Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page
Go to Issue No. 1 August 1995
Go to Issue No. 2 January 1996
Go to Issue No. 3 September 1996
Go to Issue No. 4 March 1997
Go to Issue No. 5, October 1997
Go to Issue No. 6 April 1998

FOREWORD

At the CSCAP Steering Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur in May of this year it was agreed that Professor Han Sun-joo, one-time foreign minister of South Korea, would be the next co-chair of the Steering Committee to replace Ambassador Matsunaga whose term has expired. This will be good news for Professor Han's many Australian friends. The Kuala Lumpur meeting itself spent much of its time on membership issues: India's application has been deferred again pending the formation of a national committee, and Europe will continue as an Associate Member for the time being. It is hoped that the next meeting will spend more time on the substance of the work of the working group.

Steve Bates, who has served as Executive Officer to the Australian committee virtually since its establishment, has left to take up a position with the Auditor-General's office. He was very effective in providing support to the Australian committee in addition to being well liked by AUS-CSCAP members - and we thank him and wish him well in his new position. We have been fortunate, however, to gain the services of Lesley McCulloch who is the new AUS-CSCAP Executive Officer.

Professor Stuart Harris
Co-Chair AUS-CSCAP

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

SECURITY AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

In February, AUS-CSCAP discussed in a preliminary way the Asian economic crisis and the impact it might have on regional security. Since then it has become clear that the impact of the crisis is more substantial than seemed evident then. Commentators are now more pessimistic about both the intensity of the crisis and the length of time needed for recovery.

The discussion generally accepted that the commentators were right to be less optimistic. Caution was expressed, however, against the tendency to simply extend forward existing trends. This was common when Asia was in boom and the assumption was too readily made that high rates of economic growth would continue. A similar projection bias needs to be guarded against when Asia is depressed.

Nevertheless, the situation was accepted as very serious. It is also complicated by the situation in Russia that imparts a stronger global aspect to the crisis. If it is not handled appropriately, it could create major problems that would react back on the region, although ones that are difficult to anticipate in specific terms. What is less clear is whether, leaving this broader concern aside, the regional crisis would have major security consequences. It certainly creates more unknowns in the regional security picture but this may not add up to a more difficult security situation, at least if looked at in traditional military security terms.

In the short run, the process of military modernisation around the region has clearly been curtailed in most countries, particularly in Southeast Asia. Military budgets have been cut substantially, equipment purchases reduced or deferred, training limited and fewer exercises undertaken. As a result of the continuing financial difficulties in the region, we can expect further questioning of military expenditures.

How big an effect on modernisation processes this will have will depend in part upon the length and depth of the crisis. A few years of austerity may not see a major impact on the modernisation process. A longer reduction in effort could have a more substantial effect. How important that reduction in the modernisation process itself might be depends upon the weight being placed on the need for modernisation in the first place.

It would be easy to exaggerate the security impacts of the short-term financial problems. After all, the region as a whole is relatively free of conflicts or serious threats of a military security nature. Indeed, some lower scale security issues, such as boundary disputes, may diminish in importance as attention is redirected to resolving domestic issues.

The underlying basis of a peaceful region is the relationship between the US, China and Japan and that does not appear to have been affected adversely by the crisis. Nor does the crisis appear to have affected significantly relations in the two main areas of existing tension Ð relations between North and South Korea and the cross strait relations between China and Taiwan (in the latter case, both need the other in economic terms more than before the crisis).

In the North Pacific, the shift in power relationships that are occurring, apart from those on the Korean peninsula, are often seen as posing potential balance of power problems.

Nevertheless, to date, relations among the major powers there have been based on economic interests more than the traditional realist arguments would suggest, and those interests seem likely to remain the critical ones even with diminished economic interactions.

The problem for the region as a whole is that it was economic growth that underpinned regime legitimacy, regional resilience and stability and cooperative international relations. One possible implication of the crisis, however, is that regional countries will turn away from their open economic policies and become more protectionist. This would have the effect of passing the problem onto their neighbours and if followed widely would greatly magnify the problem.

Better management of the impacts of international economic forces will be sought, and would be feasible, by governments in the region. In the long run, however, and to a considerable degree the shorter run, turning inwards is not a viable policy for most countries in the region, offering at most only a short-term respite. Economic interdependence, not just in trade but investment, technology, communications, transport, energy and the like, is unavoidable for economic growth. Each of the affected countries as well as China and Taiwan need foreign investment and this will not in general respond to inward looking policies.

Areas of particular security concern are seen as the impact on regional dialogue institutions: ASEAN, APEC and ARF; the lower level security issues; and Indonesia.

ASEAN will face more difficult circumstances and the loss of Indonesian leadership could be a significant factor. The one area of less neighbourly attention is between Singapore and Malaysia in part from the apparent impact on Singapore of the economic measures taken by Malaysia. Yet ASEAN does have 30 or so years of cooperating and accommodating in circumstances of strong differences among its members and this should help hold it together. Criticism to date of APEC may be premature; APEC has yet to be tested in what is its major role Ð holding members to open economic systems and avoiding beggar the neighbour policies that would greatly accentuate the problems of regional states. In the global context the region's influence in moving economic reform forward, as in WTO, will be less as will Australia's influence. ARF may be less affected although further development of its processes may be slowed. It remains important, however, in providing the degree of assurance that comes from transparency and mutual understanding of intentions.

In many respects the non-traditional security issues were seen as the important short term concerns - the decline in law and order as instabilities under deteriorating economic conditions intensify and people under economic pressure face the incentive to break the law. Internationally this could reflect itself not just in illegal migration, the rise of ethnic tensions and refugee flows but in such things as increased piracy and illegal fishing, with a reduced capacity for its management or prevention.

In the case of Indonesia, while Balkanisation is not a major threat, should conditions deteriorate further the possibility of such a breakdown, as the Indonesian state is being reformulated, is not negligible. Major instabilities of any kind could impact directly on Australia in ways that could lead to more bilateral tensions and disturbances to the practical aspects of the relationship.

In considering what more Australia could do, it was acknowledged that in the military cooperation field, it had been helpful in providing assistance to its regional cooperation partners to limit the cutbacks in military exercises. More generally, it has contributed significantly to regional efforts to counter the crisis seeking particularly to help Indonesia directly and in its negotiations with the US and the IMF. It was a general view that Australia's approach to the crisis had been positive and constructive but there was a broad view that it needs to do more particularly in assisting Indonesia.

Professor Stuart Harris
Co-Chair AUS-CSCAP

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

ARF MINISTERIAL MEETING MANILA, 26-27 JULY 1998

The fifth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in Manila from 26-27 July 1998. The meeting was attended by all 21 ARF members, with PNG and Cambodia the only countries to be represented by officials, rather than Foreign Ministers. Delegations from most countries also included Defence representatives, either uniformed or civilian. The meeting was chaired by Domingo Siazon, Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Philippines. Rodolfo Severino, Secretary General of ASEAN, also attended. The Japanese Prime Minister (in waiting at that stage) attended for part of the meeting. Australia was represented by Mr Alexander Downer, DFAT Secretary, Ashton Calvert and Head International Policy Division, Defence, Allan Behm. The meeting was preceded by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the two day Post Ministerial Conference followed the ARF.

The atmosphere at the meeting was cordial and constructive. The extensive discussion was robust and focussed on key issues of concern for regional security. Habits of trust and transparency are now well established in the ARF, as was illustrated by the frankness of some discussions on internal developments. Three main agenda items were addressed.

Exchange of Views on Regional and Security Issues

The discussion covered all the main security areas. However, the issue of South Asian testing dominated the ARF, with the debate centring on the strength of the language to be used in the Chairman's Statement (which is the only formal documentation of the meeting.) The vast majority of speakers stressed the seriousness of the challenge to the security of the region posed by the tests and argued in defence of the non-proliferation regime.

