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FOREWORD

On 9-10 December 1996, AUS-CSCAP, the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, hosted the Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Canberra. It was only the second time the Steering Committee had met outside Kuala Lumpur (the first being the Fourth Meeting in Honolulu in December 1995), and it was the first to be co-chaired by Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga from Japan. (Ambassador Matsunaga was elected co-chair of the CSCAP Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur in June 1996).

It was an extremely successful meeting. It was the first meeting to be attended by representatives of the two newest members, China and Vietnam. The accession of China to CSCAP now opens the way for CSCAP to more effectively support other regional security cooperation activities, including those of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The Steering Committee also agreed to the establishment of a Study Group on Transnational Crime, and nominated AUS-CSCAP to take the lead in this activity. The Group has already held its first meeting in Singapore and is planning a second meeting later this year.

On 8 December the Steering Committee was addressed by the Hon. Alexander Downer, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. On 9 December the Japanese Ambassador to Australia, His Excellency Yukio Satoh, hosted a dinner for the meeting. The AUS-CSCAP Committee is extremely grateful to both the Minister and Ambassador Satoh for their support of CSCAP.

AUS-CSCAP's next meeting will be on 20-21 August 1997.

Professor Des Ball, Co-Chair AUS-CSCAP

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LAW OF THE SEA (LOS) UPDATE

The most important recent trends with respect to the law of the sea have been first the rapid move towards universalisation of the convention, second the development of LOS institutions such as the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the International Seabed Authority and third the consolidation of the convention through such other instruments as the 1994 Agreement on seabed mining, the 1995 Agreement on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the establishment of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development which has put emphasis on law of the sea issues.

There is currently interest in UNESCO drafting a new instrument on the protection of underwater cultural heritage and growing concern about the legal aspects of mining deep seabed organisms, which have the potential to be used in genetic resources. Bio-prospecting deep seabed resources is now a reality. The need for protecting marine bio diversity was not really an issue in the negotiations on the LOS 15 years ago.

Despite the trend towards universalisation, building key LOS institutions and the consolidation of the LOS through other instruments, there are still uncertainties. The role of state practice will remain important. Some examples of LOS problems in Australia's region include the following:

• The US objects to the scope of the Southeast Asia nuclear free zone treaty on LOS grounds.
• Indonesia's archipelagic sea lanes still remain to be clarified.
• There have been recent restrictions by some Asian states on the freedom of marine scientific research vessels.
• China's baseline declarations in May 1996 conflict with the LOS.
• There are tensions between marine environmental protection and freedom of navigation in such areas as the Malacca Strait.
• There are now more questions being asked about the legitimacy of the doctrine of sovereign immunity of warships.
• Environmental groups are putting more pressure on the legal regime of the high seas as far as military uses are concerned.
• In fisheries the biggest issue is how to reduce by-catch, estimated at a third of the global fish production and what legal measures may be taken. Of particular concern in Australia's region is seabird bycatch.
• What are the legal rules governing offshore rig abandonment, an issue illustrated by the controversy over the Brent Spar in 1995?
• In the area of maritime boundaries how can the LOS resolve the numerous disputes in the region, particularly in East Asia?
• In the South Pacific how can the role of the Forum Fisheries Agency to exclude distant water fishing states from management be sustained in the light of the new High Seas fish agreement that mandates cooperation?
• What is a rock and what is an island for the purpose of generating ocean space?
• Can Australia's claim to an EEZ off its Antarctic Territory stand legal scrutiny?
• In the context of Mabo can indigenous groups claim maritime areas?

As can be seen from the somewhat incomplete list above the entry into force of the LOS in 1994 does not stop the evolution of law for the oceans. State practice will continue to play an important role in the development of LOS. The bottom line is that the LOS is not 'holy writ'. Law is dynamic. Rules codified in 1982 may seem wholly inadequate to circumstances in 1997. But the framers recognised this and the LOS convention has plenty of references to the need for implementation and the need for amplification by international bodies.

Associate Professor Anthony Bergin,
Director, Australian Defence Studies Centre, ADFA

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THE AUSTRALIAN COLLEGE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (ACDSS)

The concept of Australia forming its own strategic-level college for the post-graduate education of senior officers and officials had been thoroughly explored in a number of studies over many years before the Government decided in September 1992 to establish such an institution. The College formed in January 1994 and commenced academic operations in January 1995 in purpose-built facilities in Weston Creek, a suburb of Canberra. The College operates a 46-week programme at the strategic level for up to 40 full-time participants at the colonel/brigadier and equivalent levels.

From its inception, the College has adopted an expansive and regional perspective rather than a narrowly national one. Its title is a reflection of that approach as is its geo-strategic focus which is determinedly regional. The College sees itself as a college for the region and consequently, its participants are drawn from Asia and the Pacific. The 1995 programme had 32 participants from 11 nations, the 1996 programme had 36 nations from 14 nations, and the 1997 programme has 34 participants from 13 nations.

A feature of the College's approach is its practical orientation. It is not a university and its course is not a post-graduate university course. Intellectually, it is at that level but the College's approach is quite different from that of a university. Its course has been devised and developed by practitioners for practitioners. It concentrates on developing in its participants the skills, knowledge and attitudes needed for them to operate effectively in their future careers. Consequently, the emphasis is not on research and writing but on the use of the research and writings of others as major issues are addressed, important problems considered, and strategic options developed.

An important part of the ACDSS programme is the study tours the College undertakes both within Australia and overseas. These are designed to increase the awareness and understanding of the major issues confronting individual nations and the region through face-to-face exchanges with political, military, business, media and academic leaders. In 1995, overseas tours took the College to New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Malaysia.

In 1996, the College visited New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong. The college's experience over the last two years with its study tours has demonstrated the value of multi-national programmes of this type in raising awareness of issues and processes among people who will occupy positions of influence and authority in the years ahead. It also has the secondary but nonetheless important virtue of providing those same people with a personal feeling for the culture and values of those nations visited.

