processes, in particular the establishment of the ARF and CSCAP, have made such a concept desirable, even necessary. The concept would greatly facilitate consensus-building and the formulation of strategies, processes, institutions and measures to manage security.
   
   
2. The Asia Pacific region is large and extremely diverse in terms of domestic and external concerns; actors (states, non-governmental organisations, multinational enterprises and bilateral as well as multilateral institutions); political and social systems; and cultures. The organising concept must therefore:
   • 
     
   • be of an 'overarching' variety, adaptable enough to accommodate the diverse security concerns of all regional states. While identifying themselves with the broad outlines of the concept, states should be free to emphasise different aspects of the concept pertinent to their special security
   • focus sufficiently on common concerns and shared interests in national policy approaches relevant for regional collaboration; and
   • not endeavour to be too ambitious in scope and content, to the extent that individual states come to find the entire concept unacceptable.

   
   

3. Asia Pacific security cannot be entirely divorced from global security. This factor has to be borne in mind when developing regional strategies.
   
   
4. The security concerns of states in the Asia Pacific region are not confined to the external sphere alone. Pressing and enormous domestic challenges with security consequences confront many societies, in particular the developing countries of the region.
   
   
5. Many states have shifted defence strategy and planning from threat-based premises to interest-based calculations with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of traditional enemies. The shift is of course not complete; threat perceptions, even of an uncertain and ill-defined character, still feature in the defence plans of many countries.
   
   
6. As power becomes more diffused in the Asia Pacific region and a more multipolar or pluralistic power structure emerges, unilateralism cannot be a sustainable option for settling disputes among states. Building upon and complementing the normal bilateral ties between states, sub-regionalism and regionalism will become more credible and productive options.
   
   
7. Neither collective security nor balance of power approaches are of themselves adequate organising principles for the region because security of vital interests and core values extends beyond the military sphere and comprehensive security can only be attained through cooperation based on common interests. Collective security and balance of power therefore need to be complemented, or at times superseded, by comprehensive security approaches.

Finally, the Memorandum identified several principles which the Working Group felt should underpin the organising concept. These were:

• the principle of comprehensiveness
• the principle of mutual interdependence
• the principle of cooperative peace and shared security
• the principle of self-reliance
• the principle of inclusiveness
• the principle of peaceful engagement
• the principle of good citizenship.

Alan Dupont 4 December 1995

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THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is a non-governmental organisation of many years' standing, established to encourage a greater understanding of foreign policy matters of consequence to Australia. The AIIA accordingly arranges conferences, seminars, workshops, lectures and other opportunities for (mostly) public discussion of foreign policy matters. The Institute also has a publications programme - the most regular publication is its scholarly journal, the Australian Journal of International Affairs, which from 1996 is published three times annually.

The AIIA is precluded by its constitution from expressing institutional points of view on foreign policy matters. The Institute rather believes that, by bringing together people with expertise on a particular subject, and often very differing points of view, a greater understanding of the subject in question will arise. The AIIA is able therefore to handle sensitive matters in an harmonious manner.

The AIIA's particular strength as a member of the AUS-CSCAP Committee is the opportunity which it offers for balanced discussion of regional security matters. Matters which are relevant to the regional agenda may be raised in other contexts. The question of India's place in the region was raised at the AIIA's recent national conference, which was held in Melbourne on 17 and 18 November. While the programme was more directly bilateral, the High Commissioner took the opportunity of the presence of the Deputy Prime Minister, senior Australian officials, journalists and others, to try and advance India's case to join APEC which he criticised for representing East Asia and not the entire Asian continent. The High Commissioner also took the opportunity in the same keynote address to outline the Indian point-of-view on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Regional security matters have naturally been addressed more directly in other AIIA fora. In May 1995 the Institute hosted, in company with the RAN Maritime Studies Programme, and the Centre for Maritime Policy at Wollongong University, a one-day seminar on the rights and responsibilities of the maritime environment. Speakers from government and academia explored questions of maritime strategy and security, stewardship of the marine environment, matters of rights and responsibilities as they affect shipping, fishing and trade issues, and the problems which overlapping regimes pose for policymakers. The papers of the seminar will shortly be published by the Centre for Maritime Policy.