The Asian financial crisis was discussed at length, with most attention given to the security implications of the situation. The possible consequences of cuts to defence spending, including the slow down in military modernisation in some countries and the resultant change in the military balance, were canvassed. The issue of 'people insecurity' was raised, with concern being expressed over the possible, wide ranging effects that large numbers of people moving back into poverty could have on the security of the region. Running through much of the discussion was a debate about the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs, with a testing of the parameters of the agreed formulation of enhanced interaction.

A number of informative background briefings were given to the plenary. Alatas gave a detailed exposition of the political developments in Indonesia, and for the first time in the ARF, on East Timor. There were briefings given on Myanmar, Cambodia (the situation in the lead up to the elections), Bougainville (the positive results of the peace process), The Korean Peninsula (especially the sunshine policy and KEDO), the South China Sea (and the current decrease in tension) and the issues of non-proliferation and arms control.

The growing involvement and participation of defence and military officials in the work and activities of the ARF was noted and strongly supported. In line with accepted transparency measures, China distributed its White Paper, China's National Defense.

Reports of the Intersessional Groups

The report of the Co-Chairs (Australia and Brunei) of the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was tabled and endorsed. Reference was made to the importance of moving the CBMs agenda forward and it was agreed that there was still considerable scope to develop and deepen cooperation on CBMs. The set of tables and matrices showing the degree of implementation of agreed CBMs was welcomed and it was agreed that it should be updated annually. The lists of new CBMs for implementation in both the near future and in the medium term were endorsed. Australia made special reference to our ARF seminar on the production of defence policy documents.

It was agreed that two meetings of this group would be held in the next intersessional year. The new co-chairs - Thailand and the USA, were welcomed. The first meeting will be held in Honolulu from 4-6 November 1998, with a focus on CBMs and maritime issues. The second meeting is to be held in Bangkok from 3-5 March 1999 and will examine the overlap between CBMs and preventive diplomacy, including four tabled proposals. They are an enhanced role for the ARF Chairman, particularly the idea of a good offices role; the development of a register of experts or eminent persons among ARF participants; an annual security outlook; and voluntary background briefings on regional security issues.

The report of the Co-Chairs of the Intersessional Support Meeting on Disaster Relief was also noted and endorsed. New Zealand and Thailand were thanked for their important role as co-chairs. It was agreed that cooperation on disaster management contributes significantly to the ARF's goal of regional confidence building. Russia and Vietnam are to co-chair the third ISM next year in Moscow.

The Philippines was thanked for hosting the first meeting of the Heads of Defence Colleges and Institutions. The Ministers agreed that this meeting contributed to the growing awareness and recognition of the vital role of defence officials in the ARF process. The Republic of Korea hosted the next meeting in September 1998.

The Ministers noted the reports of the Conference on Preventive Diplomacy held in Singapore in September 1997, and the seminar on the Future of the ARF, also held in Singapore in April 1998. It was considered that the recommendations of these meetings should be addressed in the next intersessional period. Australia suggested that consideration should be given to developing some more formal relationship between Track One and Track Two activities.

Membership

Mongolian membership of the ARF was endorsed and their commitment to help achieve the ARF's key goals and to fully abide by and respect the decisions and statements already made by the ARF was noted. With the addition of Mongolia as the 22nd member of the ARF, it was decided to allow the ARF to consolidate as a group and develop an efficient process of cooperation.

Conclusion

This meeting saw a useful evolution in the ARF process. Comfort levels have now risen sufficiently to enable a frank discussion of a wide range of domestic issues and for these to be discussed in some depth. There is an emerging recognition that domestic developments can have an impact on other countries and on regional stability. The ARF is maturing well as an institution. Singapore has now taken over the chair for the 1998-99 intersessional year.

Belinda Moss
Director,
Multilateral Enagement Management,
Defence

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

MARITIME AFFAIRS INSTITUTIONS NETWORK INAUGURAL FORUM

The First Regional Forum of Marine Affairs Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region was convened by the Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SEAPOL), under the co-sponsorship of the Oceans Institute of Canada and with the support of the Canadian International Development Agency, in Bangkok from 10-11 September 1998. Fourteen invited representatives from some eleven non-government institutions attended, drawn from the following countries: Australia (Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong); Thailand; Vietnam, S Korea; Taiwan; China; Philippines; Malaysia and Indonesia. The goal of the round-table meeting was to enhance regional cooperation among institutions in ocean affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. Whilst no formal papers were required, representatives were asked to give a brief on their respective national ocean policy, structure and programme of their institution and suggestions for regional cooperation.

Dr Phiphat Tangsubkul, Director SEAPOL, in welcoming attendees, stressed the importance of such forums for the personal level of interaction they afforded that was so important, especially for representatives of Asian countries. In addition, he stressed the need, in a region where there was a proliferation of marine studies institutions (eg Thailand, Taiwan and Philippines), for some sort of conceptual framework for the region in the area of Oceans Management - research, education and training. There was an acknowledged obligation under UNCLOS for countries to accept a multi-disciplinary cooperative approach to the enhancement of knowledge and study of ocean affairs and finding solutions to the many complex maritime issues presently facing the region.

National Ocean Policy

In discussions on oceans policy it was apparent that many regional countries are trying to address common issues, including the following:

• The need for an integrated cohesive and consistent national approach to oceans management rather than a divisive and sectoral approach.
• Relative merits of an institutional arrangement focusing on a top down approach with dedicated 'Ministry of Maritime Affairs' ensuring a unified macro-policy focus (eg S Korea) or a bottom-up approach ensuring wide representation and community involvement. There was recognition that even where a dedicated ministry was established there could still be a lack of clear policy objectives and external policy demands on government (especially in foreign policy) may divert ocean policy direction.
• Maritime policy appeared to be largely reactive rather than proactive and directive, important if national direction in ocean resource management was to be firmly established.
• The continued growth and development of various ocean industries without any government guidance or control, in an environment of uncoordinated ocean resource exploitation.
• The difficulty with enforcement of ocean policy and resource management. Regional navies are acquiring more delegated enforcement powers with their associated need for enhanced enforcement capability yet navies are facing contraction in capability development in the face of the currency crisis and economic downturn in the region. This places renewed emphasis on investigating mechanisms for regional cooperation in enforcement and ocean resource management.
• The need for a strong legal basis for national ocean policy so that policy has some legally reliable mandate.

There was recognition of the need for adequate training and education programs for policy makers and managers. Public awareness of maritime policy and its associated issues also needed to be enhanced.

Marine Affairs Institutions

The meeting agreed that some form of informal network of represented non-governmental marine studies institutions needed to be established for the purposes of forming the hub of a wider network of governmental and non-governmental institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. The suggested name of the network is 'MAIN' - Maritime Affairs Institutions Network. In Australia the core institution is the Centre for Maritime Policy, who will take on a coordination role in terms of disseminating information from the regional network on maritime affairs studies, research and seminars/workshops/ conferences. The core institution is not intended to be the principal or most important institution in that country but rather the principal coordinating body for the SEAPOL network. The meeting participants expressed the view that there was a need for more comprehensive exchange of data and opportunities for joint research, especially in the areas of marine ecology and economic management, marine land-based pollution, fisheries and coastal zone management, boundary delimitation and the transfer of fishing technology. In addition, the meeting agreed that there needed to be both an updated list of marine affairs institutions in each country promulgated through the network and the publication of a calendar of international events in marine related areas, similar in format to the existing Australian 'Regional Security Dialogue Calendar'.