A statement that can be safely made is that most of the participants of the College would have had only a vague knowledge of the 'second track' of diplomacy at the beginning of the programme. This changes in a substantial and helpful way during the year. The studies which the participants undertake at the College describe the emergence and developing sophistication of the concept of the 'second track', while their experiences in our study tours brings them face-to-face with individuals and organisations that are active in this increasingly important facet of diplomacy and international affairs. Along a similar but more detailed line, a few of our participants would have come to our current programme with any deep appreciation of CSCAP, of its objectives, and of its activities. Some would have had no knowledge of it. That too has now changed substantially both through studies undertaken and through meetings with CSCAP members. Given the future roles and activities of the officers and officials who progress through the ACDSS, this must be a fact of considerable consequence for the future vitality and effectiveness of the 'second track' in general and CSCAP in particular.

National Defence Colleges and their equivalents are part of the 'second track', a fact that is becoming more widely recognised. The Charter of the ACDSS specifies as one of its objectives that the College will 'through their shared experience of the College and the maintenance of contacts after graduation, foster enduring professional relationships among participants.' In addition the College in its short history has forged a set of 'sister-institution' arrangements with a number of regional equivalents including those of Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. These arrangements involve, among other things, visits of faculty and participants to each other's institutions, the conduct of joint seminars and, more generally, exchanges of views on issues of common interest. Once again, the friendships and associations that flow from these activities will be of real importance in the future.

The value of the multi-national activities of National Defence Colleges and the associations that develop from as a consequence has been recognised by the ASEAN Regional Forum. On 23 July 1996, in the Chairman's Statement at the end of the Third ASEAN Regional Forum held in Jakarta, Ministers endorsed the proposal of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures - a Track One Activity - for 'Enhancing High-Level Defence Contacts and Exchanges Among Defence Staff Colleges and Training'. Under that heading, the statement went on to state that: 'The ARF participants should be encouraged to conduct exchanges among national defence colleges, including information sharing and personnel exchanges, and to convene a meeting of heads of national defence colleges or equivalent to this end'. As mentioned above, these processes are already under way. However, the strong support from the Third ARF will ensure national and regional commitment to an idea whose time has truly come.

Australia took a long time to establish a strategic-level college for the post-graduate education of senior officers and officials in the areas of defence and security. Having done so, Australia has made a substantial step in promoting regional security and stability by opening its college to regional nations and focusing its efforts not on Australia but on Asia and the Pacific. The added fact that the College has been instituted at a time when the 'second track' process is gaining real momentum helps to present a very bright picture for the future of this important Australian initiative.

Air Marshal Ray Funnell (Ret'd)
Principal, ACDSS.

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"MAKING FRIENDS WITH ALL COUNTRIES": VIETNAM AND THE DILEMMAS OF MULTILATERALISM

In the late 1980s Vietnamese policy-makers reconceptualised long-held beliefs about foreign relations and national security. Vietnam downplayed ideological factors and stressed instead national interest. Vietnam decided to withdraw from Cambodia and normalise relations with neighbouring states.

In May 1988 the Politburo adopted Resolution No. 13 which committed Vietnam to adopting a 'multi-directional foreign policy'. Vietnam also sought to integrate itself the regional and global economies. In June 1991 at the seventh national party congress Vietnam now sought 'to be friends with all countries' and to 'diversify and multilateralise economic relations with all countries and economic organisations'. Vietnam moved rapidly and normalised relations with Southeast Asia, China and East Asia. The year 1995 was pivotal. Vietnam normalised relations with the United States, joined ASEAN as its seventh member, and signed a framework agreement with the European Union. For the first time, socialist Vietnam had established relations with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and, equally importantly, with the world's three major economic centres: Europe, North America and East Asia. In sum, in both political and economic relations Vietnam has achieved very favourable circumstances for its integration with the region and the global economy. In 1994 when Vietnam made the decision to apply for membership in ASEAN it did so with the prime strategic objective of securing a more peaceful international environment in which to guarantee Vietnam's national security against external threat. A secondary objective was to secure the most favourable external conditions for carrying out economic renovation. Within these broad strategic objectives Vietnam specifically sought to transform its relations with ASEAN states and to enhance its bargaining position with China and the United States.

Joining ASEAN meant participation in the ASEAN Free Trade Area and gaining familiarity with the norms and practices of international trade. This in turn would facilitate membership of APEC and eventual membership of the World Trade Organisation. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam could also expect to learn from the developmental experience of its individual members. This would accelerate the development of a competitive market-orientated economy.

Vietnam's paradigm shift in foreign policy from a model stressing ideology to one with an emphasis on national interest has provoked internal party debate. This became particularly evident during the process of preparing the draft of the party's Political Report to the Eighth National Party Congress (June-July 1997). Only scant mention was made of Vietnam's landmark decision to join ASEAN in early drafts. It was only after the intervention by ASEAN diplomats in Hanoi that a more favourable reference was included.

Vietnam's ideological conservatives are concerned about the impact that their country's new foreign policy orientation will have on political stability and the continuation of one-party rule. They tend to stress the disadvantages of ASEAN membership in public discourse. For example, they argue that fitting in with the ASEAN consensus may be at the expense of Vietnam's sovereignty and independence.

They also argue that Vietnam faces several possible economic disadvantages from ASEAN membership. Vietnam and the other ASEAN economies are essentially competitive not complementary, particularly in the areas of foreign investment and development assistance. Vietnam's developing industry faces potentially stiff challenges from its ASEAN counterparts. The major disadvantage of ASEAN membership in the eyes of the ideological conservatives lies in the potential for economic success to contribute to the erosion of one-party rule. Ideological conservatives are presently fighting a rearguard action trying to bolster the state-owned sector of the economy while placing constraints on the private sector.