At the time of drafting this item the Institute was about to host (Wednesday 6 December 1995) a half-day workshop on maritime sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. Two sessions were held under Chatham House rules: an analysis of legal and resource aspects of the issue, with presentations by Dr Stewart Kaye of the University of Tasmania, and Dr Don Rothwell of the University of Sydney. In the second session Professor Carl Thayer of the University of New South Wales discussed political and strategic dimensions including arms build-ups and their impact on the region. An open session was then held in which Dr Greg Austin from the Australian National University presented a discussion paper on key elements in the continuing maritime disputes in the South China Sea and their regional implications.

During 1996 the AIIA expects to provide opportunities for further discussions on regional security matters. Some of these are likely to be in a CSCAP context. The national office is at present working with the AUS-CSCAP secretariat to identify matters on the CSCAP agenda which might usefully be explored by an AIIA forum.

In November 1996 (precise date to be finalised) the AIIA will hold its 22nd national conference, in Brisbane, which will consider US foreign policy particularly in relation to Australia but also within the wider Asia Pacific region, where of course relations with China and Japan will be of interest, and globally.

Dr Leslie Jackman, Executive Director, AIIA

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INDIAN OCEAN DIALOGUES

Since March 1995 the process of official and non-official dialogues concerning regional cooperation across the Indian Ocean has taken concrete form.

In March the Mauritian government hosted a seven nation government-to-government meeting on the island to explore the modalities of regional cooperation. Australia was represented at the meeting along with delegations from Singapore, India, Oman, Kenya and South Africa. Whilst the meeting was 'official' the Mauritians encouraged the participating countries to include academics and business leaders in their delegations with the result that the Australian delegation included Mr Harold Clough (Chair of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Mr Richard Muirhead (Western Australian Department of Commerce and Industry) and myself from the Indian Ocean Centre.

The meeting determined to continue the first track process of consultation in cooperation with peak regional business organisations and academics. The question of expanding membership was postponed to the next meeting of the 'Mauritius Process' with Australia arguing for an inclusive approach to the issue in the face of determined counter arguments that the official dialogue should remain restricted to the core group of seven. Whilst no agreement was reached on the question of immediately expanding membership it was agreed in principal that membership would be expanded at a later date.

In the following June the Australian Government, in cooperation with the government of Western Australia, hosted the International Forum on the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) in Perth. The forum was intended to encourage the development of an inclusive second track dialogue between business groups, researchers and government officials 'in their non-official' capacity. Some 120 individuals from 23 Indian Ocean countries attended the meeting which was divided into two streams: an Economic Issues Group and an Other Issues Group. The Other Issues Group was chaired by Richard Woolcott with myself as rapporteur. The Chair of IFIOR was shared by John Dawkins and the WA politician Clive Griffiths with Gareth Evans and Bob McMullan in 'the margins'!

In the Other Issues Group discussion covered topics ranging from environmental cooperation to the possibility of establishing a regional comprehensive security dialogue. In 'the margins' of the forum several officials from Indian Ocean countries made their reservations concerning such a dialogue clear and the Australian media played this theme extensively to underline their interpretation that the forum had failed. In fact, representatives of institutions from several Southeast Asian and South Asian countries enthusiastically supported the idea and an informal group to establish the dialogue is now operating. Included in this group are Sandy Gordon and Amin Saikal (ANU), Sam Bateman (Wollongong University) and myself. It is expected that the dialogue will begin with a regional workshop held on an annual basis at different venues around the Indian Ocean region.

In August the Mauritian government hosted the second round of official talks concerning regional cooperation. The 'core 7' were again the sole participants and national delegations were, as in the first meeting, made up of officials, business people and academics.

The central debate of this meeting concerned the question of 'inclusivity' versus 'exclusivity', and it resulted in very frank and vigorous discussion. Australia was concerned that the 'Mauritius Process' had to be inclusive and that it must immediately be opened up to all the states of the region. In opposition there were arguments that a grouping of possibly more than 40 states would make any progress impossible. Eventually it was agreed that the process would be opened up with a first intake of seven more countries and thereafter a steady expansion of membership. For some of us this is an uncomfortable compromise but one that had to be accepted in the face of the very real possibility that the nascent process of dialogue would collapse.