Regional Cooperation in Marine Related Matters

The meeting endorsed the need for better coordination of the numerous forums and institutions progressing and promulgating specialist information and data on marine affairs. In addition to participants nominating their respective institutions as core contact points for the new MAIN, there was acknowledgment that there needed to be the exchange of information on matters such as Law of the Sea, national marine policies, legal orders and documents, regional standards of marine pollution, monitoring and surveillance of marine resource zones, education and training programs in marine resource management and transfer of technology. The Taiwan representative suggested that the next regional forum of institutions could be convened in Taiwan late 1999 to consider national oceans policy documents from Australia, Taiwan and any other regional countries who had significantly progressed oceans policy. Other suggestions at the meeting included confidence building through the publication of relevant marine related research in national publications of other regional countries and visiting fellowship positions being made available in host institutions for research of a mutually beneficial nature. Professor Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, Director, Office for Marine Policy Studies, National Sun-Yat-sen University in Taiwan has offered to advise SEAPOL of the type and format of documents in maritime law that he can receive for translation to Chinese.

Sam Bateman
Executive Director,
Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE

This Committee, formed in 1949, is the largest and most prestigious committee in the Parliament and very active. Its membership of thirty-two is drawn from both the Senate and the House of Representatives. All parties are represented.

When the Parliament is sitting, the main Committee meets at least weekly. Election to the main committee is by ballot within the individual parties and for the life of a Parliament. Once elected to the committee, the member has the choice of joining one or more of four sub committees. The sub committees are Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Human Rights.

All the sub committees pursue active specialised agendas of their own, which, in the case of the Defence Committee involves travel within Australia to Defence establishments. All sub committees also meet at least once a week in session. The chambers of the Parliament can and do refer matters for enquiry. The reference is to the main committee and the enquiry is then referred on to the relevant sub committee.

When a reference is received and accepted by a sub committee, a set procedure follows.

The terms of reference are advertised in the newspapers and an invitation issued to any interested persons to submit a written response to the terms of the enquiry. The Committee then reviews the submissions. Those authors who have made a significant contribution are then invited to appear before the Committee to be cross examined on their evidence. The sub committee then reviews the evidence and writes a report to the Parliament. A series of conclusions are arrived at which take the form of recommendations to the government.

The government is required to make a written response to a Committee report to the Parliament within three months listing its actions in relation to any recommendations. While a government rarely implements all the recommendations in a report, a well reasoned report will influence public servants who are policy advisors and reinforce groups in the community with a particular view. In this way the policy of government can be influenced, albeit in a delayed fashion.

Some of the enquiries completed in the last three or four years by sub committees are as follows:

Defence:

Implications of Australian Defence Exports; Australia's Participation in Peace Keeping; Officer Education; Funding Australia's Defence.

Foreign Affairs:

Australia's Relations with South Africa; Australia's Relations with Indonesia; Australia's Relations with Thailand; Australia and ASEAN.

Trade:

Australia's Services Exports to Indonesia & Hong Kong; Australia's Trade Relationship with India.

Human Rights:

Human Rights & Progress Towards Democracy in Burma; Hong Kong: The Transfer of Sovereignty; Improving but.... Australia's Regional Dialogue on Human Rights.

Committee enquiries serve an important role in relation to the community in two ways. First they provide an opportunity for the public to be involved directly with policy formulation with the Parliament. Secondly they provide a pathway to transfer information from the Parliament to the community.

In addition a Seminar program has been introduced recently. This popular move fills an important role in relation to topical issues. While an enquiry may take years, a seminar can be arranged and concluded speedily. Extending over one or two days, the topic is broken up into discrete elements: well informed speakers in relation to each element are invited to speak either individually or as part of a panel for 10 - 20 minutes, followed by a short question time. At the conclusion of the seminar, a transcript of the proceedings is published. These seminars, held in Parliament House, are open to an invited audience and to the general public. The audience participate in questions to the presenters. Again it is a valuable link with the community and a useful vehicle to review a topical issue.

Seminars in this Parliament have been held in relation to the following:- Simon's Committee Report on Australian Aid; Papua New Guinea Update; ANZUS After 45 Years; The 1998 Cambodian Election.

The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has no executive powers in relation to the three portfolio areas it covers. It does provide a strong and valuable focal point for issues in relation to the Parliament; it provides an avenue for the community to communicate with the Parliament and vice versa; it provides also an avenue for overseas visitors to communicate with the Australian Parliament. Finally, it is a pathway for reviewing and to some extent creating policy options for government.

Senator MacGibbon

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC

In life, it is said, the more things change the more they remain the same. And this is equally true of international relations discipline as well. Recent developments in economic and security arenas have further confirmed this.

International relations are going to be quite messy in the coming decades because the interplay of technology, politics, economics, social and cultural change has always produced dramatic, unpredictable changes in the history of mankind. There is reason to believe that the 21st century will be anything but pacific nor will it only belong to the Asia-Pacific. Three key developments - the Asian economic crisis, political change in Indonesia and nuclear proliferation in South Asia - over the last 12 months have brought about a qualitative change in the regional power balance.

Economic crisis

A lot has been said about the Asian economic crisis, I will only list the casualties. First is the demise of the notion of the so-called 'Asian values' which, in fact, is a positive development. There is no need to shed any tears on this school's demise whose proponents came mainly from two confucian (Singapore and China) and two Islamic (Malaysia and Indonesia) countries with the preposterous claim that these 4 countries were Asian while Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and India - all democracies - were not Asian enough!

Second is the demise of the so-called 'East Asian economic model' which was as much a combination of crony capitalism, corruption and financial mismanagement as of foreign investment-based and export-oriented economic development in authoritarian states. Confidence in the Asian economic miracle has been shaken badly. China cannot remain immune for long as the Chinese financial system is in a worse state than those of other East Asian countries. If and when the economic crisis spreads to China, it will prolong the period for recovery, readjustment and growth.

Third, the finanacial crisis shows that economic interdependence and globalisation generate both prosperity and poverty, not just prosperity alone. And both economic growth and economic slowdown have security implications. Fourth casualty has been regional cohesion and the ASEAN solidarity.

Fifth, the security environment is more uncertain and complex. The economic crisis has brought into the open the long-suppressed racial tensions and bilateral disputes. Regional organisations such as ASEAN, the ARF and APEC have shown their incapacity to handle economic, security or environmental crises. As one Malaysian observer, Abdul Razak Beginda, has pointed out, '"the ASEAN way" came in the way of regional cooperation'.

Size does matter after all. Given the nature of the globalised economy, the size of the market, resources and population favour countries with large populations like China with the largest numbers of consumers and producers of goods and services. Despite slowdown, China and India are the two fastest growing economies in Asia - with their 7.5 and 5.5 percent growth rates.

Political change

Recent elections in Hong Kong and political change in Indonesia demonstrate that the march of democracy is unstoppable. But the transition to democracy will be far from peaceful. It will be marked with turmoil and conflict.

This means that we need to focus more on intra-national security and regional security (which would include both external and internal security issues) as opposed to inter-national security or national security.

Security environment

Nuclear proliferation. By exploding 10 nuclear bombs in two weeks, India and Pakistan together have blown the nuclear non-proliferation regime to pieces and fundamentally altered the nuclear balance of power. The campaign for nuclear disarmament is failing just when success seemed at hand. A Nuclear Weapons Convention based on the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention could be one way out of the imbroglio. But the harsh reality is that none of the P-5 members of the UN Security Council is contemplating the idea of dismantling its nuclear weapons. The new nuclear arms race calls into question the nature and durability of the US leadership in world affairs. From North Korea to Iran, the US writ on non-proliferation does not seem to run. And this region is home to more than half of the world's population.

Nuclear deterrence. The overarching dominance of the US coupled with the growing military gap, driven by the on-going RMA may have increased the utility and relevance of nuclear weapons for developing countries like India. The world is thus moving towards multiple nuclear deterrence games, multiple nuclear balances of power. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will give a boost to the development of ground- and space-based ballistic missile defences. Work is also continuing on anti-nukes.