Vietnam's foreign minister Nguyen Manh Cam, on the other hand, has called for a 'deepening of relations' with foreign countries. Tensions between these two camps had led to constraints on the development of deeper ties. This had led to a shallowness or flatness in relations, especially on the political, security and defence planes. It would appear that deep-seated insecurities within the party structure account for this.

Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Head, Department of Politics, ADFA

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REPORT ON THE CSCAP WORKING GROUP ON COMPREHENSIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY: Third Meeting Wellington, 3-4 December 1996

The Working Group meeting was hosted by CSCAP-New Zealand and organised around the theme of interdependencies and comprehensive security. Participating for the first time were CSCAP-China and CSCAP-Mongolia. Also represented were Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, Brunei, Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.

Main Themes

Consensus was reached that there is a strong link between security and economy, and that economic factors should therefore remain within the purview of this Working Group.

The core question of whether interdependence enhances security was examined from a variety of perspectives. One paper argued that, insofar as they benefit from the creation and maintenance of a secure environment, business communities have a stake in the development of a system of comprehensive security. Another paper explored the implications of development for security, arguing that development, precisely because it was a necessary condition for order and stability, had to be regarded as inherently linked to comprehensive security. While advantages were likely to accrue from the liberalisation of trade practices, it was noted that these need not necessarily be spread evenly across a society. A general rise in living standards may not automatically produce security for all.

A session devoted to the relationship between security and increasing global and regional interdependence concluded that the relationship was complex and open to variation according to context. While the importance of increased economic interdependence was generally accepted, there was uncertainty as to how the opening of economies and the promotion of free trade could be institutionalised in ways likely to enhance regional security.

It was generally felt nevertheless that economic interdependence provided incentives for cooperation and an increasing realisation on the part of states that they could no longer afford to pursue their interests through unilateral action or the use of purely military means.

Concluding Session

The last session was given the brief of taking the debate forward. How could a system of comprehensive security be established in the Asia Pacific region, in ways which made constructive use of the rapidly growing web of interdependencies? One paper presented by CSCAP-Malaysia proposed a number of norms and principles which could be articulated in the form of a Pacific Concord. These norms and principles would form the basis for state conduct in the region.

The paper which I presented specifically addressed the kind of multilateral framework which might effectively promote a system of comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific. Noting ASEAN's unique contribution in this area, the paper advanced a series of proposals to build on past achievements.

A Few More Steps on the Road to a 'Pacific House'

Listed below are a few of the more important recommendations:

1. A Regional Declaration of Principles (similar to the proposed Pacific Concord), with an emphasis on common security, economic cooperation, multicultural tolerance and harmony, and respect for comprehensive human rights and freedoms;
2. An Asia Pacific Annual or Biennial Leaders Meeting, to act as the roof or umbrella for the Pacific House, and to consider a wide range of economic and security and other issues;
3. APEC and ARF would constitute the two main pillars of the regional architecture, but with each pillar over time giving more attention to the interconnection between economy and security. APEC could begin by giving more systematic attention to a number of unconventional security issues, in particular those relating to energy security, food security, labour migration and drug trafficking;
4. More regular and efficient communication flows between APEC and ARF, particularly at the level of senior officials, with the focus at least initially on overlapping interest in such areas as transnational economic crime and the marine environment;
5. A more direct and methodical CSCAP contribution to ARF's future development, with particular reference to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (this to include detailed studies, policy recommendations and transitional strategies);
6. Establishment of forums giving a voice to other epistemic communities, including environmental and medical scientists, lawyers and judges, parliamentarians and civil servants;
7. A more concerted effort to improve communication and cooperation between sub-regional institutions (such as ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum), and to inject their concerns into the wider regional framework;
8. Continued encouragement to the development of conflict-specific, informal mechanisms as was the case with the Cambodian peace process, and as might happen with the South China Sea Workshops;
9. An informal track-one or track-two working group to prepare a detailed inventory of current regional dialogue mechanisms operating across the range of issues relevant to the comprehensive security agenda;
10. Another working group to be asked to prepare an annual report to the ARF Senior Officials Meeting setting out action taken in response to ARF decisions and recommendations;
11. The developing Asia-European dialogue to give serious attention to issues of comprehensive security, including global environmental change, transnational crime, and UN peacekeeping and UN reform;
12. More effective links between regional track-one and track-two institutions and the UN system, around such issues as nuclear non-proliferation, UN arms register, Law of the Sea, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

These particular proposals may not all be immediately feasible or universally acceptable. But if comprehensive security is to progress from conceptual abstraction to policy relevance, the time may well have come for serious and detailed discussion of a number of practical initiatives. CSCAP may be particularly well placed to foster and lead such discussion.

Joseph A. Camilleri
Professor of Politics, La Trobe University

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GUIDELINES FOR REGIONAL MARITIME COOPERATION

A sub-group of the CSCAP Maritime Working Group met in Jakarta from 3-4 December 1996 to consider a draft document on Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation. The initiative for these Guidelines started out with the proposal in several regional forums, at both the Track One and Track Two levels, for a Regional Agreement on the Avoidance of Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement. As a consequence of papers delivered and deliberations at the first two CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group meetings, held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1995 and April 1996, the concept evolved through the possibility of a Regional Risk Reduction or Maritime Safety Agreement to the idea of more wide-ranging guidelines covering the full scope of regional maritime cooperation.

The group which met in Jakarta consisted of 15 participants from 9 CSCAP countries, with a healthy cross section of academics and officials acting in a private capacity. Following two days of vigorous discussion they were able to propose a document which puts forward a set of basic, non-binding principles to guide regional maritime cooperation and to ensure a common understanding and approach to maritime issues in the region.