In mid-December this year many of the participants in IFIOR will be meeting in New Delhi to push the second track dialogue further and to develop cooperative research projects. It is not anticipated at this stage that the regional comprehensive security dialogue will be included in the mainstream of this second track process, but it is anticipated that in time (given the support of a healthy spread of research institutions around the region) that current suspicions and nervousness in some official circles will diminish.

Kenneth McPherson, Indian Ocean Centre,WA

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THE NORTH PACIFIC WORKING GROUP (NPWG) OF THE COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
4-5 APRIL 1995, TOKYO

The establishment of CSCAP was announced in the Kuala Lumpur Statement of 8 June 1993. Its purpose is to provide a structured process for regional confidence building in Asia Pacific. Its aims to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials and others in their private capacities. In pursuit of this ambitious agenda of policy-relevant discussions and analyses, CSCAP has organised various working groups to address the security challenges confronting Asia Pacific, and convened a number of meetings to discuss such issues. The Tokyo meeting was convened by the NPWG of CSCAP to discuss the security challenges on the Korean peninsula. Altogether there were eight speakers, plus a wrap-up session at the end.

The opening session by Professor Seizaburo Sato of Keio University was a fascinating overview of the history of efforts to achieve stability on the Korean peninsula over several centuries. The point that emerged quite clearly was that the stability of the peninsula has generally been a function of the state of relations among the major powers of the region. Most of the workshop discussions which followed focused on three inter-related themes: stability of the peninsula; the nuclear situation in the peninsula; and the reunification of the peninsula. The last, most participants agreed, will have to be essentially an inter-Korean decision. The first two issues will entail significant involvement by external powers.

On reunification, there was considerable discussion of the manner, modalities and timing. Would it result from deliberate choices made by two functioning polities? Would it come, ˆ la the German model, via a collapse of North Korea? Are the South's structures sufficiently robust and resilient to cope with reunification? And what would be the implications of a reunited Korea for regional and global international relations? The last question is important, for example, in case reunification leads to a marriage of the South's economic power with the North's military might. Professor Hans Maull of the University of Trier presented an interesting paper on the subject of population movements on a large scale vis-a-vis Korean reunification.

An important component of the DPRK's militarily threatening posture is its ambiguous nuclear policy. Few analysts can be confident of the exact stage of the North's nuclear programme. Some wonder whether resistance to rigorous international inspection might not be designed to prevent discovery of the absence of a nuclear weapons capability. Many at the workshop were sceptical of the prospects for successful implementation of the Agreed Framework signed by the DPRK and the United States on 21 October 1994. It was suggested by the South Korean participants (the North Koreans, like the Chinese, had chosen not to attend) that a major motive behind Pyongyang's machinations was to show to the world that when push comes to shove, Washington will make concessions to the North at the expense of the South. This time round, Seoul is determined not to let this happen. In other words, the critical aspect of the supplier for the light water reactors is not the economic or security implications. Rather, it is the state of Seoul-Washington relations. An interesting thought.

The Australian brief was to examine the issues involved in establishing a Northeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone (NEANFZ). The project was a cooperative endeavour between the Department of International Relations, the Northeast Asia Unit, the Peace Research Centre, and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, all of the Australian National University. The formal written paper was provided by Professor Andrew Mack; the paper was spoken to by Professor Ramesh Thakur. Mack began by noting that in Northeast Asia, the technological capacity to make nuclear weapons sits uneasily alongside deepseated historical animosities. He assessed the varying but finite and symbiotically related proliferation propensity of the following actors: Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, and China (vertical proliferation). He then stated the security and confidence building functions of nuclear-free zones, and outlined the possible shape of one that might be established in Northeast Asia. In speaking to the paper, Thakur broadened the perspective by drawing on his own work on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and on another region of high proliferation sensitivity, namely South Asia.

The non-nuclear military dimensions of stability on the Korean peninsula were discussed by Mr James Kelly, President of the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. Mr Konstantin Sarkisov, Director of the Centre for Japanese Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, led the discussion on alternative forms of security guarantees before and after reunification. He looked both at multilateral security frameworks and regional dispute settlement mechanisms. Professor Robert Bedeski of the University of Victoria in Canada explored the potential role of third countries in helping to ameliorate conflict in Korea. And Mr Kusnanto Anggoro of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta analysed the implications of Korean developments for Southeast Asia.