The changing balance of power. The economic turmoil has helped China strengthen its position as the leading power both economically and militarily. So at a time of the worsening economic crisis in Asia, the relative weakening of Japan, and turmoil in Southeast Asia, the regional balance of power appears to be moving in the bipolar direction once again: the United States versus China. The Clinton administration's policy of accommodating China has aroused some concern. Many Asians suspect that the new-found Sino-American partnership could come at the cost of US' relations with Japan, Russia, Taiwan, Vietnam and India. Neither an all-out Sino-US cold war nor a Sino-US condominium in Asia is seen as in Asian countries' security interests.

Taiwan is upset over President Clinton's unwarranted clarifications regarding its status vis-a-vis China during his recent China visit. Taiwan may conclude that its survival must now be guaranteed from its own resources or through new regional alignments. Japan is uneasy over what it perceives as Clinton's 'appeasement policy of China' as reflected in Clinton's cancelling of his plans to visit Japan as scheduled under Chinese pressure. Reports of Chinese leaders telling visitors to Beijing recently that within a generation Japan, with its weakened economy and declining population, would play a second fiddle to China in Asia add to Japan's fears. Tokyo may also decide to free itself from the ups and downs in Sino-US relations by redefining its strategic posture. The Japanese Foreign Ministry is said to be backing a study on the concept of Japan as an offshore Asian nation linked closely to other offshore or peninsular nations (Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia) which would counterbalance continental states of Russia, China and India.

The US will remain the largest power in the world well into the 21st century. The US and China will remain strategic competitors because there are genuine tensions between the world's reigning superpower and the world's rising superpower which will not go away. Likewise, a resurgent India will face a rising China which will ensure a conflict of interests between the two Asian giants. In the long term, a polycentric balance of power in Asia (US-China-Russia-Japan-India) would provide maximum manoeuvrability to small and middle powers like Australia.

Mohan Malik
Defence Studies Centre,
Deakin University

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

REPORT ON THE REGIONAL FORUM SEMINAR ON THE PRODUCTION OF DEFENCE POLICY DOCUMENTS CANBERRA 31 AUGUST-4 SEPTEMBER 1998

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Seminar on the Production of Defence Policy Documents was held in Canberra from 31 August to 4 September 1998. The seminar, initiated by Australia, was one of 14 new confidence building measures proposed by the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures. It was endorsed for implementation during 1998-99 at the ARF Ministerial meeting held in Manila in July this year.

The seminar was co-chaired by Australia and Malaysia. This fulfilled a longstanding Australian objective to bring together ARF officials involved in strategic planning to look at the way in which Defence policy documents are put together and the role they can play in enhancing transparency and building trust in the region.

The official working program was conducted over three days from Tuesday 1 September to Thursday 3 September 1998, and was held in Canberra, at the Australian Federal Police College. In addition to the three days of plenary sessions, delegates were welcomed to the seminar on the evening of Monday 31 August at a dinner hosted by the Secretary of Defence, Mr Paul Barratt. A closing dinner, hosted by Mr Kim Jones, Deputy Secretary, DFAT, was held on Thursday 3 September. Each of the 22 ARF member nations was invited to send a delegation of two officials. All ARF countries, except Vietnam, were represented - Mongolia for the first time in any ARF activity (having been admitted to the ARF at the Manila Ministerial meeting). Most of the delegates were actively involved in the defence strategic planning process and capital based. As one of the goals of the ARF is to enhance transparency in strategic perceptions, defence planning and force structure, the seminar was a successful and timely exercise in underlining the rationale for, and importance of, credible defence policy documents.

The objectives for the seminar were:

• to provide a forum for regional defence planners to discuss the underlying considerations and the steps in the development of a range of defence policy documents;
• to encourage and enable ARF defence planners to develop defence policy documents that suit their needs; and
• to further enhance confidence, understanding and transparency among ARF nations.

The seminar was guided by Prof. Paul Dibb, as facilitator and Prof. Charles Newton, as academic director. It had a balance of theory and practical exercises. Guest presentations were given by senior officials from the Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Prime Minister and Cabinet, including the Chief of the Defence Force, ADM Chris Barrie. Senior presenters from Indonesia (MAJGEN Agus Widjojo), Thailand (MAJGEN Piti Kumpoopong), Malaysia (Cik Siti Azizah) and New Zealand (Secretary of Defence, Gerald Hensley) discussed their country's approaches to producing defence policy documents.

Much of the seminar program focussed on the methodology involved in producing defence policy documents. In addition to the presentations, delegates worked in syndicate groups to produce a skeleton white paper document. Syndicate groups gave presentations on various aspects of a white paper, such as the strategic environment, force structure priorities, alliances and regional/global issues. To make this exercise as realistic and interesting as possible, we used real countries, avoiding the Asia-Pacific region. This worked well.

The atmospherics of the seminar were very friendly and relaxed, with all delegates actively involved in syndicate discussions and presentations. Feedback was both positive and constructive. The mix of presentations and syndicate work proved successful, as did the focus on both the content of policy documents and the process involved in their production. We were able to engage participants intensively on the issues underpinning the production of defence policy documents and gave them much to think about.

A report on the seminar will be made, in conjunction with Malaysia, to the next meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures. This is to take place in Honolulu in November this year.

Belinda Moss
Director,
Multilateral Engagement Management,
Department of Defence

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

FIRES, HAZE AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Discussions about security and stability in Southeast Asia have tended to focus on the economic crisis, social tension, election outcomes and political change. Environmental problems have been less to the fore. Yet events such as the most recent (1997/98) haze episode have been disruptive of economic and human security in the region and a source of tension among ASEAN neighbours. The problem has been exacerbated by the economic crisis and has raised questions about the ability of ASEAN to address severe transboundary problems.

The 'haze' problem (the air-borne dissemination of fine particulate matter) has its source in the fires which have been burning out of control in the forest and grasslands (as well as the peat and coal seams) of Kalimantan and Sumatra. While the haze events have coincided with and have been exacerbated by the prolonged dry periods which accompany El Nino they are not natural disasters. Many of them have been illegally lit on plantation and forestry concessions. Although burning for land-clearing was banned in Indonesia in 1995, fire remains the cheapest way to dispose of forest waste (including wood) once timber resources have been extracted to clear land for plantation crops. Economic factors are important. The Indonesian government is keen to establish the country as a major producer of palmoil and wood pulp and while the costs are met in Rupiah, the returns are often in US dollars. Further pressures on land arise as unemployed urban dwellers return to rural areas and as smallholders cultivate more land as a risk-averse strategy against food insecurity in times of drought and economic hardship. Fewer resources are available to regional authorities and local communities to fight the fires or address their consequences.

The fires were geographically confined, for the most part, to Indonesia, but the impacts have been felt in the health, economic and ecological sectors in other countries in the region. The haze spread to Malaysia, to Singapore, to Brunei and to a lesser extent to Southern Thailand and to Mindanao and Palawan in the Philippines. Air pollutant indexes reached hazardous levels not only in Indonesia but also in Malaysia, Singapore and parts of Thailand. The health impacts include increased respiratory disease, impaired lung function, cardiac disease, and eye and skin irritation as well as the costs associated with short and long-term treatment of such illnesses. The economic sectors affected, often quite severely, include air, land and shipping transport; construction; tourism; forestry and agriculture. The ecological costs are also extensive: increased contributions to global greenhouse emissions, soil erosion; damage to protected sites, species and vulnerable ecosystems. Recent studies suggest that the direct and indirect costs to ASEAN economies may total some billions of dollars at a time when regional economies are facing other severe challenges.

Regional responses to the problem have been coordinated under ASEAN. The ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution, adopted in 1995, established broad policies and strategies to address transboundary air pollution including fire-sourced pollution. In December 1997, the ASEAN countries agreed to a Regional Haze Action Plan and the calendar of regional meetings on haze is a full one: the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment Haze Technical Task Force meets once every six weeks; ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Haze have been convened every two months; there is also now a series of meetings on ASEAN Sub-Regional Fire-fighting Arrangements, on National Haze Action Plans and on the Asian Development Bank's Regional Technical Assistance Project.