The Guidelines adopt a comprehensive approach to regional security. If adopted by regional countries, they will constitute a major contribution to regional security. They cover the maritime confidence and security building and preventive diplomacy measures identified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and reflect the strong support in the region for the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The importance of the Guidelines flows from the nature and complexity of the regional geographical environment, the significance of maritime issues in the region, and the propensity for illegal activities and disputes to occur at sea. Maritime cooperation will contribute to regional stability by easing tensions and reducing the risks of conflict. The Guidelines also reflect the recent entry into force of the UNCLOS. They provide strong regional support for UNCLOS which has been ratified by many ARF member states.

The Guidelines serve several purposes:

First, they constitute an important regional confidence-building measure, laying down general principles for regional maritime cooperation in line with the ARF's long term objective of becoming a mechanism for conflict resolution. They should serve to dampen down tensions, particularly in areas of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea with disputed or overlapping maritime jurisdiction.

Secondly, they serve as a step in the process of building an oceans governance regime for the Asia Pacific region based on UNCLOS and the inter-related nature of ocean issues, and devoted to the notion of integrated management of such issues.

Thirdly, the Guidelines should help promote a stable maritime regime in the region with the free and uninterrupted flow of seaborne trade, and nations able to pursue their maritime interests and manage their marine resources in an ecologically sustainable manner in accordance with agreed principles of international law.

Fourthly, the Guidelines apply the concept of comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific region. They should provide a link between the various concepts and processes of comprehensive security and the various forums which are concerned with elements of comprehensive security.

Lastly, the proposed Guidelines encapsulate the progress achieved in the Maritime Cooperation Working Group meetings and pave the way for further work within each of the maritime security issue areas covered by the broad principles for cooperation laid down in the Guidelines.

By their non-binding nature, the Guidelines set down broad principles of cooperative behaviour in the maritime sector, and do not create legally binding obligations between states. They will be regarded as 'soft' law by international lawyers. Soft law instruments are a relatively recent phenomenon in respect of the growing body of international agreements between states. They are generally regarded as non-binding instruments which do not create legal obligations, but instead reflect agreement between states concerning the need to cooperate in identified issue areas. Some of these instruments have been uniquely successful in articulating basic ground rules for international behaviour. This is especially true in the field of the international environment. For example, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment is widely accepted as laying down the general principle of a state's responsibility for environmental damage to areas beyond its national jurisdiction. This principle has been reaffirmed by many other well known 'soft law' instruments such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development as well as binding instruments including UNCLOS itself.

The proposed Guidelines aspire to a similar status in respect of the maritime relations between states in the region. If adopted by regional countries they represent a consensus among these states as to the maritime issues which in their view require cooperation in order to achieve the overall objective of a stable regime for all aspects of maritime activities conducted within the region.

Subsequent to the Jakarta workshop a draft of the Guidelines was submitted to the CSCAP Steering Committee and has now been forwarded to CSCAP Member Committees for endorsement prior to publication as a formal CSCAP Memorandum and onward progress to the ARF. Response to date have been encouraging and a sub-working group within AUS-CSCAP, delegated with the task of endorsing them on Australia's behalf has met and agreed, subject to some minor changes, to their endorsement.

Sam Bateman
Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong
and Dick Sherwood
Director General, Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program, Department of Defence

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STUDY GROUP ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

At the initiative of the Australian Committee of CSCAP, the Council is now considering how best to deal with Transnational Crime, either as a topic for consideration by the Working Group on Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security (CCCS), or as a Working Group in its own right. To provide some background on our thinking in this area, the Australian CSCAP Committee distributed Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 294 titled Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm at the 5th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1996. Draft terms of reference for a Working Group on Transnational Crime were also tabled by AUS-CSCAP. No formal resolutions were considered at this meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee and it was agreed that the matter would be considered in more detail at the 6th Meeting of the CSCAP Steering Committee.

Following a lengthy discussion of this issue at the 6th Steering Committee Meeting of CSCAP, which was held in Canberra between 8-10 December 1996, the following resolution was passed:

Transnational Crime

Recognising the range and growth of Transnational Crime and its impact on the Asia Pacific region, the CSCAP Steering Committee agreed to the establishment of a Study Group to consider the issues involved in Transnational Crime and its security implications in the region. The primary objectives of any CSCAP involvement in the Transnational Crime issue would be:

• To gain a better understanding of and reach agreement on the major Transnational Crime trends affecting the region as a whole;
• To consider practical measures which might be adopted to combat Transnational Crime in the region;
• To encourage and assist those countries which have recently become engaged in regional security cooperation, and which are concerned about the problem of Transnational Crime in the region, to endorse the United Nations and other protocols dealing with Transnational Crime, particularly in the narcotics area, and to develop laws to assist in regional and international cooperation to counter drug trafficking, money laundering, mutual assistance, extradition and the like.

The Steering Committee noted that CSCAP's involvement in this area is consistent with the views of Ministers expressed at the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Jakarta in July 1996, when the Chairman's report stated (at paragraph 18) that:

The Ministers also agreed to consider at the next ARF meeting the question of drug trafficking and related transnational issues such as economic crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute threats to the security of the countries of the region.

In this area, CSCAP will be solely concerned with regional crime trends and will not become involved in any way in the internal affairs of member countries.

To give effect to this resolution, CSCAP Singapore has agreed to host a meeting of CSCAP representatives who would be interested in serving on the proposed Study Group, under Co-Chairs provided by Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. It is proposed that the Study Group on Transnational Crime should discuss and agree on terms of reference for any future CSCAP involvement in the Transnational Crime issue, and if so, what form that involvement should take.

Some broad themes which could be considered by CSCAP might include:

• Conceptual aspects of Transnational Crime as a threat to regional security;
• Factors which might lead to the expansion of Transnational Crime within the region.
• The economic impact of Transnational Crime at the regional level.