The workshop was remarkable in that every paper had been received and distributed in advance (a first in my experience). On the basis of comments and discussions in Tokyo, paper-writers were asked to revise their original drafts and send the new versions to the convenor for presentation to the CSCAP meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June.

Ramesh Thakur, Peace Research Centre, ANU

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REPORT ON THE CSCAP WORKING GROUP MEETING ON CSBMS
SINGAPORE, 16-17 MAY 1995

A CSCAP Working Group meeting on CSBMs was held in Singapore, 16-17 May 1995. The meeting was co-chaired by Ralph Cossa, Executive Director Pacific Forum/CSIS, and Kwa Chong Guan, Acting Chairman SIIA. All founder-members were represented, along with associated India and Europe, with Vietnam, UN and China also represented (the latter two as guests). The meeting considered issues of military transparency, a regional arms register and regional participation in global CSBMs such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The CSCAP CSBM memorandum was amended and endorsed for presentation to the ARF.

I attended the working group on behalf of CSCAP Australia, and delivered a paper on military transparency in the first session. That paper drew on Professor Dibb's ARF-SOM TBMs paper and inter-sessional TBMs seminar in Canberra in November 1994. Parallel activity dealing with maritime transparency in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Asia Pacific Dialogue on Maritime Security and Confidence Building was also included, reflecting the drafter's participation and interest. The paper recommended improving information flows between diverse Trust Building Measure (TBM) fora, connecting the seminar process back to practitioners, and de-linking the adoption of TBMs with the perception of compulsoriness (drawing on existing bilateral successes within the region, for example, some of which have not yet even been considered in ARF or second track context). The paper suggested (in the face of orthodoxy) one way to achieve these recommended aims was through the establishment of a small transparency secretariat. This would provide regional advocacy, a data base of successes, and a resource of implementation experience which could facilitate first-track implementation of TBMs.

The paper was well-received. The broad feeling of the meeting was that existing classifications of TBMs probably used too many baskets, and that not enough was being made of the region's clear successes. Consensus on transparency secretariat was very positive. The reality of the ARF's reluctance to adopt institutional forms, however, and the fact that the proposed secretariat would be a first, mitigated against recommending its adoption.

The issue of White Papers was also discussed at length, with the suggestion made that CSCAP could take on the task of developing a generic list of contents for Defence Policy Statements (as opposed to White Papers). The utility of such statements was debated, but consensus was reached that policy statements, although often largely window-dressing, do show trends in strategic thinking over a period.

Papers were presented by Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford) and Mohamed Jawhar Hassan (ISIS Malaysia) on a regional arms register. Discussion was lively, and the broad consensus was that stricter (or any) participation of the UN Conventional Arms Register was preferable to a new regional register. Several members spoke of the benefits accruing from a regional dialogue on conventional arms as part of the process of contributing to the UN Register.

Arms registers themselves were criticised as having shortcomings. Indigenous production was not included, for example. The benefits however were observable; the UN Register is variously accepted as collecting 95 percent of world arms trade, when three years ago, the percentage captured was zero. Agreement was reached on encouraging full, timely participation in UN Register, while seeking to maximise opportunities for regional, apolitical, dialogue on the input.

Soedjati Djiwandono (CSCAP Indonesia) and Robert Ross presented on the topic of Asia Pacific Participation in Global CSBMs, and discussion agreed that regional commitment to global CSBMs such as NPT, CWC, BWC, and MTCR, could assist maintenance of regional security by indicating commitment to agreed norms of international behaviour, by allowing collective responses to divergence from these norms, and by encouraging acquisition of defensive weapon systems rather than offensive.

The draft CSCAP memorandum 'Confidence and Security Building Measures In the Asia Pacific', which had already been circulated twice to national CSCAP committees for comment, was amended to reflect unlimited extension of NPT, and the outcomes of this workshop meeting (particularly concerning agreement on defence policy papers, and encouraging participation in UN Conventional Arms Register). Workshop outcomes were briefed to plenary session of 9th Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur 6-8 June 1995.

The Working Group meeting achieved progress in giving further voice to a number of issues affecting the implementation of TBMs in the region. The conclusion of the CSBM Memorandum may assist ARF consideration, and lead to positive outcomes in official first track implementation.

Captain Russ Swinnerton, RAN
Defence Adviser Kuala Lumpur

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