Despite what is, on the surface, a detailed framework of programs, projects and plans, success in meeting the fires/haze challenge has been minimal, because of limited resources and expertise, political and administrative constraints and a lack of capacity (and sometimes willingness) to enforce existing law. ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo Severino, has noted that 'the international community ... our own governments and peoples have come to consider the haze as a major test of ASEAN's capacity to work together'. But ASEAN generally has a poor record on environmental conflict resolution and it has not responded well to the haze issue.

The haze problem, and the slow response to it, has contributed to tension between neighbouring ASEAN countries. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have expressed varying levels of concern about the economic and social impact of the haze and the apparent inability (or even unwillingness) of the Indonesian government to do much about it. Former President Suharto twice apologised to his regional neighbours for the impact of the fires. There are reports that Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore have filed complaints with Indonesia's Agency for Environmental Control and that Thailand has considered suing the Indonesian government for loss of tourism revenue. Recent discussions within ASEAN about constructive intervention or flexible engagement, and the need for more 'proactive' regional policy-making, were motivated in part by concerns over the transboundary implications of the fires and haze.

The recent 12th Asia-Pacific RoundTable in Kuala Lumpur, which took the theme of Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction, devoted a full session to the 'haze' issue. Presenters made it clear that this is a serious regional problem which has a political as well as environmental and economic dimension. Addressing the fires and haze issue as a long-term problem in the region (and the problem will not go away despite the easing of El Nino) will contribute to regional confidence building and is directly relevant to CSCAP's concern with comprehensive security.

Lorraine Elliott
Dept. of Political Science,
Australian National University

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

WORKSHOP ON HUMAN SECURITY

The forces of international change are demanding that our traditional ways of thinking about security be reconsidered and that a broadening of traditional security paradigms is now required. Acknowledging this trend, AUS-CSCAP recently co-sponsored a workshop on 'Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling "Traditional" and "Human" Security" to weigh the argument that the idea of 'national security' is no longer sufficient to address the needs and aspirations of individual human beings and to explore alternative concepts and postures that might address this imperative more effectively. The workshop convened in Canberra during 31-August/1 September 1998 and again in Brisbane during 3-4 September. Regional scholars and experts were invited to address how the 'human security' concept applies to various Asia-Pacific and international developments.

Several major themes emerging from the papers and discussion emerging from the workshop. Reaching a consensus over what 'human' security is will not be achieved rapidly or easily. Different interest-groups will vie to be included in future efforts to implement the concept. This may be achieved through 'learning' (perhaps implemented by groups of elites and experts or 'epistemic communities') or through achieving a wide consensus on the need to uphold certain values or to achieve designated tasks. Yet any implementation of human security will be further complicated by the reality that it is as often driven by 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' forces and processes, with grass-roots movements pressuring otherwise indifferent or insensitive elites to incorporate their agendas into their policy-making agendas. The question of who will - or should - exercise the human security franchise will be integral to shaping its overall impact and effectiveness.

Debate also focused on structural concerns, or what international relations theorists would term 'the levels of analysis question'. Is human security pursued within an exclusively multilateral security environment or can specific bilateral ties (i.e. U.S. security relationships with various Asia-Pacific states) facilitate its advancement? Or is human security more 'holistic' in nature, with increasingly universal ideas of 'civil society' and 'interdependence' rendering traditional demarcations between 'domestic' and 'international' or 'systemic' security problems less relevant? Some participants rejected this notion, arguing that states remained critical agents in implementing and enforcing standards and mechanisms designed to overcome functional challenges to human prosperity and welfare such as narcotics traffic, environmental degradation and terrorism. States (and especially so-called 'middle powers') are best able to identify niche policy areas and to direct resources toward fulfilling them. Others were convinced that sovereignty and human security were basically incompatible ideas, as the security referent gradually shifts from the state to the individual. In this context, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are destined to play a greater role as conduits between individuals concerns and priorities and the international community's willingness and ability to respond. Specific 'case studies' considered by the workshop in this regard included the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel land mines (APL) and the 1996 Canberra Commission's arguments for replacing traditional postwar nuclear deterrence postulates with arrangements for achieving complete nuclear disarmament.

The role of regional organisations - more specifically the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum ('the ARF') were also assessed as potential human security actors. General conclusions about these groupings were not optimistic. Most regional analysts who spoke in Brisbane lamented the loss of momentum possibly suffered by these organisations in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and as a result of increasing domestic political turmoil in several key ASEAN states (i.e. Indonesia and Malaysia). Both developing Asian countries and those with more advanced industrialised and service sectors are experiencing difficulties in reconciling their traditional reliance on strong central organs which have largely underwritten their postwar de-colonisation and national security with the aspirations of increasing middle class pressures to emphasise individual benefits and prerogatives over the collective interests embodied by past state policies. The struggle over how to define and sustain political legitimacy is thus intensifying throughout South-east Asian societies and the greater Asia-Pacific region. This often makes the receptivity and assimilation of 'global' values which human security advocates assert are becoming more self-evident and urgent, more difficult for these societies.

The quality of discussion was consistently high throughout the proceedings. As is usually the case in such instances, far more questions were raised than answers reached. However, the key factors which related to a relatively new, albeit highly important mode of analysing security problems, were given a fair and comprehensive hearing. The conference organisers are currently negotiating with the United Nations University Press to publish the workshop papers. AUS-CSCAP is especially grateful to The Japan Foundation and to Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for providing critical financial support to this project. The conference organisers also wish to express their appreciation to Dr Rikki Kirsten and Professor Joe Camilleri who attended the Brisbane session as formal CSCAP representatives and to Korea University's Ilmin International Relations Institute for sending a special delegation to the workshop as part of DFAT's 'Australia-Asia Linkages Program'. Other workshop co-sponsors were the Australian Defence Force Academy's Defence Studies Centre; the University of Queensland's International Relations and Asian Politics Research Unit (IRAPRU); and Griffith University's Centre for the Study of Australian Asia Relations (CSAAR).

William Tow
Director,
International Relations and Asian Politics Research Unit,
Queensland University

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION

Like a pebble dropped into a pond the depreciation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 spread its ripples with remarkable speed through to the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and then to South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Though less direct or immediate, the impact on China and Japan and Russia - and in due course on Australia, Canada and even the United States - may prove to be quite substantial. This, then, was no series of isolated or discrete national crises, but the result of a number of connecting mechanisms, which collectively constitute a powerful transmission belt helping to spread the disease from one country to another, and its effects from one region to another.

Accentuating the crisis has been the absence of a timely or coherent regional response. The Malaysian government was the most vocal in calling for the establishment of an Asian fund specifically designed to meet the needs of Asian economies and currencies. In the wake of vehement US opposition, ASEAN adopted in December 1997 a substantially diluted proposal, which provided for the creation of a fund mobilised from private capital and subjected to market principles and to IMF regulations. In February 1998 ASEAN also agreed to the establishment of a regional surveillance agency to provide early warning of deteriorating economic or financial conditions, which would be initially run within the Asian Development Bank before being handed over to the ASEAN secretariat. These tentative steps were, however, late in coming and would take considerable time to implement. They were more an attempt to project an image of continuing relevance and cohesion than an effective remedy for the crisis at hand.

If regional leadership were to have been exercised in response to the crisis, the only possible candidate would have been Japan. It certainly had the incentive given the exposure of its banks and manufacturing firms to the ill winds blowing across East Asia's economies. Although it accounts for only a small fraction of total Japanese production, Asia absorbed some 44 per cent of Japan's exports (compared with 30 per cent for the United States and 9 per cent for the European Union). Equally troublesome was the extent to which Japanese banks had financed East Asia's mounting external private debt. According to one calculation Japan accounted for $69.3 billion in outstanding loans to the ASEAN-4, or 46 per cent of their combined debts.