Based on the recent recommendations of a group of experts set up by the G7/P8 to advise on measures to combat transnational organised crime, other issues which might be considered include the following:

• A general review of cooperative arrangements concerning Transnational Crime in the region, as well as measures dealing with law enforcement training and crime prevention;
• The exposition of principles that would assist in the development of mutual legal assistance arrangements to facilitate the handling of requests for mutual assistance, extradition (where appropriate), witness protection, criminal intelligence exchange, assistance with forensic support, criminal asset forfeiture, and the like;
• The requirements for training and education programs, language training, secondments and exchanges to facilitate regional cooperation and mutual assistance;
• Recognising that drug trafficking is a major source of finance for transnational organised crime groups, the importance of the regional implementation of three United Nations Conventions (1961, 1971 and 1983) should be emphasised as fundamental in the action against the illicit drug trade, as well as the work of international agencies, such as the International Narcotic Control Board, the United Nations Drug Control Program, and the like, in addressing illicit drug production, the diversion of chemical precursors and crop substitution measures;
• The development of a clearer understanding of the implications of the illicit trade in firearms, alien smuggling, documentation fraud, credit card fraud and related financial crimes, computer crime, piracy, and so on;
• Explanation of the work of the Financial Action Task Force, established by the G7, to assist in dealing with the problems associated with money laundering and other financial crimes.

AUS-CSCAP has now written to the Co-Chairs of all the members of CSCAP formally advising them of the decisions reached at the 6th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting held in Canberra in December 1996, inviting them to nominate any representatives they might like to send to the meeting of the Transnational Crime Study Group. So far, we have received positive replies from the Philippines, Singapore and the European Union, together with a request for further details from New Zealand. Singapore has agreed to host the Study group, which will be held between 24 - 26 March 1997. We have now written to all CSCAP Co-Chairs advising them of these dates.

In addition, a number of Australian agencies which might be interested in contributing papers on Transnational Crime, have been contacted. At this stage, however, we are conscious of the need to avoid appearing to flood the work of the Study Group with Australian contributions, so we are only seeking one paper in the immediate future. This would be a paper on money laundering, to be provided by Mr Rick McDonell of the Asian Secretariat of the Financial Action Task Force, based in Sydney. We envisage that other agencies will be interested in contributing additional papers at some future stage.

Subject to the response of the other members, the prospects for a useful exchange on the issue of Transnational Crime look good, with every possibility that the proposal for the establishment of a Working Group on Transnational Crime, in its own right, will be viable.

A J McFarlane
National Intelligence Division , Australian Federal Police

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REPORT ON THE CSCAP WORKING GROUP MEETING ON CSBMs
SINGAPORE, 30 OCTOBER 1996

There were three main themes discussed at this meeting: the UN Register on Conventional arms; Preventive Diplomacy; and Non-Proliferation and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.

J.N. Mak argued the case for making the UN Register more relevant to the security concerns of Asia; Malcolm Chalmers analysed the implications of the 1997 Review of the UN Register for the ARF.

Two papers were presented on preventive diplomacy. Amitav Archarya presented an overview of the concept of preventive diplomacy; Simon Tay looked at possible preventive diplomacy mechanisms for the region. This is a new topic for the CSBM Working Group. A number of participants from the Singapore meeting went on to participate in the ARF Working Group on Preventive Diplomacy in Paris, 7--8 November.

The third issue area, Non-Proliferation and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, revisited a topic which had been raised in a previous workshop and which had generated considerable interest. Papers were presented by Hiroyula Koroda on cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Asia Pacific and by Brad Roberts and Zachary Davis on nuclear cooperation in the Asia Pacific. The latter paper included a review of various proposals to create an ASIATOM organisation in East Asia, inspired by but not necessarily modelled on Euratom.

Professor Andrew Mack
International Relations, ANU

Note from CSBM WG Co-chair Ralph Cossa re the next meeting

The next meeting of the CSCAP International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures will be held in Washington DC on May 21-23, 1997. Two topics will be discussed:

• nuclear safety/non-proliferation (PACATOM): to include discussion on possible frameworks, lessons learned from other regions, and energy needs and alternative sources.
• preventive diplomacy: to include current unilateral and bilateral examples and a more detailed look at how the ARF can evolve into a preventive diplomacy mechanism.

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A FULL HOUSE IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA/NORTH PACIFIC POLICY COMMUNITY:

CSCAP North Pacific Working Group Vancouver Meeting 31 Jan - 2 Feb 1997

This was the first 'full house' meeting of the Working Group, as the Co-chair, Paul Evans, noted. It was also the first meeting with the new Co-chair, Professor Yamamoto Yoshinobu (Tokyo University). In addition to welcoming members from the CSCAP member committees of DPR Korea and from China, as well as from Indonesia, the Philippines, and European CSCAP, the meeting also welcomed as 'other participants', Mr Umezu Itaru from KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation), and Professors Lin Cheng-yi (Institute of European and American Studies, Taipei) and Wu Linjun (Institute of International Relations, Taipei).

There were five sessions altogether in the Working Group meeting. In addition, Mr Umezu gave a short informal briefing on the work of KEDO. A dinner for delegates was hosted by the Consul-General for Japan.

Session 1. 'Mechanisms for Dialogue in Northeast Asia and North Pacific'

Papers were given by Professors Paul Evans (Canada) and Lee Seo-hang (RO Korea). Evans reviewed the record on Northeast Asian/North Pacific dialogue, noting that despite repeated proposals from 1990, there were no Track 1 fora to date. However, various Track 2 series meetings had been held. The present Working Group held its first meeting in Tokyo, 4-5 April 1995. Its principal focus was on the Korean peninsula. With the now widened membership, the Group's subsequent work was expected to shift to include region wide issues, including the likely impact of the activities and findings of other CSCAP Working Groups in such areas as maritime guidelines, transparency measures, contrasting understandings of 'security', and differences and similarities with Southeast Asia. This work would be conducted according to four principles: inclusivity, focussing on NE Asia/North Pacific but with a wider membership, non-official character, free exchange of ideas with the result, in the longer time and subject to consensus, of the production of policy relevant recommendations. The paper of Lee Seo-hang observed that conceptions of security were changing significantly. Non-conventional security issues - such as the management of natural resources, the protection of the environment, refugees, international crime and terrorism - were now on the agenda. Further, despite the continued relevance of bilateral security mechanisms, there was a trend towards multilateral security.