Yet incentive did not easily translate into capability, which is not to say that the Hashimoto Government was inactive during the crisis. Of the $17.2 billion loan to Thailand coordinated by the IMF in early August Japan's Export-Import (EXIM) Bank had contributed $4 billion. In response to external criticism, Tokyo claimed that its financial support for Indonesia, Thailand and Korea amounted to $19 billion compared to $8 billion offered by the Untied States and $6.2 billion by the EU. In addition, Japan provided flexible application of trade insurance to facilitate private sector activities, emergency grant aid valued at 4 billion yen, as well as assistance to Asian students in Japan.

Asian governments remained nevertheless deeply dissatisfied. What they wanted first and foremost was greater access to Japanese markets, and massive pump-priming of Japan's stagnant economy through tax cuts and increased public spending. Tokyo's response, constrained by domestic political and economic circumstances, fell far short of Asian expectations. Japan's failure to withstand US pressure and proceed with the establishment of an Asian fund independent of the IMF also provoked deep disappointment, as did the refusal of Japanese banks to entertain requests for a temporary moratorium on loan repayments. Japan, it seemed lacked the institutional and political capacity to initiate, let alone coordinate, a viable recovery plan.

China, for its part, attempted to demonstrate its Asian credentials by contributing $1 billion to the IMF rescue package (in addition to the $1 billion pledged by Hong Kong), by expressing its readiness to explore investment opportunities in Southeast Asia, and most importantly by pledging not to devalue the yuan and keeping the Hong Kong dollar tied to the US dollar. Yet China too, preoccupied with its troubled state sector, manufacturing overcapacity, and weakening demand, could offer limited assistance.

In the absence of more palatable alternatives, the worst hit economies turned for assistance to the IMF. Financial packages were made available to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea conditional on their willingness to implement tight fiscal and monetary policy, labour market reforms, faster, trade liberalisation, greater transparency of financial transactions, and relaxation of foreign investment controls to allow for greater foreign ownership. The IMF's intervention proved highly controversial, accelerating the economic downturn, and exacerbating social and economic tensions.

Within a few months of being prescribed, the IMF medicine had contributed to the doubling of Thailand's and Indonesia's unemployment rates. South Korea's rose from 2.3 per cent in October 1997 to 6.7 per cent in March 1998. As for the suspension or closure of financial firms, though it may have helped to contain unproductive speculation in real estate, it also deprived small and medium-sized business of access to much needed funds, thereby provoking further business bankruptcies. The danger now was that the economies in receipt of IMF largesse - but also others by dint of the spill-over effect - would experience a deep and prolonged recession.

The IMF's intervention had punctured East Asia's self-confidence and sense of achievement. Nothing could have been more revealing than the photo of President Suharto signing on the dotted line with Michael Candessus, the IMF's Managing Director, imperiously looking over his shoulder. The same symbolism was expressed in the IMF's demand that the agreement negotiated with the South Korean Government be formally endorsed by all three presidential candidates prior to the 1997 December elections. Even Malaysia, which pointedly refrained from seeking IMF assistance, nevertheless implemented a programme of reforms strikingly similar to those imposed by the IMF on other East Asian economies. Michael Camdessus is reported to have advised Deputy prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim that Malaysia needed to tone down its "political rhetoric" and implement painful measures to restore confidence as "soon as possible". The subsequent rift between Mahathir and Anwar and the ensuing political crisis provide an apt reminder of the close connection between economic vulnerability and political instability.

It is, of course, entirely possible that the United States will itself fall victim to the East Asian virus. With Asian producers attempting to offset weak domestic demand by increased exports, greatly facilitated by weaker currencies, there is every prospect that the US current account deficit which reached $178 billion in 1997, will increase this year by between $50 billion and $100 billion. The net effect would be slower economic growth and increased unemployment in the United States, compounded by downward pressure on corporate profits, and a probable fall in stock prices. Adding to this pressure are the difficult circumstances of Japanese financial institutions. Having acquired large quantities of US treasury bonds during the preceding decade, they might now have to sell these bonds to cover their financial losses at home and in East Asia. The ensuing fall in US stock prices as well as bond prices could adversely affect US consumption, which could in turn accelerate the downward pressure on share prices, and provoke a deflationary spiral both in the domestic and international markets. Large and dynamic though it is, the US economy cannot be insulated from the consequences of globalisation.

The unmistakable lesson of the crisis is that East Asia - or to be more precise Asia Pacific - will increasingly have to turn to regional solutions if it is to surmount the problems which currently beset its ailing economies. The inability of the great powers - each for different reasons - to exercise effective leadership and initiate a concerted response to the crisis merely serves to reinforce this lesson. It is equally clear, however, that neither ASEAN nor APEC has as of now the inclination or capacity to perform an effective coordinating role. On the other hand, should the crisis continue to deepen, the consequences will be severe as much for internal political stability as for regional security. The East Asian crisis will have not been in vain if it stimulates among policy makers, scholars and citizens generally a renewed commitment to building in this region better structured and better resourced multilateral institutions attuned to local needs and local circumstances. Regional institution building remains a key objective.

Joseph A Camilleri
Professor of Politics,
La Trobe University

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

AUS-CSCAP SPONSOR: TENIX DEFENCE SYSTEMS

Tenix Defence Systems (TDS) is a shipbuilding and defence systems company that forms part of Australia's largest defence and high technology contractor, the Tenix Group. TDS is a foundation sponsor of AUS CSCAP.

TDS has long recognised that Australia's security is intrinsically linked to the broader Asia-Pacific region and has over many years participated in forums that seek to better understand the strategic and security dynamics of the region. The company also understands the need for close cooperation between industry, government and academia in developing public understanding of national security issues and in promoting Australia's interests further afield.

TDS is also aware of the critical importance to Australia of working through such conduits, as the ADF and Australian Defence industry to have the country perceived as being actively engaged in the region. This being particularly so during times of economic and other uncertainty. In this respect the company is working closely with various aid agencies in developing essential maritime search and rescue capabilities in both the Philippines and Indonesia, and in assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines to develop the conceptual basis for force development to meet its needs in protecting its vital national maritime interests. To meet these needs it has recently opened an office in Manila.

Rather then seeing the present economic crisis as a time for withdrawal, the company as a result of its longstanding business involvement in the Asia-Pacific sees the future in a very positive light and recognises the opportunity provided by the crisis to cement Australia's role as a valuable partner across all facets of our relationships with our Asian neighbours.

Dick Sherwood
Strategic Planning,
Tenix

Back to Table of Contents
Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

CSCAP WORKING GROUP ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

The 3rd Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime was held in Manila on 23/24 May 1998. The meeting was attended by a total of 59 people from eleven countries, together with a participant from Taiwan.

Keynote Address

The Keynote Address at the meeting was given by the Secretary of the Philippine Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chairman of the National Police Commission, the Hon. Epimaco Velasco, who emphasised that, in the post-Cold War environment, transnational crime, in its various manifestations, has emerged as "an extremely dangerous and subversive" trend in the regional security agenda.