The comments (by Leonid Moiseev, Russia) on and discussion of the papers in this session reviewed recent progress and changes in bilateral security relations, noting especially the two rounds of confidence building measures agreed between Russia and China. The more complex relationship that was emerging between bilateral and multilateral security measures was discussed; it was emphasised that if multilateral measures were to be completely effective they would need to include all interested parties.

Session 2 'The Relevance of the Southeast Asian Experience to Conflict Management in Northeast Asia: Implications for the ARF Process'

The paper was given by Soedjati Djiwandono of Indonesia. He discussed the origins of the ASEAN organisation, and the evolution of its concerns from economic to security issues. He pointed out that it was not inconsistent with the maintenance of bilateral security ties (or even the formation of new ones, as the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Treaty attests). He proposed that the ASEAN Regional Forum could function as a two-way 'bridge' for Northeast Asia. Through its collective membership, the region could develop its understanding of security by taking account of Southeast Asian concerns. At the same time, by participating together in the wider security dialogue, the Northeast Asia countries could also profit from exchanges among themselves.

Comment (by Ralph Cossa, US, and Jose Rene Jarque of the Philippines) and discussion generally emphasised that there was more to learn from Southeast Asian practices than from Southeast Asian security predicaments. The inclusivity and step-by-step nature of Southeast Asian exchanges could be copied. But there were no analogous problems in Southeast Asia to the Korea and Taiwan issues; furthermore there was no 'big brother' or 'first among equals' who could lead security reconciliation. In Northeast Asia, by contrast, there was a relative lack of political will to engage in comprehensive multilateral security exchanges, and the policy community had yet to develop along ASEAN-ISIS lines. Some of the territorial issues in the Northeast Asian region would likely be more difficult to resolve than those in Southeast Asia.

Session 3 'The Connection between Economic and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia'

Papers were given by Dr Kuang Mei (China) and Professor Kikuchi Tsutomu (Japan). Dr Kuang emphasised that the foundations for security in the Northeast Asian region were being laid by economic interdependence especially in the form of subregional cooperation. Economic cooperation laid the basis for the prosperity that was inseparable from security; economic cooperation also diminished barriers and improved mutual understanding. Ultimately, fora established to enhance economic cooperation could extend their activities to security concerns; in the meantime the five principles for Asia Pacific security put forward by China in 1994 should be followed: peaceful settlement, non-proliferation, dialogue, mutual confidence, and China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Professor Kikuchi reviewed the record of micro-regional economic cooperation in East Asia. Though this was a positive record as for example the Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia growth triangle demonstrated, it should be recognised that economic interdependence did not necessarily enhance security. Some countries may even regard this trend as leading to an erosion of sovereignty, and efforts should be made to supplement economic with other confidence building activities.

The commentary (by Sanjaa Bayar from Mongolia and Gerald Chan from New Zealand) and the discussion reviewed the difficulties faced by some of the micro-regional cooperation schemes in Northeast Asia. It was held that, despite problems, there were some hopeful examples of multilateral cooperation, notably the activities which have emerged as a result of the formation of KEDO, the Tumen River Cooperation scheme, and other regional economic schemes. The projected Four Party Talks might see this cooperation extended to matters of security. The emerging and complex connection between economic and security issues would be a worthwhile future concern for the expertise available to this Working Group.

Session 4 'Most Promising CBMs in Northeast Asia'

The paper was presented by Mr Pak Hyon Jae of North Korea. Mr Pak argued that the gravest threat to security in Korea derived from the lack of a permanent peace mechanism, given the temporary and unsatisfactory nature of the present MAC (Military Armistice Commission). Such a permanent mechanism should be negotiated between DPR Korea and the US, and this would then pave the way for reconciliation between the two Koreas in the form of a confederal union of the two states. The later was the task 'of the Korean people themselves', although its international importance was recognised.

Comment (by Ambassador Shi Chunlai of China, and Professor James Cotton, Australia) and discussion focussed on the importance of early multilateral exchanges for laying the foundation for a general improvement in security on the Korean peninsula. DPR Korea's decision to attend the preliminary briefing on the 'Four Party Talks' was regarded as a hopeful move in that direction, though Mr Pak indicated that DPR Korea was reserving its position on the Talks until their purpose was clarified at the briefing.

Session 5 'Future Activities of the North Pacific Working Group'

After a thorough review of the proceedings, the following issues were raised as possible topics for discussion at future meetings of the Working Group.

1. Impact of technology on regional relations.
2. Military issues including proliferation.
3. Non-conventional threats to security: environment, the nuclear fuel cycle, criminal activity, piracy.
4. The coordination of Track 1 and Track 2 security exchanges.
5. The Korea issue, the negotiation of a permanent peace mechanism, and the role of the major powers.
6. Multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia: KEDO, Tumen River, Four Party Talks: what are the conditions that facilitate and what are the conditions that obstruct such cooperation.
7. Relationship between economic and security cooperation, and the degree of fit or mismatch between institutions and efforts devoted to these.
8. Contrasting Security outlooks in NE Asia.
9. Border cooperation regimes.
10. Regional energy needs, use, and safety.
11. Recent progress in China-Russia and China-India confidence building, and lessons for Northeast Asia.
12. Studies on findings of existing Working Groups, and their specific relevance to Northeast Asia/North Pacific.

It was suggested that, in light of the fact that the Co-chair is from Japan, and Canada acted as the host of this meeting of the Group, the next meeting should be held in Japan. A meeting during September 1997 was proposed.