Papers Delivered at the Meeting

The meeting received and discussed presentations on the following themes:

• Overview of Transnational Crime
• 
  -Transnational Crime as a Security Issue
  - Crime in a Shrinking World
  - Factors Contributing to the Expansion or Containment of Transnational Crime within the Region
  
• Impact of Transnational Crime and Efforts Towards Prevention
• 
  - International Cooperation Against Transnational Organised Crime - How Can We Fight 21st Century Crime?
  - Multinational Initiatives to Combat Transnational Crime
  
• Drug Trafficking
• 
  - Drug Trafficking and Regional Security
  - Drug Trafficking: The New Threat to Russia from the East
  
• Money Laundering
• 
  - Money Laundering Methodologies and International and Regional Countermeasures
  
• Weapon Smuggling
• 
  - Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons
  - Proliferation of Small Guns and Its Impact on Regional Security: A Perspective from the Philippines
  
• Terrorism
• 
  - Overview on Terrorism in Southeast Asia
  - Terrorism in the Philippines and Its Impact on Regional Security
  
• Illegal Immigration
• 
  - Background Issues in Illegal Immigration
  
• Technology Crime
• 
  - Crime in Cyberspace: Trends in Computer Crime
  The Working Group will now take early action to publish a number of these papers as a CSCAP book.
  Recent Regional and International Initiatives Against Transnational Crime
  The meeting was held against the background of a number of regional and international initiatives relating to the threat of transnational crime, in its various manifestations. These initiatives include:
  • 
    
  • The expressed desire of the ASEAN Ministers, at the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Jakarta in July 1996, to consider "the question of drug trafficking and related transnational issues, such as economic crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute threats to the security of the countries of the region";
    
  • The ASEAN Ministers' Declaration on Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila on 20 December 1997;
  • The Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime, concluded in Manila on 25 March 1998;
  • The ongoing work of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering;
  • The United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, concluded in New York in December 1996, and the related Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, concluded in Paris on 17 December 1997;
  • The G8 Statement on Drugs and International Crime, issued at the end of the G8 Summit Meeting in Birmingham, United Kingdom, on 17 May 1998.
  • The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on International Drug Control, held in New York from 8 - 10 June 1998;
  • The work of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice on drafting a Convention Against Organised Transnational Crime;
  • The discussions on the establishment of an International Criminal Court to deal with such issues as crimes against humanity.

  
  Outcomes
  The main outcomes of the meeting included:

  • 
    
  • The importance of encouraging cooperation against the common threat of transnational crime, which affects all countries in the region. It was agreed that as the threat is trans-jurisdictional and increasing in complexity and impact, no state can effectively counter this threat alone;
  • Although more research needs to be undertaken to understand the key drivers behind the expansion or containment of transnational crime within the region, CSCAP can provide a valuable service to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the regional political leadership generally in explaining the nature and impact of the transnational crime threat, in contributing towards the development of policy responses and encouraging the harmonisation of criminal law amongst the nations of the region;
  • For the first time, the Working Group considered the issue of terrorism within the region and noted that in addition to the familiar political, secessionist and religious issues motivating various terrorist activity within the region, there is evidence of terrorism arising out of the break-down of state law and order, and also narcotics trafficking being used in support of the objectives behind terrorist groups;
  • Illegal immigration is a complex human security problem associated with which there is frequently a serious criminal connection, in relation to such issues as transnational drug trafficking, so-called sexual slavery, counterfeit documentation, and so on;
  • Computer crime is an increasing threat to the regional banking and finance sector, as well as the revolution in document counterfeiting, gambling, fraud and sexually-related commerce;
  • All countries face the problem of corruption, which facilitates and complicates attempts to deal with the transnational crime threat within the region.

  
  Next Meeting

  Having now provided a general overview of most of the transnational crime types potentially affecting the security and stability of the region, at its 4th Meeting the Working Group will concentrate on two regional themes: the trafficking in small arms; and the production, trafficking and growth in abuse of synthetic drugs. However, at the suggestion of AUS-CSCAP, a short workshop on the impact of the Asian financial crisis on transnational crime in the region will also be conducted.
  

  The meeting will be held at the Australian Institute of Police Management, Manly, between 11 - 13 October 1998.

  John McFarlane
  Australian Federal Police,
  ADFA

  Back to Table of Contents
  Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

  ---

  REPORT OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE CSCAP WORKING GROUP ON COMPREHENSIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY,
  WELLINGTON 14-15 JULY 1998

  ---

  Introduction

  Has Asian economic turbulence damaged the security structure that underpins regional peace and stability? This question, with emphasis on security cooperation, was the theme of the 5th Meeting of the track two Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security hosted by CSCAP-New Zealand. It built upon earlier work which had focussed on Comprehensive Security in the Group.

  The meeting attracted a near full house of East Asian participants (China, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei) as well as United States and New Zealand. North Korea participated for the first time, and Brunei for the first time offered a paper. A participant from Taiwan attended for the first occasion. Australia, Canada, Singapore, the Philippines, Russia, India and the European Union did not attend. The quality of the input and quiet enthusiasm of younger regional participants, contributed to a worthwhile discussion and good atmospherics.

  
  Economic Turbulence and Regional Security

  There was a general consensus that the regional economic turbulence has not adversely effected interstate political security relations. There was agreement that the economic crisis was longer and deeper than expected. CSCAP-China drew attention to the positive role of United States intervention which had stalled the devaluation of the Japanese Yen. Had the devaluation followed its natural course, the Chinese participant argued, the region would have faced a potentially more dangerous economic crisis than the currency crisis effecting South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

  The importance of recovery through export led growth was commented on by most participants. Few were optimistic that Japan would be willing or in a position to display leadership that would underpin such recovery especially by market opening. Several participants commented that the United States willingness to keep open its markets to the Asian exports would be the most important single contribution to regional security. Other participants, especially from South East Asia, while commending the constructive role played by the United States in the economic crisis were critical of American failure to dismantle trade barriers for agricultural goods. ASEAN participants identified further cooperation within APEC (between ASEAN states and New Zealand and Australia) as necessary to urge reform of United States (and Japanese) agricultural trade barriers.

  Several participants concurred that the economic crisis highlighted the importance of developing an early warning system for economic security. CSCAP China suggested that the UN might have a role in formulating response to the economic crisis. It had the potential to respond organisationally by forming ad hoc groups of economic advisers to present independent advice.

  
  Implications of Clinton Visit to China

  There was broad agreement from both the United States and Chinese participants that President Clinton's visit to China had been a success. Tensions between both countries had subsided to the point reached before the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, and perhaps even to the point reached before the Tiananmen Square incident. China would continue to voice its concerns over the strengthening of US led alliances formed in the Cold War. However as China's relations with the United States were positive it did not need, and was realistic enough not to expect, that the alliance led framework would be dismantled in the near future. Several East Asian participants, with the point made most strongly by Vietnam, emphasised that the presence of the United States forces was still useful in the context of the security of the region.

  Interestingly, the Chinese participant commended the idea of a possible development of a three-way political framework (China,US and Japan) as one outcome in cooperative security of the improved PRC-US relationship. Much would depend on the PRC Presidents' scheduled 1998 visit to Japan. But Chinese readiness to contemplate a trilateral framework, represents a modification of earlier reticence about this idea.

  Two alternatives to an alliance based security system were suggested. One sought to freeze the existing structure of alliances. The other suggested an adaptation of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) model of security organised as an arrangement, that served as a confidence building function, and that provided valuable joint military training to all participants but which did not have an enemy in mind. Such an arrangement builds cooperation among its members while avoiding the antagonising of neighbours. Not all participants were however, convinced of the relevance of the FPDA model.

  Settlement of the Taiwan issue was not likely to be achieved in early time. Reference was made to the idea (by Joseph Nye of Harvard) that the issue be simply set aside for 50 years. The Chinese participant suggested this was simply too long a pause as far as the PRC is concerned. President Clinton had been so informed by Beijing. Any regional cooperative security framework could not embrace the Taiwan issue.

  
  Role of ASEAN

  One participant observed that the economic crisis had sidelined ASEAN as a leader of multilateral security and predicted that ASEAN would be unable to play a role in managing the economic crisis. ASEAN participants, responded that ASEAN needed to be judged in its own terms. ASEAN was not a regional economic policy instrument. South East Asians insisted that ASEAN's capacity to remain relevant as an instrument of sub-regional political organisation would not be dented by the crisis. ASEAN's capacity to host intense personal diplomacy (300 meetings in 1997) would remain. The programming of meetings had already been streamlined and delegations trimmed. The ASEAN process would remain credible. ASEAN had, for example, played an important role in mobilising support within South East Asia for European assistance with the crisis.