The Work of KEDO

The informal briefing on the work of KEDO (Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organisation) was given by Mr Umezu, who offered an account of KEDO work to date. After 8 to 9 months of almost continuous negotiation with DPR Korea, a total of five Protocols had now been agreed; regarding the legal status of KEDO on-site personnel, KEDO communications within DPR Korea, transportation for materials provided by KEPCO (the prime contractor), on-site services (including labour) provided by DPR Korea, and KEDO's assumption of control of the construction site. It was significant that a practical and positive relationship had developed with the DPR Korea side, and the specialists from both Koreas had worked together in a cooperative way. The multilateral character of KEDO was manifest in various ways. DPR Korea was itself concerned to increase the membership of KEDO. The organisation also provided a unique venue for joint consultation between Japan, RO Korea and the US.

The consensus decision making procedure, requiring agreement from all the participating nations, has led to some delays. Further, there were some tensions for the organisation between global and regional requirements regarding non-proliferation. However, the biggest problem at the moment was finance. Due to delays in funding, many liabilities were falling due, and international assistance would be required to keep the Organisation functioning according to schedule. The next job to be done was to build accommodation and improve services on the site. Longer term, some practical problems would be encountered, including the need for DPR Korea to construct elements of a new power transmission grid to accommodate the energy generated by the reactor complex at Sinpo.

Assessment

Overall this was a useful and productive meeting. The focus of the Working Group has shifted to multilateral issues, the inclusive nature of the meeting helped build a comprehensive Northeast Asia/North Pacific policy community, and the readiness with which delegates responded to the proposal for a third meeting in the series indicated that they considered the process worthwhile. In particular, North Korea assumed its place in the policy community, and the role of China was positive and constructive. While careful to eschew the role of regional 'big brother', the delegates from China ably led by Ambassador Shi expressed a strong commitment to multilateral confidence building and exchanges in the region. In the light of the convening of the initial briefing for the 'Four Party Talks' on Korea for the period following this meeting of the Working Group, this was interpreted as a favourable development in regional confidence building. However, North Korea still needs to become more engaged in the policy community, as was indicated by North Korean representatives' reluctance to discuss the KEDO experience, even though it now had a genuinely multilateral aspect.

Professor James Cotton
University of Tasmania

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ARF INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS: DISASTER RELIEF AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

The 1996-97 ARF intersessional programme is well under way. Two 'second track' ARF meetings on non-proliferation and on preventive diplomacy were held in late 1996 (see reports below). Two official level, or 'first track', ARF meetings have been held so far in 1997 and a third, on Search and Rescue, will take place in Singapore under ARF auspices in Kuala Lumpur from 10 to 14 March and a de-mining course will be held in New Zealand in April.

New Zealand and Thailand co-hosted one of the first track meetings, a meeting on Disaster Relief, in Wellington from 19 to 20 February, China and the Philippines also co-hosted the third meeting of the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG on CBMs) in Beijing from 6-8 March. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials from Australia attended both meetings. The delegation to the Wellington meeting also included experts on disaster relief and the CBMs delegation included representatives from the Australian Department of Defence and HQADF.

This was the first time that either New Zealand or China had hosted an official ARF meeting. In fact, the CBMs meeting in Beijing was the first official multilateral meeting on security issues that China had ever hosted - an event welcomed by many.

Disaster Relief

The Disaster Relief meeting was judged a success by those who participated in it. Those at the meeting clearly welcomed the opportunity to explore an important, but relatively non-controversial, issue. Due to the generally active involvement of defence organisations in disaster relief, discussion on the issue provides a useful means of building amongst the defence forces in the region. This was also the first track one activity attended by new ARF members, India and Burma.

The meeting provided a chance for the participants to share the approaches they already take to disaster relief, with discussion of regional initiatives and international approaches also taking place. Representatives from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies added to the discussions by outlining the contributions that their organisations make.

Several practical proposals to recommend to the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF SOM) emerged from the meeting, and the value of continuing discussions on these issues was highlighted - with the possibility of a second intersessional meeting on the topic raised.

Intersessional Support Group on CBMs

The meeting of the ISG on CBMs, co-chaired by China and the Philippines, built on discussions at the previous two meetings in the 1995/96 intersessional year. The exchange of views on developments in the region relevant to security was franker without becoming confrontational and more countries made substantive interventions this year. Discussion of non-proliferation and disarmament issues was also more positive than previously with many countries welcoming the progress that had been made, urging support for the global regimes and stressing the contribution they had made to regional security.

Implementation of some of the previously agreed voluntary CBMS is proceeding well, such as the circulation of returns to UN Conventional Arms Register between ARF countries. ARF countries already have a good record of participation in the Register with only three countries yet to submit returns. ARF countries are obviously becoming more comfortable with transparency measures, as most countries were prepared to table papers outlining their defence policies and regional defence contacts. An increasing number of ARF countries are also working on the publication of defence white papers or their equivalent. The Philippines indicated that it proposed to host the first meeting of the heads of national defence colleges, an idea which was agreed by the ARF last year.

Although agreement was not able to be reached on some of the more difficult issues, such as aspects of the proposal to notify of and invite other ARF countries to observe military exercises, discussion revealed considerable support for such activities, on a voluntary basis, as CBMs contributing to understanding and transparency. It is to be hoped that individual ARF countries will try to do more in this area next year. For the first time non-military CBMS were on the agenda and there was general support for these given the comprehensive security agenda which the ARF espouses. Several delegations, however, made the point that there was a need to avoid duplicating specialist work on issues in other fora and to ensure that discussion of these did not detract from discussion of core security issues. Maritime security issues, a topic in which Australia has an interest, were raised and there was general support for more detailed discussion of these in the future.

The level of defence interest was very high with most countries including civilian and military personnel in their delegations. This was appropriate given that many of the measures under discussion are defence-related. It is also important to the promotion of contact, transparency and confidence between regional defence forces. A highlight of the meeting was a visit to a PLA facility to observe military training exercises.

The meeting agreed to recommend to the ARF SOM that this ISG continue to operate in the next intersessional period.

Second Track Meetings

Two second track meetings have also been held in this intersessional period. A seminar on non-proliferation held in December last year was co-hosted by Australia, Indonesia and Germany. The Australian team was comprised of two officials in their personal capacity and two Australian academics - Professor Ramesh Thakur (co-chair of the meeting) and Professor Andrew Mack. A seminar on preventive diplomacy was also held in France last year. Professor Stuart Harris (ANU) attended the meeting, with an Australian official in her personal capacity completing the Australian side. The results of these meetings will be discussed at the ARF Senior Officials Meeting in May.

Rosemary Greaves
Director, Regional Security Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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ARF TRACK TWO SEMINARS ON PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

One of the first intersessional seminars under ARF auspices was held in Seoul in May 1995, largely arising at the urging of Australia and dealing with preventive diplomacy. I attended the Seoul meeting on preventive diplomacy as an academic participant at what was a 'track two' process, although not one formally tied to CSCAP. I also participated in the subsequent preventive diplomacy meeting in Paris in December 1996, again an ARF second track (or like the Seoul meeting sometimes referred to, inaccurately as 'one and a half track') meeting but with a more substantial representation of those customarily attending CSCAP meetings. This meeting aimed to take the idea of preventive diplomacy further towards practical proposals that could be put forward for consideration to the ARF. The Seoul meeting succeeded in giving a diffuse conceptual discussion a more coherent focus. This process was taken further in Paris, and starting from the beginning made at Seoul, took as its basis the then Secretary General of the UN's definition of preventive diplomacy in his 1992 Agenda for Peace. The meeting at its conclusion achieved a consensus on a statement by the Co-Chairs, Soedjati Djiwandono and Francois Godement.

This statement set out specific proposals for consideration by the ARF under three headings: first, in the areas of annual reporting and information gathering and analysis, mainly by CSCAP (including regular - perhaps annual - reporting on the security outlook for the region), but also including the desirability of the ARF establishing an early warning system on the emergence of disputes or conflicts; second, the utilisation of various measures including some confidence building measures, which were discussed subsequently at the March 1997 meeting in Beijing, and which will be taken further by the CSCAP working group on CSBMs as well as by the ARF SOMs; and, third, expanding the role of the ARF chair (subject to maintaining consensus among the members), building on the experience of the ARF chair (Indonesia) on Burma at the last (1996) ARF meeting (and to some extent on the experience of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE), and giving consideration to other measures such as a register of experts, the use of ad hoc preventive diplomacy procedures and, in the long term, an ARF risk-reduction centre.

The Paris meeting, was additionally interesting as an early occasion of China's active participation in such second track meetings on security, including a strong statement of support made by its delegation for an ARF role in regional preventive diplomacy. While the ideas and proposals put forward at the Paris meeting need further refining and definition, they seemed to provide a useful movement forward in the application of concrete measures of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Professor Stuart Harris
Co-chair AUS-CSCAP

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ARF TRACK TWO SEMINAR ON NON-PROLIFERATION

The Chairman's Statement from the Third ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, held on 23 July 1996 in Jakarta, included an item on an ARF Track Two seminar on non-proliferation under the combined sponsorship of the Government of Australia, the Government of Germany, and the European Union (EU). The seminar, organised jointly by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Munich and the Peace Research Centre, Canberra, was held in Jakarta on 6-7 December 1996. The seminar was attended by more than fifty academics and officials in their personal capacities, including representation from every ARF member.

The purpose of the seminar was to discuss:

1. The challenge of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Asia Pacific;
2. The adequacy of currently available international and regional instruments for meeting the challenge; and
3. Measures that might be adopted to strengthen the barriers to proliferation and to encourage further disarmament.

The format was to have two speakers lead off each substantive session, one addressing the topic from a global perspective and the other from a regional perspective. There was also a final wrap-up session. The three co-chairs then prepared a Chairman's Statement which reflected their sense of the main points of deliberations and conclusions.

In their discussions, seminar participants were guided by the vision of a world eventually free of all weapons of mass destruction. International structural changes were considered on balance to promote non-proliferation and disarmament which are integrally linked. Although progress has been achieved, not the least because of internationally recognised regimes which impose technical, normative, legal and political barriers to proliferation, the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda remains incomplete. The stability and prosperity of Asia Pacific have flowed in part from the widespread adherence by regional countries to the non-proliferation norms and regimes, the centrepiece of which is the NPT. Consultation and cooperation have also become established norms in the region, as exemplified in the ARF and CSCAP in official and Track Two channels respectively.

Based on these assessments, the seminar adopted a number of Track One and Track Two recommendations. ARF countries were urged to sign/ratify the major global non-proliferation regimes, and to support the implementation of the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Russia and the United States were urged to ratify START II immediately and to commence early negotiations on START III. ARF members were urged to adhere to the existing norms of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

The ARF was also urged (a) to consider convening a Track Two seminar on the CTBT in India in order to facilitate an exchange of views; and (b) to establish a Study Group on the most appropriate formulation and mechanism to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The seminar was a precedent setting exercise in Track Two diplomacy. Universal participation by the ARF membership was a decided plus. The discussions were conducted in a positive atmosphere and in an amicable spirit. The exchange of views was full, free and frank, yet without acrimony or rancour. Officials were able to communicate their personal points of view about their own country's positions and comment on other countries' policies. Academics were able to analyse and comment on national security policies with relatively fewer inhibitions. All participants will have come away with a much clearer appreciation of what is practicable to put on the diplomatic agenda of the region, what is still highly sensitive, and what is so sensitive that it is premature to discuss them even in a Track Two forum.

The papers from the seminar will be edited by Professor Ramesh Thakur of the Peace Research Centre and published jointly by the three organising institutes.

Ramesh Thakur
Peace Research Centre, RSPAS, ANU

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