  A Taiwanese suggestion that the APEC agenda ought to be widened to include security issues was resisted by ASEAN participants. ARF operated at foreign minister and senior official level unlike APEC which remained a forum for heads of state. Attention was drawn to ARF's record as the region's only security dialogue mechanism with a proven capacity for political cooperation. Besides involvement with the South China Seas issue, a claim was made for the ASEAN role in improving US-China relations after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996.

  Land Border Confidence Building Measures

  The Chinese paper (authored by a principal negotiator of Beijing's border Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with New Delhi) described the CBMs agreed by China with its neighbours in the Central Asian Republics, Mongolia, Russia and India. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese papers examined the prospects of applying this model for border CBMs elsewhere in East Asia. This CBM model had worked well, was accepted as relevant by the parties concerned, and had weathered various storms. Further development of this model was noted. China and Vietnam are currently negotiating CBMs covering their shared land border. Vietnam is negotiating with Laos and Cambodia the form border CBMs may take. China's past, and unsuccessful, efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to consider CBMs covering their border (not restricted to Kashmir) was described. The prospects for adapting the Chinese CBM model to the Taiwan Straits and to the border separating the Korea's was discussed. Participants from these states agreed that sovereignty issues and the political sensitivities precluded further examination of these ideas in the short term. The Russian idea of "shelving disputes", for instance on the Northern Islands with Japan, was supported by the Chinese participant as a potential model that could be applied on the Nansha Islands in the South China Seas. This was possibly the only model that could apply to the India-China border according to the Chinese participant

  South Asia

  There was general agreement that India and Pakistan's nuclear tests had not destabilised the security of South Asia. China and India's relations were however noted to have been severley damaged by the tests. Trust between India and China had eroded. China had been hurt both by Indian accusations that Beijing continued to supply Pakistan with military nuclear technology (this support had ceased in the early 1990s China's participant insisted), the identification of China as a threat, and by the actual tests themselves. While trust between both countries was damaged participants predicted that both China and India would act responsibly on this issue in the future. It was suggested that the tests did not interfere with the generally smooth running of border CBMs between China and India. While the prospects of high level talks were assessed as being slight, China's participant mentioned that Beijing and New Delhi were both currently engaged in negotiations towards a joint no-first use policy.

  The ARF was identified as the only multilateral regional security institution with potential capacity to play a constructive role in rebuilding high level trust and personal linkages between India and China at the political level. The unwillingness of the SAARC to touch on issues of contention between states suggested that this institution would probably not play a role.

  Terence O'Brien
  Workshop Co-Chair

  Back to Table of Contents
  Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

  ---

  CSCAP CSBMs WORKING GROUP MEETING, WASHINGTON DC 7-9 MAY 1998

  ---

  The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) International Working Group (IWG) on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) met for the eighth time on 7-9 May, 1998 in Washington DC. During this session, participants from 15 member committees plus the United Nations and Taiwan built upon the Working Group's earlier efforts to identify, define, and promote regional CSBMs associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Working Group members examined various approaches and options for addressing regional concerns, suspicions, and misunderstandings about nuclear energy programs. These include concerns about the safety of nuclear energy production and research operations, the potential downsides and dangers associated with reprocessing, spent fuel and other nuclear waste storage and disposal challenges, questions regarding the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials, and general suspicions about nuclear weapons applications and proliferation.

  A wide-ranging list of potential CSBMs had been developed at the October 1997 CSBM Meeting in Fukushima, Japan. This session's objective was to build upon that work by investigating some of those suggestions in greater detail. A range of other options and approaches were also examined, beginning with maintaining the status quo (i.e., working through existing regimes, perhaps with incremental changes or improvements) and including, at the other extreme, the creation of a formal governmental (or at least semi-official) PACATOM mechanism.

  Most appeared to agree that a status quo or incremental approach alone was not a satisfying option for addressing security problems associated with nuclear energy. In addition, while there may be some virtues in institution building (especially in approaching back end of the fuel cycle problems), funding concerns are a problem, particularly given the financial crisis. As a result, a formal, institutionalized PACATOM still seems premature.

  Working Group members did agree that greater transparency of existing facilities and operations is needed, along with greater awareness of the many efforts already underway to promote nuclear energy cooperation. It is in these areas that the CSBM Working Group makes its greatest immediate contribution. Participants agreed that the CSBM Working Group should take the lead in developing a comprehensive inventory of current organizations, programs, and initiatives that already address nuclear energy-related challenges and concerns, in order to understand what institutions and processes--whether multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral--are tackling what parts of the problem.

  The Working Group also endorsed continued transparency efforts such as last year's CSBM Working Group visit to Fukushima nuclear power station and called upon other member committees to approach their governments about conducting similar tours at their facilities. The feasibility of establishing a "Statement of Principles Relating to Nuclear Energy Research and Production in the Asia Pacific" was also discussed, as was the possibility of developing a generic Nuclear Energy White Paper to promote greater transparency among nuclear energy producers.

  In sum, the Washington meeting provided participants with new insights into the nature and complexity of nuclear energy- related problems and concerns. The discussions reinforced the need for greater awareness among Asia Pacific policy makers of the potential problems and the need for imaginative cooperative approaches toward addressing them. While the creation of a formal PACATOM institution remains premature, much needs to be done to increase transparency and promote confidence in the region. The states of the region, individually and collectively, must do more to deal with common problems such as spent fuel management, storage, and disposal and regional apprehensions about the safety and security of nuclear energy production, research, and reprocessing activities. As a result, the CSCAP Working Group proposes to continue its efforts first to identify and articulate nuclear energy-related concerns and then to identify and help develop confidence building measures aimed at reducing these concerns while also setting the stage for more formalized multilateral cooperation in the future.

  Ralph Cossa
  Workshop Co-Chair

  Back to Table of Contents
  Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

  ---

  DEFENCE STUDIES PROGRAM AT DEAKIN UNIVERSITY

  ---

  Deakin University has been teaching postgraduate courses in Defence Studies (Master of Defence Studies, Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate in Defence Studies) since 1990. Since then it has established an excellent reputation in this field both nationally and internationally and attracted students of very high calibre from military and civilian backgrounds who have gone on to serve in important policy planning positions. Nearly 300 students have graduated from the program including 18 foreign students from New Zealand, PNG, Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia. The Program offers a number of courses dealing with international and regional security: Conflict Management, Security Studies, Technology and War, Principles of Policy Studies, United Nations, Refugees in Global Politics, Australia and Asia, Australian Defence Policy, Australia's Wars, International Humanitarian Law, European Security Issues, and Asian Defence Policies. Defence Studies Program has one of Australia's largest and most committed Defence Studies Staff. Program Director is Dr Mohan Malik.

  Recent publications by the staff include Contemporary Security and Strategy (Macmillan 1999), Australia's Security in the 21st Century (Allen & Unwin 1998), The Future Battlefield (Deakin University Press, 1997), Australia and Asia (Oxford University Press 1997), Australia in the World (OUP 1996), Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australia's Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin 1997), Theories of International Relations (Macmillan 1996), Australia's War 1939-45, Australia's War 1914-18 (Allen & Unwin 1996) and Asian Defence Policies (DUP 1994). Information about the Program can be obtained from the Internet http://arts.deakin.edu.au/sais/courses/Postgrad_Programs/Defence/default.HTM.

  Dr Mohan Malik
  Defence Studies Centre,
  Deakin University

  Back to Table of Contents
  Back to AUS-CSCAP Home Page

  ---

  This WWW server is provided by the Coombs Computing Unit, Research Schools of Social Sciences & Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra.

  Maintainer: Lesley McCulloch (auscscap@anu.edu.au), ANU, Canberra

  Copyright & copy; 1998 by Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. This Web page may be linked to any other Web pages. Contents may not be altered.

  URL Auscnws6.html

  [ Asian Studies WWW VL ] [ Coombsweb ] [ Social Sciences WWW WL]